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Abstract 
 
Performance-based approaches to managing water quality on agricultural landscapes offer the 
potential to improve the effectiveness of water quality outcomes compared to current practice-
based approaches. Performance-based approaches, however, require varying degrees of precise 
measures or modeling of water quality and differentiated payment structures to achieve these 
effective outcomes.  
The potential to implement performance-based approaches for water quality management on 
agricultural landscapes was assessed through three broad objectives: 1) review and evaluate 
performance-based approaches used for a similar purpose in other jurisdictions; 2) assess the 
social context of the study region of southwest Alberta, with the intention that this region would 
serve as a test case for implementing performance-based approaches; and 3) determine the 
suitability of performance-based approaches for the study region based on social and institutional 
context. 
Several performance-based approaches were identified through the review and evaluation of 
approaches that have been implemented elsewhere, these were: water quality trading, 
differentiated payments for ecological goods and services, cross-compliance, and emissions 
charges. The drivers and enabling conditions were evaluated and social and institutional factors 
were often important for the social, environmental, and/or economic successes of the approaches. 
The social context, or social norms and values, related to agriculture and water quality within the 
study region was assessed using interviews with watershed landowners and surveys with rural 
and urban residents. Respondents were generally in favour of a combination of polluter pays and 
beneficiary pays principles. Implementation of an environmental standard of care was a common 
suggestion; agricultural landowners who achieved water quality beyond the standard could be 
eligible for incremental payments based on water quality improvement. Suitability of 
performance-based approaches to the social and institutional context of the study region revealed 
that a suite of measures may be required to align with social norms and values. Cross-compliance 
and differentiated payments for ecological goods and services were two approaches that provided 
a suitable mix of polluter pays and beneficiary pays principles; however, institutional barriers 
exist to implementing these approaches. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING PERFORMANCE-BASED APPROACHES FOR 
MANAGING WATER QUALITY ON AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPES 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Canada is experiencing a time of potential change in the development of agri-environmental 
policy. Policy makers have recognized the importance of including ecological goods and services 
(EG&S) into policy decisions and a number of pilot projects are currently underway that 
encourage the production of EG&S through payments to landowners, the results of which are 
likely to guide future agri-environmental policy decisions at the federal and provincial levels 
(AAFC 2006, 2008). Ecological goods and services "represent the benefits human populations 
derive, directly or indirectly, from ecosystem functions" (Costanza et al. 1997). Ecological goods 
and services encompass both benefits valued by markets (such as food and fibre) and benefits 
that do not have a monetary value (such as nutrient cycling, water filtration, and aesthetic values) 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Within this thesis, the discussion of EG&S will be 
limited to those goods and services that are not currently valued by markets. 
The Canadian government has implemented and maintained a conventional, practice-based 
approach to agri-environmental policy to date, which pays landowners to adopt sustainable 
farming practices regardless of the environmental outcome, or provision of EG&S that actually 
occurs (AAFC 2011). This creates dissonance; there is government acknowledgement of the 
importance of EG&S, but program offerings for agricultural producers do not support a focus on 
the production EG&S as the basis for the level of payment or cost-sharing provided. An 
alternative to these current approaches that focus on inputs and practices is a performance-based 
approach to EG&S provision that pays or penalizes landowners based on environmental output.  
Practice-based approaches have resulted in some small improvements to water quality; however, 
on agricultural landscapes, water pollutant levels often exceed guidelines for protection of 
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aquatic life and water quality overall in Canada has actually decreased over the past 25 years 
(Environment Canada 2010; Eilers et al. 2010). Events such as the Walkerton tragedy in Ontario 
where several deaths occurred1 (Justice O'Connor 2002), and the large algal blooms that have 
spread over Lake Winnipeg2 (Environment Canada 2010) have put a spotlight on the potential 
for serious harm from agricultural pollution. These major events, as well as the broader 
indications of inadequate water quality on agricultural landscapes, indicate that the current policy 
approach to agricultural water pollution is not effective. A new approach may be required - an 
approach that focuses on outcomes rather than on inputs - that has the capacity to address areas 
of particular concern. 
Performance-based approaches, in the context of agri-environmental policy, can be broadly 
defined as approaches that pay or penalize agricultural producers based on some measure of 
environmental outcome and not on inputs or practices (Keeney and Boody 2005; Weinberg and 
Claassen 2006). Measurement of outcomes may be based on models or monitoring, and 
payments or penalties are conditional upon outcome delivery (Wunder et al. 2008; Lowell et al. 
2007). Performance-based approaches have been implemented in several other regions, such as 
the United States and Europe, but have been left largely unexplored by Canadian policy makers. 
However, performance-based approaches hold the potential to provide greater environmental, 
social, and/or economic benefits than the practice-based approach (Winsten 2009; Weinberg and 
Claassen 2006), and warrant further investigation in the Canadian context.  
 
1.2 Theoretical and conceptual perspective 
 
The role of environmental policy, broadly, is to achieve environmental objectives at the least cost 
(Horan and Ribaudo 1999). When placed within the context of EG&S and agriculture, the role of 
agri-environmental policy is to ensure the provision of EG&S where markets do not provide 
them. Current practice-based approaches for the provision of EG&S by agriculture are likely not 
                                                           
1
 Seven deaths and over 2200 illnesses were reported in Walkerton, Ontario in 2000 as a result of inadequately 
treated drinking water that had been contaminated by agricultural pollutants via runoff. 
2
 The algal blooms on Lake Winnipeg in Manitoba have been largely attributed to high levels of phosphorus from 
manure contamination. The conditions for aquatic life have been compromised in large areas of the lake (up to 
13,000 km2). 
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the most efficient means to provide EG&S, as the link between practice adoption and outcomes 
is uncertain due to variations in climate, topography, land location, and other agricultural 
practices having an influence on EG&S outcomes. 
Performance-based approaches are structured around payments or penalties based on 
environmental quality, that is, the focus of these approaches are on the outcomes provided by the 
changes to management practices, rather than on the management practices themselves (Claassen 
et al. 2001). This type of approach is generally touted as more flexible for program participants 
and potentially more efficient in terms of payments or penalties that are more closely related to 
actual or modeled environmental outcomes (Wätzold and Dreschler 2005; Claassen et al. 2001; 
Weinberg and Claassen 2006). For example, where the goal is to reduce agricultural pollutants 
travelling to a water body, some agricultural producers may enhance riparian buffer areas, while 
others may decide to alter timing or method of soil fertilization. Under a performance-based 
approach, all of these producers would be paid according to their individual impact on water 
quality, giving them the option to choose their practices with the knowledge of the expected 
outcome and resulting payment. However, performance-based approaches are prone to 
difficulties in measurement - particularly where non-point source pollution occurs - and there is 
resulting unpredictability in environmental outcomes, and associated risks to program providers 
and participants (Weinberg and Claassen 2006). Despite the challenges associated with 
implementing performance-based approaches, they offer the potential to improve efficiency of 
programs aiming to enhance the delivery of EG&S from agricultural landscapes (Weinberg and 
Claassen 2006), presenting a policy opportunity for Canada. 
Performance-based approaches may provide more than double the environmental benefit than 
practice based approaches. A modeled comparison for water quality management on agricultural 
land in the United States was undertaken with $1 billion allocated for each program (Weinberg 
and Claassen 2006). The same amount of environmental improvement for $1 billion spent on 
practice-based approaches could be attained with $200 million with performance-based 
approaches, although the costs of water quality data collection and model development were not 
included in the analysis. Weinberg and Claassen (2006) attribute the large difference in part to 
producer flexibility in choosing the least-cost and most effective management practice to achieve 
environmental goals. The implementation of performance-based approaches, however, requires 
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the development of mechanisms to measure or predict water quality impacts from agriculture, 
and payment or penalty schemes to reflect those impacts which can be very costly. Where 
performance-based approaches have been already developed, an opportunity exists to transfer 
them to a new jurisdiction thereby reducing the costs associated with policy development 
(Benson 2009). In the development and implementation of new performance-based policy, the 
process can be informed by understanding the nature and success of relevant policy applications 
in other jurisdictions. This process is broadly referred to as 'policy transfer' and it encompasses 
the transfer of policies, policy instruments, structures, and concepts (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). 
Policy transfer allows policy-makers to learn and apply lessons from other regions.  
The successful transfer of a policy approach from one jurisdiction to another is highly dependent 
upon the drivers and enabling conditions that constitute the relevant policy context (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 2000; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Mossberger and Wolman 2003). The 
social and institutional context have a particularly important role in assessing policy fit 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). The term 'institution' in the literature refers to both the formal and 
informal rules of society (e.g., North 1990; Roland 2004) and this definition is not disputed; 
however, within this thesis, the term 'institution' is used to describe the formal rules and 
organizations that govern society, while the term 'social context' refers to the informal rules of 
social norms and values to which society adheres. This distinction is used in order to separate the 
informal social context from the more formalized rules that govern society for analysis and 
discussion. With this distinction clear 'institutions', as defined for this thesis, provide the 
legislative and political framework for implementing and administering policy approaches. The 
prevailing social norms and values (social context) dictate how the policy approach will be 
perceived by society. Dwyer and Ellison (2009), in a review of recent policy transfer literature, 
emphasize the importance of understanding the context surrounding policies prior to policy 
transfer, and acknowledge that context is often undervalued in policy transfers. Given the 
importance of addressing context in policy transfers, and the potential for Canada to transfer 
performance-based approaches from other jurisdictions, an assessment of Canada's institutional 
and social context is required including (dis)similarity to other jurisdictions where performance-
based approaches have been implemented. A review of the literature revealed that there is a lack 
of data available describing social norms and values in Canada. This gap in the literature will be 
addressed within this thesis. 
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Transformations and resilience 
The potential for change to occur in Canadian agri-environmental policy represents an 
opportunity for a policy transformation; that is, the opportunity for policy to move from a state 
where environmental performance (production of EG&S) is not taken into account in payment 
schemes to a state where EG&S production becomes the focus. Transformations are described as 
opportunities for a policy transformation when the current paradigm becomes untenable (Walker 
et al. 2004). Opportunities for transformations, such as the shift from practice-based approaches 
to performance-based approaches, is dependent in large part upon the resilience of the current 
system. Resilience can be defined as the degree of resistance to change within the current system 
configuration, while maintaining the ability to reorganize as a result of disturbance (Walker et al. 
2002; Holling 2001). While resilience is a desirable quality in that it is a stable system that can 
manage shocks, a high level of resilience can be harmful where the current system is 
unsustainable, as it may reduce the potential to alter the system to a more sustainable 
configuration (Walker et al. 2002). For example, new policies that improve the sustainability of 
agriculture in terms of water quality may not be implemented as a result of the resilience of 
current policies demonstrated through strong support by the agricultural community and a 
resulting political unpalatability to change. The social context of a region may aid in identifying 
dissonance between social norms and values and the assumptions that underpin policy 
approaches. Where these are not aligned, social context may provide a good indicator of 
potential opportunities for policy transformation. 
1.3 Research purpose 
 
To date, the Canadian government has focused on practice-based approaches to EG&S provision 
in the design of agri-environmental policy. However, performance-based approaches should be 
considered as an alternative that could provide more efficient means to promote the production 
of EG&S. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate performance-based approaches to water 
quality policy for Alberta, Canada. This will be achieved using a policy transfer framework that 
follows the process of context assessment for fit including: recognition of a problem, source site 
selection, identification of key contextual factors involved, and finally evaluation of fit with the 
target region and recommendations (Hermans 2011).  
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1.4 Objectives 
 
The objectives of this research were to: 
i. Identify performance-based approaches to manage water quality on agricultural 
landscapes implemented in regions outside of the study region of southwest Alberta, and 
assess the drivers and enabling conditions of that implementation; 
ii. Assess the social norms and values of the study region related to agricultural landowners' 
rights and responsibilities for water quality; and 
iii. Synthesize the findings of objectives i and ii to evaluate the capacity of the study region 
to implement a performance-based approach, and provide recommendations based on 
contextual alignment of the study region to the host regions. 
1.5 Research methods overview 
 
Several methods were used to fulfill the objectives of the research project. The research approach 
is described in the process diagram below (Figure 1-1). First, a survey of the relevant literature 
was conducted to identify and describe existing agri-environmental performance-based 
approaches for water quality management. This search was bounded by institutional and 
developmental congruencies with the study region in southwest Alberta (Mossberger and 
Wolman 2003). The approaches were organized by measurement and payment structure; this 
created an organizational tool to select performance-based approaches that are best-suited to a 
region's institutional capacity for implementation and social context for each approach.  
An assessment of the social norms and values of the study region was conducted. This was a 
novel method to assess the potential to implement different policy approaches for the region. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted within the study watershed, and surveys with 
corresponding questions were sent to several communities (rural and urban) downstream from 
the study watershed. The surveys and interviews used Likert scales that rated the degree of 
agreement or disagreement to statements to evaluate agricultural landowner and public 
perceptions of agricultural producers' rights and responsibilities around water quality on 
agricultural landscapes (Rea and Parker 2005). Additional open-ended questions provided 
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opportunities for respondents to make comments. Open-ended responses proved useful in 
rationalizing many of the answers provided from the Likert scales.  
The responses to interviews and surveys were analyzed using NVivo 8 (QSR International, Inc.) 
for qualitative data and PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS, Inc) for quantitative data. Finally, a 
description of the social context of the study region (using the analyses from survey and 
interview responses) was created and compared to the contexts of other regions where 
performance-based approaches have been implemented. An assessment of similarity of contexts 
was conducted and a matrix was created to visually describe how closely the context of the study 
region and others were aligned (Sheate et al. 2008). Based on this assessment and a discussion of 
barriers to implementation for each performance-based approach, recommendations were 
provided for approaches that fit best within the social context of the study region. 
 
Figure 1-1. Process diagram of research methods 
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1.5.1 Research quality and validity 
The survey and interview data were collected using an instrument that was approved by the 
University of Saskatchewan Ethics Review Board. Surveys and interview questions were largely 
carried out using Likert scales; this format is widely used for the purpose of eliciting values or 
attitudes (Rea and Parker 2005; Gillham 2008). Every effort was made to minimize personal 
bias; however, I acknowledge that some bias based on personal experience and background is 
likely in the framing of questions and the interpretation of results. Despite this 
acknowledgement, a strong effort has been made throughout the study to fairly represent the 
results in analysis, interpretation, and application to the broader literature.  
Bounding the review of performance-based approaches was necessary to retain some degree of 
consistency in the purpose of the approach and institutional context between the study region and 
regions where these approaches were implemented. As a result, only those performance-based 
approaches implemented within the jurisdictional and institutional boundaries were reviewed. 
Bounding the review in this way presented a limitation in the type of literature available. Most of 
the performance-based approaches identified were implemented as a result of pilot projects or 
were relatively new and were not comprehensively represented within the peer-reviewed 
literature. Grey literature was also included in the review, and provided a good source of 
information about specific instances where performance-based approaches were implemented. 
Often, these literature sources described the enabling conditions and drivers for the programs and 
were deemed appropriate for the purpose of reviewing the specific instances where performance-
based approaches were implemented.  
1.6 Thesis organization 
This thesis is organized into four remaining chapters, each structured in a manuscript format. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first objective of the research study: that is, to identify performance-
based approaches implemented in other regions to manage water quality on agricultural 
landscapes and assess the drivers and enabling conditions of that implementation. Chapter 3 
addresses the second objective of the study and describes the assessment of social norms and 
values of the study region related to agricultural landowners' rights and responsibilities for water 
quality. Chapter 4 is informed by the previous two chapters and provides a synthesis of the 
results presented and evaluates the suitability of potential performance-based approaches for the 
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study region based on the degree of social contextual similarity. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the 
thesis with a discussion of how this research informs the performance-based policy literature and 
the literature related to policy transfer.  
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CHAPTER 2: PERFORMANCE-BASED APPROACHES TO AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL WATER QUALITY POLICY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 There is growing public concern about the effects of agricultural activities on water quality 
(OECD 2003; Coote and Gregorich 2000). In Canada, several agricultural water contamination 
events and on-going boil water advisories in some areas have served to fuel this growing 
concern. An often-cited example is the contamination of drinking water in Walkerton, Ontario in 
2000 by bacteria from livestock manure, which severe rain events washed into groundwater. 
Seven deaths and approximately 2300 illnesses occurred due to this contamination. While 
Walkerton received significant media attention due to the severity of the problem, there have 
been several other documented instances where contamination of drinking water by fecal 
coliform bacteria have caused disease outbreaks in Canada (Schuster et al. 2005). Agricultural 
water contamination can also have deleterious effects on aquatic life. Nutrient loading of Lake 
Winnipeg, thought to be from primarily livestock manure, is an example that has received much 
media and research attention. High levels of phosphorus have caused large algal blooms (up to 
13,000 km2) that reduce the oxygen concentrations and produce toxins in large portions of the 
lake (Environment Canada 2010; Salki 2007).  
 
Water quality concerns across Canada have been highlighted in recent national and provincial 
reports. For example, a report from the Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators 
initiative (Environment Canada 2010) rated 20% of sites tested as “marginal” or “poor” (water 
quality guidelines are exceeded often) in reference to the guidelines for the protection of aquatic 
life and testing a variety of minerals, nutrients and organic compounds. Similarly, a report on 
agricultural water quality using agri-environmental indicators developed by Agriculture and 
13 
 
Agri-Food Canada reported that water quality in Canada decreased between 1981 and 2006, 
primarily as a result of increasing applications of nitrogen and phosphorus (P) from fertilizers 
and manure (Eilers et al. 2010). Concerns over declining water quality as a result of agricultural 
practices are echoed in prairie provincial reports.  
 
Many agricultural contaminants that affect water quality are non point-source; that is, they are 
diffuse, entering water bodies from a variety of sources and at several locations. Water quality, 
along with many other open access and public goods that are affected by land management have 
been described as ‘ecological goods and services’ (EG&S). Ecological goods and services are the 
benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). 
Ecological goods and services are often undersupplied by markets, and this is the case with water 
quality. Water pollution from agricultural sources is usually an external cost (externality) and not 
incorporated into costs of production. This results in an undersupply of water quality to 
downstream users and the need for policy measures to increase EG&S provision. Measuring 
water quality from individual fields or farms is very difficult, which makes regulation and 
enforcement of water quality standards difficult. Therefore, policy makers have relied upon 
incentives and education or technical assistance to encourage agricultural producers to adopt 
practices that minimize contributions of non point-source contaminants to water bodies and 
ensure the production of water quality EG&S. These practices are referred to as 'beneficial 
management practices' (BMPs). 
 
Performance-based approaches for agri-environmental policy may have an important role in 
managing water quality. The current approach to water quality policy in Canada and 
internationally has encouraged changes to management practices through some regulatory and 
often voluntary measures (Weersink et al. 1998). These efforts have resulted in some positive 
changes to water quality, but the changes have not been sufficient to ensure that water quality 
guidelines are being consistently met (Environment Canada 2010). Performance-based 
approaches may complement current efforts and enhance water quality management because 
they provide a means to ensure agri-environmental programs result in improvements, as 
measurement (or estimation) of outcomes is an intrinsic component of these instruments. 
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The objectives of this paper are: 1) to identify alternative, performance-based policy approaches 
that have been implemented elsewhere to manage water quality, 2) to assess the institutional and 
socio-cultural context that resulted in their adoption; and 3) to critically assess their relative 
success where literature is available.  
 
2.2 Background 
 
2.2.1 Policy approaches to manage water quality  
 
Agri-environmental policy may be implemented based on inputs (i.e., adoption of management 
practices) or outputs (i.e., environmental performance), depending on the structure of the 
approach. The choice of approach is largely dependent on how the objective, or environmental 
goal, is defined. Where goals are related to inputs or management practices, policy approaches 
with a focus on inputs, such as cost-sharing measures to adopt practices, are appropriate. 
However, where goals are output-based, such as water quality objectives, a corresponding 
output-based approach to policy may be more appropriate. This is because there are a number of 
factors other than inputs that affect water quality, some beyond the control of the landowner, and 
input-based policy goals and corresponding approaches may not be the most effective way to 
ensure water quality improvements. Where the direct measurement of outputs is not possible, 
emission proxies or modeled approximations of water quality improvements through changes to 
practices may be feasible mechanisms to assess achievement of water quality objectives (Dunn 
and Shortle 1987; Shortle and Horan 2001).  
 
2.2.2 Evaluation of effectiveness of regulations and voluntary programs 
 
The nature of the pollution source is very important from the policy perspective. Agricultural 
pollution is almost entirely non-point source; that is, emissions occur via seepage, erosion, and 
runoff and are extremely difficult to trace (Weersink et al. 1998). Examples include leaching and 
runoff from manure and fertilizer application, irrigation return flows, pesticide drift, and soil 
management practices causing wind and water erosion. Non-point source pollution is influenced 
in part by agricultural activities and management decisions, but can also be heavily influenced by 
weather and physical properties of the land, such as soil type. Because water quality is affected 
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by many agricultural activities and other stochastic influences, it is very difficult to measure the 
impact of a specific practice, regulation, or program on water quality. Most evaluation efforts 
have been general measures of changes to water quality over time, such as the water quality 
reports created by Environment Canada and AAFC, or else measures of adoption rates of BMPs 
with the assumption that an increased rate of adoption improves water quality (MacKay and 
Hewitt 2010). 
 
2.2.3 Theoretical framework: Performance-based approaches to agri-environmental water 
quality policy  
 
Voluntary incentive or cost-sharing programs are the main tool used by governments and NGOs 
to manage agricultural activities that affect water quality (Weersink et al. 1998). These programs 
are often designed to encourage the adoption of BMPs by agricultural producers. The programs 
focus on inputs with the assumption that improvements to practices will result in improvements 
to environmental outcomes. However, the link between inputs and outputs is indirect and 
influenced by a number of factors, including location, topography, weather and specific farm 
traits. For example, fencing a stream to restrict cattle access (and providing off-site watering 
systems for cattle) can have a significant positive impact on water quality where stream banks 
are steeply sloped and cattle cause erosion and damage to riparian areas, and particularly where 
water ways are prone to erosion from severe runoff events. The fencing will have much less of 
an impact where the stream bank is only gently sloped or level and cattle cause little damage to 
the water way and riparian area. Further differences in impact of the fencing practice would be 
noticed if the number of cattle accessing the stream was high for the sloped land and low for the 
level land. Under a cost-sharing program available to all agricultural landowners, both could 
receive equal compensation despite an obvious discrepancy in water quality benefits between the 
two scenarios.  
 
Performance-based approaches to agri-environmental policy can be defined, in the broadest 
sense, as approaches that are designed based on some measurement of environmental outcome, 
rather than on inputs or management practices. A common definition of performance-based 
incentives describes them as payments or charges tied to outcomes and not to particular 
practices, where producer flexibility is a key component (Winsten 2009; Weinberg and Claassen 
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2006; Keeney and Boody 2005). In addition, the environmental outcome must be well-defined 
and program responses must be conditional on outcome delivery (Wunder et al. 2008). This 
distinguishes performance-based approaches that target a specific environmental outcome from 
other input-based approaches directed toward general improvements to the environment. The 
expected performance of a particular practice can be estimated with models (Lowell et al. 2007), 
indicators (Weinberg and Claassen 2006), and remote sensing (Cohen and Goward 2004), while 
actual performance can be measured with direct inspections (Hanley et al. 2004). Often, more 
than one mechanism is used to estimate performance, such as models supplemented with local 
data for more accurate estimates of the effect of a management change (Lowell et al. 2007). 
Payments or charges incurred through performance-based approaches can be fixed and 
contingent on achieving an environmental standard, or incremental with each unit of 
environmental outcome (for example, payments for each unit reduction in a specific water 
pollutant).  
 
The use of performance-based approaches has been shown to provide a cost-effective way for the 
landowner to provide EG&S because the landowner has the ability to adopt the least-cost 
strategy to meet a target (Wätzold and Dreschler 2005). Flexibility for the landowner is a key 
benefit of a performance-based approach (Claassen et al. 2001; Weinberg and Claassen 2006). 
For example, where the program goal is to reduce P contamination of a waterway, landowners 
may choose to exclude livestock from streams, alter timing of manure application to land, alter 
the method of manure application to land, increase water filtration by improving riparian buffer 
zones, or grow cover crops to reduce runoff. These practices have different adoption costs 
depending on location or management specific characteristics of the equipment capabilities and 
the agricultural activities of the landowner. Where modeling capabilities exist, the effects where 
the practice is implemented can be estimated and the landowner is given the opportunity to make 
the most economically viable decision for their individual operation based on the expected 
benefits and costs of the relevant BMPs.  
 
A performance-based approach to agri-environmental policy has been shown to provide certain 
benefits to the program provider and to society as well. First, funds are directed toward practices 
that have a demonstrated positive effect on the environment, reducing the potential to pay for 
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practices that are ineffective in meeting the environmental objectives (Claassen et al. 2001). As 
previously mentioned, modeling impacts of specific practices creates the ability to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of each practice. Where the impact (and associated payment) is relatively 
small, agricultural producers are unlikely to adopt the practices that are economically 
unattractive. Agricultural producers are more likely to choose approaches that have a larger 
environmental benefit and potentially provide higher payments. This approach provides greater 
environmental benefit for tax dollars spent. A further benefit is that performance-based 
approaches can be targeted to specific locations (Weinberg and Claassen 2006), and spatially 
heterogeneous or targeted payments for EG&S may be more cost-effective than uniform 
payments (Wätzold and Dreschler 2005).  
 
Performance-based approaches provide the opportunity for governments to demonstrate to the 
public, in a more concrete way, that tax dollars are funding actual improvements to 
environmental outcomes from agriculture. The ability to demonstrate environmental 
improvements at a site-specific scale may also have a positive impact on how society views 
government spending on agri-environmental programs (Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge 2003) and 
on the efforts of agricultural producers to make environmental improvements.  
 
While there are significant advantages to using performance-based approaches for agricultural 
water quality policy, there are several drawbacks as well. Development and implementation of 
complex delivery systems and subsequent monitoring are required, and the high administrative 
cost of these activities is commonly cited as a major constraint to adopting a performance-based 
approach to agri-environmental policy (Hodge 2000; Weinberg and Claassen 2006). Information 
requirements to determine baseline levels of measurable attributes and model research and 
development would likely be very high, as much of the information needed is not currently 
available (Claassen et al. 2001).  
 
The second major constraint to adoption of performance-based approaches in agri-environmental 
policy is the unpredictability of environmental gains (Jack et al. 2008); this is common to both 
performance-based and practice-based approaches, but more pronounced in the former. 
Environmental outcomes are subject to factors such as climate and ecological variability that are 
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outside the control of the landowner (Hodge 2000). These factors reduce the ability of the 
landowner to evaluate the outcome of a management strategy in advance and thus may impose a 
high degree of risk in providing EG&S where payments are contingent on EG&S delivery (Engel 
et al. 2008). Accordingly, landowners may be hesitant to commit to a program or may demand 
high payments to alleviate the risky nature of the program (Hodge 2000). 
 
There are other potential issues that have been identified with performance-based programs. One 
concern is that in some situations non-compliance by one large polluter can reduce the 
effectiveness of the actions of many smaller polluters in a watershed (Keeney and Boody 2005). 
In addition, the lag time between a change in practices and the benefits of that change can be 
several years and the payment scheme can be complicated by this problem. Finally, physical 
process models that estimate the effect of a change in agricultural practice can be flawed and 
result in substantially less improvement than estimated, resulting in reduced cost-effectiveness 
(Keeney and Boody 2005). These are issues that require consideration when contemplating a 
performance-based approach to water quality management, particularly due to the nonpoint 
nature of the pollution in agricultural systems. 
 
2.2.4 The importance of context in implementing performance-based approaches 
 
Performance-based approaches are implemented within a specific context and as a result of a 
number of drivers and enabling conditions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Garrick et 
al. 2009). Drivers can be based on demand (environmental, social and/or economic), or drivers 
can be institutional where legislation and/or policy is put in place so that performance-based 
approaches may be implemented. Enabling conditions describe the history of legal and 
regulatory reforms, environmental conditions and social norms that allow the consideration of 
performance-based approaches as a viable option for water quality management on agricultural 
land. Enabling conditions include factors such as recognition by policy makers of water quality 
as an ecosystem good and well-defined property rights of agricultural landowners that create the 
potential to be paid for improvements to water quality (i.e., a 'right' to pollute). Recognition of 
EG&S is vital to the implementation of some performance-based approaches that are based on 
the premise that agricultural producers should be paid for the public (external) benefits they 
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supply, such as schemes that pay for EG&S. Well-defined property rights allow an 
understanding of who pays for what; that is, whether governments employ a ‘beneficiary pays’ 
principle or a ‘polluter pays’ principle for agricultural landowners (OECD 2010). When this is 
clearly defined, policy approaches that fit within the property rights framework are more easily 
identified. Factors that affect the ability of a government to implement performance-based 
approaches will be described for each approach identified in the selected cases where it has been 
implemented.  
 
Together, the drivers and enabling conditions describe the relevant context surrounding 
performance-based approach implementation and are useful in assessing potential fit of the 
approach to another region (i.e.,, policy transfer). The successful transfer of a policy approach 
from one place to another depends, in large part, on the broader contextual factors that drive and 
enable it (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Mossberger and Wolman 2003; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005). Policy transfer literature indicates that many policy transfers are performed 
with an unsystematic approach and rely on anecdotal evidence, paying inadequate heed to 
context (Wolman 1992). Dwyer and Ellison (2009), in a review of recent policy transfer 
literature, emphasize the importance of understanding the context surrounding policies prior to 
policy transfer, and state that there is currently a lack of consideration of policy context. This is 
also the case when focusing specifically on water policy (Pigram 2001). 
 
Drivers and enabling conditions of a performance-based approach can be divided into economic, 
environmental, institutional, and social factors that have influenced the implementation and 
operation of performance-based approaches (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). An analysis of drivers 
and enabling conditions across regions allows some generalizations to be made about those that 
facilitate implementation of performance-based approaches, and an identification of common 
contextual factors in successful and/or unsuccessful approaches within and between approaches. 
Social and institutional drivers and enabling conditions can be particularly important in assessing 
fit in water policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Much of the policy transfer literature 
related to the transfer process discusses social and institutional context (e.g., Mossberger and 
Wolman 2003; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Rose 1993; de Jong 2009). Previous contextual 
analyses for potential water policy transfer have identified social and institutional capacity or 
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mismatch as significant barriers to a transfer (e.g., Hu 1999; Malano et al. 1999). Where policy 
transfers have been evaluated post-implementation, social and institutional mismatches have 
often been identified as a significant cause of substandard outcomes or outright policy failure 
(e.g., Wolman 1992; Barnes et al. 2009). This paper focuses specifically on social and 
institutional factors, but also acknowledges that other factors, such as economic or environmental 
factors, are important and relevant to the assessment of context for a particular approach. 
 
2.2.5 Paper structure  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. First, a brief introduction to 
performance-based approaches is provided to acquaint the reader with the concepts and 
definitions adopted by the author. Second, a review of performance-based approaches, with a 
focus on managing water quality on agricultural landscapes, is presented. This review is 
accompanied by a discussion of the relevant institutional and social drivers and enabling 
conditions for each approach. Within the bounds of what are considered ‘performance-based’ 
approaches, a range of methods to measure performance and payment structures exist. The third 
section develops an organizational framework for performance-based approaches based on the 
preceding discussion. This organizational framework provides a tool to rank approaches 
according to capacity to incorporate performance and to select appropriate approaches and policy 
instruments based on the measurement/estimation capacity and desired payment structure for 
regions where performance-based approaches are being considered. The framework is developed 
based on the assessment of individual programs using performance-based approaches, the policy 
instruments employed, and their approach to measurement and payment structure. The fourth and 
final section discusses applications of the organizational framework for policy ranking, selection, 
and transfer.  
 
2.3 Introduction to performance-based approaches review 
 
Performance-based instruments and methods to implement policy instruments are described in 
this section, and are discussed jointly using the term 'performance-based approaches'. 
Performance-based approaches were defined, for the purposes of this discussion, as those 
programs where there was some differentiation in payment/penalty level based on water quality 
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outcomes and some effort to measure or estimate those water quality outcomes. Performance-
based approaches identified were briefly described, including a clear statement of the method 
used to measure water quality outcomes and the structure of the payment or penalty scheme. The 
enabling conditions and drivers for the program were discussed, and the outcomes evaluated 
where this information was available. Where there was more than one instance of 
implementation of a particular approach, the case where the most literature was available formed 
the main body of the discussion, with additional information supplied from other cases.  
 
Three constraints were placed on this survey of the literature for performance-based approaches. 
All constraints were implemented to maintain a degree of consistency between the Canadian 
context and the contexts of other regions investigated, as well as to maintain a focus on agri-
environmental policy and water quality (Mossberger and Wolman 2003). The constraints were as 
follows: 1) the review was limited to those approaches targeted specifically for agriculture; 2) the 
review was limited to approaches that focused on water quality, or else had water quality 
management as a component; and 3) the review was limited to the member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Member countries of the 
OECD were chosen as a geographical limit to this discussion for the institutional characteristics 
to maintain a degree of contextual similarity between Canada and other member countries (Rose 
1993). Specifically, in these countries, agriculture is practiced on private land, all have a system 
of democratic governance, and all are developed countries with market economies (OECD 
2010).  
 
2.3.1 Water quality trading/permits  
 
Water quality trading or permitting allows large emitters of water pollution to buy emission 
credits from low level emitters. This market-based approach establishes property rights for 
pollutant discharge and can be implemented where cap and trade regulations have been put in 
place, or where voluntary demand is great enough to warrant the policy instrument (Lal et al. 
2009). There are several necessary conditions for water quality permit trading to occur: 1) a 
specific environmental objective ; 2) a clearly defined commodity; 3) appropriate level of 
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incentives to ensure trades; 4) appropriate and clear trading rules; and 5) measurement and 
monitoring (Weersink et al. 1998; Cantin et al. 2005). 
 
Water quality trading uses an appropriate model or set of models to estimate water quality 
improvements and/or value transfer from other studies to estimate the effect of specific BMPs. In 
the case of water quality improvement, payments are made based on the magnitude of reduction 
in pollutants estimated from those models. I reviewed a number of cases where water quality 
trading was implemented in the United States and one in Canada (Table 2-1). These examples 
are generally based in small watersheds where there is a point source polluter (often industrial) 
that acts as a buyer of water quality permits from several non-point source polluters (often 
agricultural producers).  
 
Table 2-1. Water quality trading programs 
South Nation River Watershed Phosphorus Trading Program, Ontario, Canada 
This watershed-based water quality trading program is operated by the South Nation Conservation (SNC) 
community watershed organization. The SNC acts as a broker between water quality credit buyers and 
sellers. In this case, the sellers are farmers and the buyers are industrial wastewater emitters.  
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement:  
Modeled based on 
measured performance 
of practices in other 
regions, calculated per 
hectare or per head for 
livestock.  
Payment:  
The South Nation 
Conservation group 
retained the funds paid 
for P credits and used 
those funds for grants 
to agricultural 
producers to 
implement BMPs. 
Grant amounts were 
based on projects and 
not amount of P 
reduction  
Institutional: 
The Ontario Ministry of 
Environment created 
water quality guidelines 
with maximum allowable 
concentrations of 
pollutants. 
 
Regulatory measures for 
drinking water 
implemented under the 
Safe Water Drinking Act 
 
South Nation 
Conservation community 
group established to 
manage natural resources 
in the watershed 
Institutional: 
Phosphorus concentration 
limit enforced in watershed 
 
Program viewed as an 
economical way to mitigate 
impacts of wastewater 
emissions 
 
Removal of legal liability 
for agricultural producers 
through "Statement of 
Roles and Responsibilities" 
 
Social: 
Stakeholder buy-in 
achieved through the use of 
Water quality in the 
watershed has 
improved, with an 
estimated reduction 
in emissions of 
approximately 
10,000 kg per year 
 
More cost-effective 
than improving 
wastewater 
treatment 
 
Watershed residents 
perceived other 
benefits, including 
soil and livestock 
health benefits, 
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Social: 
Agricultural producers 
were well-organized and 
effective in lobbying for 
policies that affirm strong 
property rights 
a locally-trusted 
organization, created a 
sense of security and trust 
 
Use of a trusted 
organization, the South 
Nation Conservation group, 
as a broker for credits 
reduced risk to 
human health, 
improved opinions 
of the South Nation 
Conservation group, 
increased property 
values 
(O'Grady 2011; Allaway 2003; OMOE 1994; Driedger 2010; Justice O'Connor 2002; OFEC 2006; 
Selman et al. 2009; Boutz 2007) 
United States water quality trading programs (several states) 
Most US WQT programs are based on a point source buyer and non-point source sellers of pollution 
credits. Trades occur through clearinghouses (intermediaries between the buyer and seller); exchange 
marketplaces where buyers and sellers connect directly; and/or bilateral trades where buyers and sellers 
conduct single trades  
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement: 
Either site-specific 
calculations to 
estimate nutrient 
losses or reductions 
using variables such as 
soil type, slope and 
other input rates; or 
pre-determined 
nutrient reductions for 
practices that assigns a 
nutrient reduction 
credit based on 
estimated average 
nutrient reductions  
 
Payment: 
Credits based on an 
emission unit 
purchased through 
three mechanisms: 1) 
bilateral negotiations; 
2) clearinghouses; or 
3) exchange markets  
Institutional: 
Previous success of 
sulphur dioxide trading 
under Clean Air Act 
 
Clean Water Act gave 
individual states authority 
to regulate non-point 
source pollution 
 
US Environmental 
Protection Agency's 
Watershed Protection 
Approach created 
capacity to use unique 
approaches to achieve 
ecological goals 
Institutional: 
US Environmental 
Protection Agency and 
United States Department 
of Agriculture have 
promoted water quality 
trading through funding 
initiatives and policy 
provisions 
 
Several state-specific 
regulations to encourage 
trading 
 
Implementation, or 
imminent implementation, 
of nutrient caps for water 
bodies based on total 
maximum daily load 
(TMDL) for pollutants 
Economic benefits, 
lower cost to reduce 
pollutant loads 
 
Where trades have 
not occurred, 
attributed to lack of 
institutional drivers 
(Selman et al. 2009; Woodward 2003; Woodward et al. 2002; McGinnis 2001; Abdalla et al. 2007; Fang 
et al. 2005) 
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2.3.1.1 Common conditions among water quality trading programs 
 
There are several common enabling conditions identified from US and Canadian programs using 
water quality trading as a policy approach. The first enabling condition is a physical need for 
water quality control from agricultural landscapes; that is, water quality conditions have 
deteriorated to a level that is unacceptable. The second enabling condition is the legal capacity to 
implement a water quality trading program. There are two separate aspects to legal capacity. 
First, the water quality trading policy instrument must be recognized as an acceptable method of 
reducing non-point source pollution. In the South Nation case, this capacity was not explicit, but 
the institutional capacity was present and facilitated interpretation of the legislation in a way that 
created legal capacity. Second, there must be legal entitlement for the non-point source 
discharge. That is, there must be a “right to pollute” in place and this was the case for all 
programs reviewed. Finally, the policy instrument must be based on sound and socially-
acceptable science. In cases where trading occurred, methods of estimating P emission reduction, 
calculating trading ratios, and monitoring for actual results were important factors in stakeholder 
buy-in and the long-term viability of the approach.  
 
Common drivers were also evident among water quality trading programs. An institutional driver 
(i.e.,, agency endorsement and encouragement of using the specific policy instrument) was key 
to actually implementing the water quality trading program. Another important driver was the 
funding available to implement the program. In the South Nation watershed, it was the 
recognition that the cost to taxpayers for improving wastewater treatment was prohibitively high 
and this triggered the serious consideration of water quality trading. In the US programs, 
significant grants were provided for start-up of programs; this reduced financial risk for local 
agencies and created opportunities to implement water quality trading. 
 
Several of the common enabling conditions and drivers identified among water quality trading 
programs were similar to those proposed by researchers. The success of the South Nation 
Watershed Phosphorus Trading Program was attributed by O’Grady (2011) to the following 
eight conditions: community consensus on the trading process; the legislative requirements to 
implement trading; reliable, science-based measurement; absence of economic risk to buyers and 
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sellers of credits; broker credibility; written instruments for trading and verification; and liability 
protection for buyers and sellers. Several of these conditions are similar to those identified by 
Selman et al (2009) in an assessment of several US water quality trading programs: demand for 
water quality must be driven by strong regulation and/or other non-regulatory drivers; 
minimization of agricultural landowner legal liability; strong science backing for water quality 
measurement; standardized processes and tools to minimize transaction costs; and, buy-in from 
stakeholders. 
2.3.2 Differentiated payments for EG&S 
 
Performance-based payments for EG&S encompass a range of payment types for the production 
of EG&S. This group of approaches relies on site-specific models and payments are structured to 
reflect degree of improvement in pollutant concentrations in water (Claassen et al. 2001). While 
there are a number of purported 'performance-based' PES programs being used in the US and 
abroad (Wunder et al. 2008), most have payments that are tied strictly to inputs or practices. The 
definition of performance-based PES used in this discussion requires that payments are 
differentiated, at least to some extent, based on estimated environmental outcomes. This means 
that payments can be based on estimated units of pollution reduction, or can be tiered to pay set 
amounts based on estimated outcomes. Programs that met the requirements of this definition 
were reviewed below (Table 2-2). Many of the PES programs implemented in OECD countries 
do not have this feature, and therefore are not within the scope of this review. 
Table 2-2. Differentiated payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs 
Performance-based Environmental Policies for Agriculture (PEPA), Hewitt Creek Watershed, 
Iowa, United States 
A series of pilot projects under the PEPA framework have been implemented since 2005. Most research 
findings in the literature relate to the Hewitt Creek Watershed in Iowa, so this watershed will be the focus. 
The watershed is considered to be one of the main contributors of nutrient, sediment, and fecal bacteria 
pollution of the Mississippi River. Interested stakeholders formed a watershed council that made 
decisions concerning the measurement method and payment structure for improvements to water quality 
at the farm level.  
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement:  
Suite of indices to estimate 
nutrient and sediment losses. 
All of these indices are 
calculated for individual 
Institutional: 
Listed as impaired 
watershed from Clean 
Water Act 
 
Institutional: 
Impending regulation as 
a result of impaired 
watershed listing 
 
Social successes 
were considered 
important. 
Stakeholders formed 
cohesive structure, 
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fields. 
 
Payment:  
Variety of incentive 
payments; some are based on 
nutrient testing or fixed 
payments for specific 
practices, while others are 
incremental and increase 
based on degree of reduction 
in pollutants as estimated by 
indices. 
 Financial support of 
local farm bureaus 
 
Social: 
Fear of government 
intervention 
 
Civic responsibility and 
peer pressure 
shared knowledge 
and ideas. 
 
Water quality 
improved, estimated 
reduction of 23% of 
nitrate pollution; 
phosphorus pollution 
was reduced by 14% 
(Morton 2008; Morton et al. 2006; Winsten 2009; PEPA 2011; Hewitt Creek Watershed Improvement 
Association Inc. 2008) 
 Privately-Sponsored PES, Vittel Company, France 
Vittel is a water bottling-company that has been successful based on the 'natural mineral water' branding 
and purported health benefits associated with its source. To maintain water quality with increasing 
agricultural intensification around the source, the company developed a program for the farms within a set 
zone around the water source. The program provided long-term contracts for farmers to make extensive 
changes to their production systems based on the estimated impact of their specific land on the water 
quality of the bottling source. 
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement: 
Estimated the total reduction 
of nitrogen emissions 
required to maintain an 
acceptable water quality 
standard, based on site-
specific research. 
Management practices were 
identified that could achieve 
the nitrogen reduction 
requirement.  
 
Payment: 
Contracts negotiated based 
on actions required from each 
farmer 
 Institutional: 
Company required actions 
at the farm level to 
maintain viability 
 
Political will to retain 
company in the region 
 
Social:  
Company employed many 
people in the region, this 
provided a strong incentive 
for farmers to work with 
the company; stakeholder 
buy-in 
Water quality 
maintained at an 
acceptable level for 
company to continue 
to operate, no jobs 
lost 
 
Farmers negotiated 
contracts that have 
been satisfactory, no 
ill will. 
(Perrot-Maȋtre 2006) 
Group PES, Cullers Run Watershed, West Virginia, United States 
This particular watershed was chosen for a pilot project because it was small, had a history of water 
quality sampling, and a cropland distribution that facilitated measurement of effects of changes to 
practices relatively easily. Just over 50% of the agricultural households in the watershed participated in 
the project as a result of several informational meetings and the development of a farmer advisory 
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committee.  
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement: 
Measurement of water 
quality was direct, 
background levels of 
nitrogen were accounted for 
by measuring water quality in 
an additional "index 
watershed" that was similar 
in size and location but not 
impacted by agricultural 
activities.  
 
Payment: 
Payments to whole group, 
distributed equally and based 
on water quality, volume. 
Institutional: 
Impaired watershed 
listed under Clean 
Water Act 
Social: 
Researcher interest in 
assessing feasibility of 
using a group-based PES 
approach to managing 
water quality 
 
Social successes 
included increased 
interest in acquiring 
information about 
water quality, 
increased 
participation, and 
pressure to 
participate from 
other farmers. Trust 
among researchers 
and farmers 
developed 
throughout the 
project. 
(Maille et al. 2009) 
 
2.3.2.1 Contextual similarities for differentiated PES programs 
There are some important similarities in the differentiated PES programs presented for 
discussion. All were small-scale projects aimed at individual watersheds. The programs 
generally required a high degree of involvement by researchers or program proponents and a 
substantial amount of time to develop relationships and build trust with watershed landholders. 
Collection of water quality data and use of physical process models were common and necessary 
elements of all programs.  
 
The most discussed successes of these programs in the literature related to the social capital 
creation and empowerment of local agricultural landowners who participated in the programs. 
All programs found that giving the landowners some authority in determining the payment terms 
and/or managing funding created a stronger program and a desire to learn more and to involve 
others.  
2.3.3 Reverse Auctions 
 
Reverse auctions have been applied where markets for the commodities of interest are not well 
established (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). Reverse auctions are characterized 
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by multiple sellers of EG&S that participate in a competitive bidding system and a single buyer, 
usually a government agency. There are three ways to select successful bids from sellers in a 
reverse auction: 1) based on cost where bids are ranked and winning bids are funded from lowest 
to highest; 2) based on benefits where bids are ranked according to environmental outcomes and 
funded from greatest to least benefit; and 3) based on cost effectiveness where ranking occurs 
with both cost and benefit considerations (Selman et al. 2008). The latter two types of auctions 
can be considered performance-based, as there some measure of benefits and payment is based 
on the degree of benefit provided by the seller. Models are generally used to estimate the 
environmental outcomes and can be based on site-specific characteristics and practices. 
Payments are tied to degree of environmental outcomes in the sense that the most cost-effective, 
or the most beneficial, plans are paid out first. While the bid may not directly reflect the value of 
the outcome, it is sufficient payment for the landowner to achieve the outcome and therefore may 
actually be more cost-effective in some cases than differentiated payments.  
The reverse auction approach allows agricultural landowners to use their knowledge of the costs 
of implementing specific practices in order to create a bid price that makes the activity 
financially worthwhile for their business (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997). 
However, the participants must also be mindful of other sellers with the same intent and be 
strategic. Bids are constrained by the presence of multiple sellers and with the possibility of a 
rejected bid if the amount proposed exceeds the perceived value of expected environmental 
outcomes. This mechanism alleviates the problem of asymmetric information for funding 
agencies, as it reveals opportunity costs for landowners to provide EG&S (Ferraro 2008). 
 
Reverse auctions have been implemented in the US through programs to manage highly erodible 
land and to reduce phosphorus runoff (Reichelderfer and Boggess 1988; Selman et al. 2008) and 
in Australia with widespread efforts to manage water quality along with other land management 
issues (Lowell et al. 2007; Eigenraam et al. 2007). The US program is the most well-established 
and incorporates water quality objectives, and therefore will form the basis for this discussion, 
with a summary discussion of programs implemented elsewhere (Table 2-3).  
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Table 2-3. Reverse auctions 
Conservation Reserve Program, United States 
First introduced in 1986, the program aimed to achieve environmental benefits through land retirement, 
including improvements to water quality. 
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement:  
Use of an Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI) to 
estimate the site-specific 
environmental outcomes of 
retiring land, and weighted 
them according to the 
priorities of the program. 
 
Payment:  
Bidding by landowners for 
land retirement payments. 
Bids selected based on EBI 
score. 
Institutional: 
History of land 
retirement programs 
during periods of low 
commodity prices; 
significant area of 
land designated as 
highly erodible 
 
Social: 
Desire to support 
agricultural 
landowners 
Institutional: 
Enactment of the Food 
Security Act with a 
legislated land base 
target 
 
United States Congress 
authorized use of cost-
benefit targeting to 
select bids 
Estimated increase in 
environmental 
benefits but no 
measurement 
 
Criticisms of 
program for lack of 
objectivity, 
inflexibility to 
respond to changing 
environmental 
conditions 
(Claassen et al. 2008; Reichelderfer and Boggess 1988) 
 Conestoga Watershed, Pennsylvania, United States 
A recent demonstration project implemented in the Conestoga Watershed in Pennsylvania is a more 
specific reverse auction for water quality. 
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement: 
The expected reduction in 
phosphorus runoff was 
estimated using a 
combination of site-specific 
variables and along with 
research estimates of 
effectiveness of various 
BMPs  
 
Payment:  
Used a cost-effectiveness 
strategy to select bids for 
specific BMPs agricultural 
producers were willing to 
implement on their land  
Institutional: 
Watershed listed as 
impaired under the 
Clean Water Act 
Social:  
Researcher interest in 
demonstrating the 
potential cost efficiencies 
using a performance-
based approach as 
compared to a 
conventional input-based 
approach 
The difference in 
phosphorus pollution 
reduction and costs 
were substantial: the 
conventional 
program required 
$26.19 lb-1, while the 
reverse auction paid 
out an average of 
$5.06 lb-1 
(Selman et al. 2008) 
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 Great Barrier Reef, Australia 
Water quality reverse auctions based on four one-year trials to assess opportunity costs of changing 
practices and to improve funding allocation (cost-effectiveness) for agri-environmental water quality 
programs offered by the Australian government 
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement: 
Used models with site-
specific data to estimate the 
amount of agricultural 
emissions reduced by each 
bid proposal, resulting in an 
environmental benefit index 
score 
 
Payment: From the EBI and 
the proposed bid amount, 
cost-effectiveness was 
determined and bids were 
selected on this basis  
Institutional: 
Previous successes 
of reverse auctions 
for conservation 
Institutional: 
Governmental concern 
about misallocation of 
resources; these trial 
auctions were perceived 
as a method to better 
estimate opportunity costs 
for agricultural producers 
to make changes to 
practices and reduce 
potential of over-payment 
These trials 
highlighted the 
variability in 
producers' costs and 
the importance of 
using a cost-
effectiveness strategy 
in assessing bids. 
(Rolfe and Windle 2011) 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Common context within reverse auction approaches 
 
There are several similarities in the enabling conditions, drivers, and implementation strategies 
of programs utilizing the reverse auction policy approach. First, presence of an institutional 
driver is required. In all cases, there was a governmental or non-governmental agency with 
sufficient resources to promote the reverse auction approach to water quality management. 
Without support from these agencies, this policy approach would not be utilized, as the 
administrative and data-gathering costs can be very high and labour intensive (Weinberg and 
Claassen 2006). A common enabling condition was the failure of previous policy approaches to 
address water quality concerns. This similarity was particularly evident for the Australian and 
US pilot projects. Both studies made reference to previous programs that had failed to achieve 
desired outcomes, and the reverse auction was being trialled as an alternative, more cost-
effective option (Keeney and Boody 2005; Rolfe and Windle 2011). Finally, an environmental 
benefit index is imperative to implementing the reverse auction in a performance-based manner. 
Though the link between practices and environmental outcomes was weak in the CRP, there was 
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an attempt to tie bid selection to expected outcomes and maximize cost-effectiveness. Site- or 
farm-specific environmental benefit indices were used in all programs, though the indices were 
based on models with varying capacities for accurately estimating environmental outcomes.  
2.3.4 Cross-compliance 
 
Cross-compliance imposes a minimum standard for environmental performance (i.e.,, production 
of EG&S) that is required of agricultural producers. The compliance instrument requires that 
agricultural producers undertake activities to achieve the minimum environmental standard to 
remain eligible for government support programs, loan programs, and voluntary agri-
environmental programs. (Mann 2005; OECD 2010; Claassen et al. 2004). Where agricultural 
producers choose not to achieve the minimum standard, they are excluded from support 
programs and other forms of government assistance (Claassen et al. 2004). While the objective 
of programs that use cross-compliance is an environmental outcome, compliance is determined 
based on the adoption of practices (Baylis et al. 2008). As such, cross-compliance may be 
considered a 'hybrid' policy instrument, rather than strictly performance- or practice-based 
(Weinberg and Claassen 2006).  
 
The EU has been implementing cross-compliance measures since the 1990's, and it has been a 
compulsory policy instrument in many of the member states since 2005 (OECD 2010). The 
following discussion of cross-compliance will focus on the United Kingdom experience with 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (Table 2-4). 
 
2.3.4.1 Important considerations for cross-compliance 
 
A main enabling condition of this type of instrument is existence of substantial agri-
environmental payments and/or income support for agricultural producers. Creating conditions 
where agricultural producers must meet minimum environmental standards to remain eligible for 
income support provides an important incentive to comply. Likewise, where the economic 
benefits of agri-environmental payment programs outweigh costs, an incentive is created to 
comply with environmental standards. Without the conditionality of income support and other 
payment programs of significant value to the agricultural producer, this approach will fail.  
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Table 2-4. Cross-compliance 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones, United Kingdom 
These zones have been created under the EU Nitrates Directive where nitrate levels in watersheds exceed, 
or are likely to exceed 50 mg l-1 . The entire watershed becomes an NVZ and all agricultural producers 
within the zone are expected to comply with nitrate pollution minimizing practices, thus taking on 
characteristics of a group-based approach.  
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement:  
No measurement of 
individual farm 
contribution to water 
quality. However, 
beyond the initial 
assessment of a 
watershed as a NVZ, 
reviews must be 
undertaken every four 
years to assess water 
quality and revise the 
NVZ based on direct 
water quality 
monitoring  
 
Payment:  
Where producers 
within these zones 
comply with required 
practices, income 
support payments are 
provided in full. 
Otherwise, reductions 
to, or denial of income 
support payments and 
agri-environmental 
payments occurs  
Institutional: 
Previous water quality 
directives and legislation  
 
Previous zonal 
designations for water 
protection (Nitrate 
Sensitive Areas) and 
implementation of the 
Common Agricultural 
Policy reforms of 1992 
created institutional 
capacity  
 
Social: 
Growing social belief that 
agricultural producers 
should not receive 
payments unless they 
comply with basic 
environmental 
requirements 
 
Institutional: 
World Trade 
Organization 
pressure to reduce 
income support 
payments and fit 
payments within 
'green box' 
requirements 
(decoupled payments 
from production) 
Mixed environmental 
outcomes: some NVZs 
(31%) showed 
improvement in surface 
water quality; some 
remained the same; and 
some (17%) became more 
polluted over a 12-year 
period 
 
Focus on inputs was not 
an effective strategy to 
reduce nitrate pollution  
 
Social outcomes showed a 
mismatch between 
farmers attitudes and 
public expectation of 
environmental benefits. 
Farmers were distrustful 
and felt penalized. 
However, considered an 
effective way to induce a 
change in practices and 
improved environmental 
outcomes in the face of a 
lack of interest by 
landowners 
(Macgregor and Warren 2006; DEFRA 2011; EC 2010; Baylis et al. 2008; Amin-Hanjani and Todd 2005; 
Osborn and Cook 1997; Worrall et al. 2009; Nielsen et al. 2009; Hall et al. 2004; McVittie et al. 2010; 
WTO 2008; Barnes et al. 2009) 
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A second enabling condition of cross-compliance is an environmental standard, or else a 
practice-based set of standards linked to expected environmental outcomes. For NVZ scheme, 
the maximum concentration of nitrate in water provided that standard. However, environmental 
standards may not be socially acceptable by all sectors. A study of farmers' attitudes toward 
NVZs in Scotland showed that most felt penalized by being placed within a NVZ compared to 
those outside these areas (Barnes et al. 2009). Farmers were wary and wanted proof that the 
practices they were asked to implement actually had a positive impact on water quality. The 
productivist attitude of the farmers was not adequately accounted for in the introduction of the 
NVZ regulations, and this created an atmosphere of distrust and scepticism of the benefits of 
required actions. The lack of understanding of the dominant productivist culture of farmers in 
Scotland has led to very little change in behaviours and practices in NVZs (Barnes et al. 2009). 
 
There are some issues to be aware of with the cross-compliance approach. One of the major 
shortfalls noted by Badertscher (2005) is that, once cross-compliance measures have been 
implemented, there are no further improvements to the production of EG&S beyond those 
required for compliance (i.e.,, this policy instrument does not foster innovation and continuous 
improvement). Evidence from studies of the impact of NVZ designations in the UK support this 
potential issue with cross-compliance, as an overall improvement in nitrate levels was not 
observed (Worrall et al. 2009). Another potential hazard of cross-compliance is level of subsidies 
and payments available to compliant agricultural producers. Where potential gain is less than the 
cost of compliance, compliance rates will be low (Claassen et al. 2004). 
2.3.5 Emission charges 
 
Emissions charges are based on the polluter pays principle and result in increasing and 
incremental levies charged to agricultural producers who create more pollution than they are 
allotted based on individual operations. The only OECD country that has instituted a 
performance-based emission charge to manage water quality is the Netherlands (Table 2-5).  
In the case of the Netherlands, nutrient accounting - specifically for nitrogen and phosphorus 
inputs and outputs - was required of all farmers. This approach was mandatory and no payments 
were made for maintaining pollutant emissions below the limit, but levies were administered 
where emissions were exceeded (Peerlings and Polman 2008). 
34 
 
Table 2-5. Emissions charges 
MINAS program, The Netherlands 
The Minerals Accounting System (MINAS) was introduced in 1998 for the highest risk farms, and then 
became compulsory for all farms in 2001 . The program was implemented as a result of the unsustainable 
quantities of manure being produced by intensive livestock operations with inadequate areas of land for 
manure distribution.  
Characteristics Enabling conditions Drivers Outcomes 
Measurement:  
Individual farm accounting of 
inputs and outputs related to 
phosphorus 
 
Payment:  
Nutrient surpluses subject to 
incremental levy 
Social: Intensive 
agriculture industry 
that maintains viability 
through livestock 
production, resulting in 
excess manure which 
contributed pollutants 
to water bodies 
Institutional: 
Failed attempts to 
manage agricultural 
sources of water 
contamination through 
input-based 
regulations 
Some water 
pollutants reduced 
(nitrates), but 
phosphorus remained 
a concern and 
actually increased. 
Program considered 
unsuccessful 
 
Eventually 
discontinued as a 
result of 
incompatibility with 
European Union 
directives 
(van Grinsven et al. 2005) 
 
2.4 Organizing performance-based approaches: The Performance Capacity Meter 
 
The organizational tool developed from the review of performance-based approaches, called the 
Performance Capacity Meter, ranks reviewed programs and their approaches to provide an 
understanding of how approaches compare to one another. The meter uses methods of 
measurement of water quality and the structure of payments or penalties to rank approaches on a 
scale from strongly performance-based to weakly performance-based. Each approach, as well as 
individual programs, can be described as fitting within a ranking system for performance 
capacity. The strongest approach in terms of performance incorporates site-based direct 
measurements of performance and variable payments. In contrast, the weakest approach includes 
only a very weak measure of performance, and payments are based on inputs with no varying 
degree of incentive or disincentive based on the degree of outcome (Figure 2-1). The labelled 
arrows in Figure 2-1 represent benchmarks that reflect changes in measurement method and 
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payment structure along the ranking system. Measurement method and payment structure of the 
performance-based approaches are not necessarily linked, though they may occupy a similar 
rank. 
 
Using water quality to demonstrate the performance capacity meter, a strongly performance-
based approach is one that uses direct water quality measurements to evaluate the magnitude of 
the potential payment or levy. A key benefit to the program provider of a strongly performance-
based approach is efficiency and effectiveness of payments/penalties; a high degree of accuracy 
is ensured and payments are made only for genuine improvements. However, there are several 
significant disadvantages to strongly performance-based approaches, including high 
administrative costs and potentially a high degree of risk assumed by the producer associated 
with, for example, variable and unpredictable weather events and other landowners, which has 
been shown by the programs reviewed to lead to stakeholder refusal to participate. 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Performance Capacity Meter to rank effectiveness of potential of applicable 
performance-based approaches as indicated by measurement data availability/methods and 
payment/penalty structure capacity. 
 
Strongly 
performance-based
Moderately 
performance-based
Measurement Payment/Penalty Structure 
Direct, 
site-specific
Modeled, site-
specific
Modeled, region-
specific
Based on 
research findings
Based on actual 
outcome 
Variable, based 
on expected 
outcome 
Fixed, based on 
expected 
outcome 
Set amount once 
performance 
threshold is reached
Practice-based
Cost-sharing/subsidy 
based on inputs 
(practices)
Performance Capacity Meter
Direct, region-
specific 
36 
 
Moving to a less-strongly performance-based approach, as performance is estimated instead of 
measured directly, accuracy and cost-effectiveness decreases for the program provider but there 
is potential for increased landowner program adoption due to decreased risk. Water quality 
estimates that include site-specific conditions (e.g., slope, distance to surface water, crop grown, 
soil nutrient levels) are higher on the performance capacity meter than regional estimates, where 
only regional conditions are considered. Payment types can be variable and based on expected 
outcome from models or else fixed and based on model outcomes (e.g., reaching a set standard 
of water quality to be eligible for government funding). These types of approaches afford 
landowners greater security in receiving funding if actions are carried out, regardless of the 
effect of weather and other conditions beyond their control.  
 
Finally, where approaches are only very weakly performance-based, outcomes are assessed 
based on research results that indicate average responses to a specific management practice. The 
programs that incorporate this type of approach are prescriptive and allow no flexibility for the 
landowner to adopt practices to his or her particular situation. While some attempt is made to 
assess whether there will be a positive environmental outcome, the attempt is weak and 
outcomes are assumed to be linked to inputs or management practices. Payment structures for 
these approaches are usually fixed, paid as a cost-share or subsidy for inputs, and measurement is 
not included. There are some benefits to these approaches: administrative costs are low, as there 
is no need to develop models or measure site-specific or regional conditions; this approach can 
be applied to a broad landbase; and, there is no risk to landowners as the receipt of payments is 
based entirely on inputs. However, there is only an indirect link between environmental 
performance and payment structure and the environmental outcomes are likely lower than with 
other approaches.  
2.4.1 Applying the performance capacity meter to policy examples 
 
Categories of performance-based approaches varied in the degree of performance incorporated 
within them. Further, programs using a particular policy approach implemented that approach 
differently, resulting in differing capacity for performance within policy approaches, as well as 
among them, shown in Figure 2-2. While the approaches varied in their performance capacity, 
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they can be qualitatively ranked using the two dimensions of performance - measurement and 
payment/penalty structure - for the relative degree of performance incorporated into them.  
 
Depending on the context within which the performance-based approaches are implemented, 
rankings on the scale may differ (Figure 2-2). For example, if cross-compliance was based on 
achieving water quality standards, rather than the assumption of that achievement with the 
adoption of specific practices, then reliable, site-specific models would be required and payments 
could be based more strongly on performance. This change would alter the ranking of the cross-
compliance approach from very weak to moderately performance-based. The context 
surrounding implementation of these approaches, which influences the capability for 
measurement of water quality and payment/penalty structure, is critical in the degree of cost-
effectiveness achieved by performance-based approaches.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Variability in degree of performance applied to categories of performance-based 
approaches to manage water quality for agricultural landscapes. Variability is a result of the 
specific implementation strategies used.  
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2.4.2 Applications of the organizational framework 
 
Performance-based approaches can occupy more than one rank on the performance capacity 
meter. The methods used to measure performance and to pay or penalize agricultural producers 
can vary among programs using the same category of approach, creating a range of potential for 
performance capacity (Figure 2-2). This creates opportunities to improve the degree of 
performance of a policy instrument where drivers and enabling conditions are present (Rose 
1993; Hospers and Beugelsdijk 2002). For example, in its current application in the UK, cross-
compliance for NVZs is based almost entirely on agricultural producers adopting specific 
practices where their land falls within a designated zone, making it a very weakly performance-
based approach when viewed as from an individual producer perspective, but stronger when 
viewed as a whole watershed-based approach. Basing compliance on flexible, site-specific 
practices where physical process models are available to provide reliable estimates of the 
environmental outcomes of those practices would create a stronger performance-based cross-
compliance approach at the individual producer level. The performance capacity meter provides 
a useful tool to understand what is needed to achieve a stronger performance element in water 
quality programs for agriculture.   
 
The tool has further potential to serve as a general approach to categorizing performance-based 
approaches and may be useful in other research or policy studies to enable the selection of 
appropriate instruments based on measurement or payment structure capabilities, or where a 
specific level of environmental performance is desired. Using the performance capacity meter, a 
region can assess its capacity to measure environmental outcomes and the social and institutional 
capacity to implement varying degrees of differentiation of payments. Based on these two 
measures of capacity, the region can determine where they rank on the capacity meter - and what 
policy approaches are associated with their ranking.  
 
2.4.3 Success and the performance capacity meter 
 
In addition to the organizational framework provided by the performance capacity meter, an 
investigation was performed to assess the possibility of a linkage between a higher degree of 
capacity for performance in the usage of the approach with reported success of the specific 
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programs. The definition of 'success' and reports of success are based on available information 
from the literature and therefore no assertions can be made beyond the acknowledgement of a 
general trend. This potential relationship between degree of basis in performance and degree of 
success warrants further study with quantifiable metrics to measure reported successes. 
 
Successes reported were largely encompassed within the social and environmental contexts. 
Social successes were often reported as stakeholder buy-in, development of trust, and high rates 
of participation by agricultural producers. Environmental successes were measured or estimated 
improvements to water quality as a result of the implementation of a program. The 
environmental outcomes often varied among pollutants; for example, in the MINAS program (an 
emissions charges instrument) nitrogen was reduced from water bodies, but phosphorus was not. 
In a few cases, economic successes were also noted. The Vittel water company PES program 
identified economic successes for the company (continued to operate with assurances of 
adequate water quality), for the program participants (payments to farmers were negotiated 
individually), and also to the broader community (many community members were employed by 
Vittel).  
 
There appeared to be a weak correlation between perceived successes of programs implementing 
performance-based approaches and increasing capacity for performance. For example, the UK 
where a weakly performance-based cross-compliance approach was used reported mixed 
successes and failures while some of the more strongly performance-based approaches 
(particularly those that used differentiated PES) reported high levels of successes in several areas 
(economic, environmental, and social) and no failures. Further evidence of this weak trend was 
the MINAS program that failed to meaningfully reduce P emissions and was eventually 
discontinued.  
 
An important consideration may be the temporal and physical scales of the programs when 
reporting successes. Many of the pilot and small watershed-based programs reported greater 
successes than larger, established regional or national programs. This may be due in part to the 
scale of the project, the amount of time available to assess program performance and success, 
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and also to the attention and time paid by researchers and governments to evaluate the successes 
and failures of the program.  
 
2.4.4 Risk and the performance capacity meter 
 
A common theme identified in the programs evaluated was the importance of the 
"conditionality" aspect of performance-based approaches (Wunder et al. 2008) and the associated 
distribution of risk. Approaches that tie payments or penalties to the achievement of water 
quality outcomes produces or increases the inherent risk of production, primarily as a result of 
variable weather and other factors that can directly or indirectly influence water quality beyond 
the participants' control. This risk must be borne either by the program participant(s), or by the 
program provider, or shared by these and other stakeholder groups. As performance capacity for 
payment/penalty structure increases, risk in receiving payments for water quality also increases 
for program participants. For example, a program low on the capacity meter, such as a practice-
based payment program, will pay regardless of environmental outcome, so risk to the participant 
is limited. Conversely, payments for incremental improvements to water quality that are 
measured directly will have substantial risk associated with them; variables beyond the control of 
agricultural producers could have a significant impact on water quality and influence outcomes 
and associated payments. A high degree of risk was identified in several of the programs as an 
issue that had to be resolved in order to implement a performance-based approach (e.g., 
differentiated PES, water quality trading, cross-compliance). 
 
Often, resolving the issue of risk resulted in transferring risk from the agricultural producer 
(participant) to the program provider or other bodies through guaranteed payments for actions in 
the programs reviewed. This created a substantial weakening effect on the performance-based 
aspect of the programs. For example, in the South Nation water quality trading program a 
"Statement of Roles and Responsibilities" was created that shifted the liability for achieving 
water quality outcomes from landowners to purchasers of water quality credits. This statement 
created the necessary stakeholder buy-in to proceed with the program (O'Grady 2011). This is a 
common theme with payments for ecosystem services; Wunder (2006) reported that most PES 
schemes in existence do not adhere to the 'conditionality' requirement in an attempt to maintain 
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relationships with farmers. The inference in Wunder's report is that conducting PES programs 
with non-payment for undelivered ecological goods and services would likely have negative 
impacts on relationships between governments and farmers. 
 
Balancing risk assignment for stakeholder buy-in is an important consideration in implementing 
performance-based approaches: higher risk is inherent in cost-efficient payment structures; 
however, stakeholder buy-in has been shown through this review to be a key driver in the 
perceived success of programs. Tools to manage the effects of environmental variability on 
EG&S production have been proposed, including a combination of fixed and variable payments 
that reduces the payment risk borne by agricultural producers (Meijerink 2008).The assurance of 
a payment increases participation, and the variable payment provides added incentive to produce 
EG&S. Another tool to reduce the negative impact of risk on program participation is a relative 
performance evaluation, where the performance of agricultural producers are compared to one 
another, rather than actual measurements or estimates of EG&S production (Zabel and Roe 
2009).  
2.5 General lessons drawn from review of performance-based approaches 
 
The preceding review and assessment of performance-based approaches to agri-environmental 
policy indicates that they have not been well-developed for management of agricultural water 
quality. There are few examples of performance-based approaches available within OECD 
countries, and of those examples most are pilot projects or localized, watershed-based initiatives 
(particularly those that are more strongly performance-based). Despite this, there are contextual 
similarities among many of the described cases and some general lessons for successful 
implementation of performance-based approaches can be taken from them. 
 
2.5.1 Social context matters 
 
There are two facets of social context that can play an important part in the capacity to 
implement performance-based approaches. First, the general social context of the region plays an 
important role in the success of implementing a program with these types of approaches. A 
general public acknowledgement of the importance of environmental outcomes from agriculture 
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created the appropriate social enabling conditions to implement a performance-based approach. 
Understanding the prevailing social context regarding agriculture and the environment at a broad 
scale will allow an assessment of the capacity of a region to implement a performance-based 
approach. 
 
Second, understanding social values and norms provides an important benefit to program 
administrators in that programs (and policy approaches therein) can be tailored to the specific 
conditions of the region, leading to greater potential for success (Perrot-Maȋtre 2006). Where 
performance-based approaches have been used to manage water quality successfully, social buy-
in is essential (Selman et al. 2009). Researchers involved in pilot projects identified trust as the 
key factor in gaining stakeholder buy-in for the program region (O'Grady 2011; Perrot-Maȋtre 
2006). For example, O'Grady (2011) described a point in the process of developing a watershed-
based water quality trading program in the South Nation Watershed where progress stalled as a 
result of stakeholder lack of trust. The issue was one of risk management and which party would 
shoulder the majority of the risk in achieving water quality outcomes. He reports that the 
program would not have been successfully implemented without developing social buy-in from 
the community by implementing the approach in a manner that was consistent with the social 
norms and values of the stakeholders. Selman et al. (2009) report that several water quality 
trading programs in the US have stalled short of implementation due to lack of support from key 
stakeholders. Lack of buy-in by agricultural producers in Scotland was described as a limiting 
factor on the success of cross-compliance measures there to reduce nitrate pollution to water 
bodies, and stakeholder reluctance to participate hindered all cross-compliance efforts reviewed 
here. The main problem was a mismatch of social values between agricultural producers who 
view agriculture as an activity to produce food and fibre, and the public at large with multi-
functional expectations of agriculture (McVittie et al. 2010; Macgregor and Warren 2006). The 
effort to understand the social values of stakeholders and development of trust have been 
acknowledged as factors important to the success of watershed-based management (Perrot-
Maȋtre 2006; Global Water Partnership 2009; Mandarano 2009; Conley and Moote 2003). 
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2.5.2 Water quality standards facilitate the implementation of performance-based 
approaches 
 
Institutional capacity appears to be a common constraint to increased implementation of 
performance-based approaches. Researchers have called for specific language in legislation that 
creates capacity for these approaches (Selman et al. 2008; O'Grady 2011). Where the 
institutional capacity does exist, there are several examples of policy approaches implemented in 
other regions to draw from. For example, the total maximum daily load (TMDL) standards in the 
US, combined with specific mandates for cost-effective agri-environmental programming, have 
contributed to the implementation of a major reverse auction program along with over 50 smaller 
water quality trading programs and several examples of PES programs (Selman et al. 2009; 
Claassen et al. 2001).  
 
Implementation, or forthcoming implementation of water quality standards has been an 
important factor in many of the US-based programs and pilot projects, as well as in the UK and 
the South Nation Watershed in Ontario (Selman et al. 2009). The introduction of TMDLs and 
local or regional pollution caps has driven interest in water quality trading, PES, and cross-
compliance. The presence of standards is required to implement some of the more strongly 
performance-based approaches. Even where water quality standards have not been implemented 
or enforced, the fear of regulation on the basis of water quality standards has created social 
conditions conducive to the use of performance-based approaches. In some cases, agricultural 
producers recognized a potential for water quality regulation within their watershed and this 
spurred interest in alternative mechanisms to manage water quality (Winsten 2009).  
 
2.5.3 Well-developed estimation methods are required for stronger performance-based 
approaches 
 
Standardized, consistent, and robust estimation methodologies are necessary for successful 
implementation of performance-based approaches (Selman et al. 2009; Selman et al. 2008; 
Guiling and St. John 2007). Guiling and St. John (2007) call for improved site-specific research 
to improve estimates of environmental outcomes (EG&S), a framework to monitor and ground-
truth models and test accuracy, and a repository of estimation models and monitoring data for the 
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US. Current estimation tools are relatively simple and unlikely to be highly accurate (Winsten 
2009). Improvements in accuracy and site specificity would result in an increase in cost-
effectiveness of payments for EG&S (Ribaudo et al. 2001). These needs likely extend to other 
regions as well, especially those with less experience in implementing performance-based 
approaches to agri-environmental policy, such as Canada. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
The vast majority of OECD member countries have not used performance-based policy 
approaches in the execution of agri-environmental policies related to water quality, based on 
available literature (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997; OECD 2008). The review is 
limited by the relative newness of the use of performance-based instruments for water quality 
and agriculture, as well as by the dearth of published literature related to these approaches. 
However, it is evident from OECD documents that all member countries have several agri-
environmental regulations, policies, and programs to manage water pollution that are based on 
inputs or BMP adoption (OECD 2008). Where performance-based approaches have been used, 
they generally have been piloted but not implemented into longer-term programs. The US, 
Australia and Canada are the main countries that have applied instruments that use performance 
or outcomes rather than inputs as measures for improvements to water quality and to calculate 
payment levels. Other OECD countries have used market-based policy instruments for a number 
of other issues, but not specifically to manage water quality (OECD 2008). 
 
The contextual conditions of regions where performance-based approaches have been 
implemented show some similarities, particularly in the need for a physical driver, institutional 
capacity, and favourable social conditions. There are also noticeable differences among regions 
with performance-based approaches; unique conditions such as data availability or private 
company initiatives create opportunities for specific approaches. However, general lessons can 
be drawn from the similarities among cases. 
 
The contextual factors contribute to a ranking for each performance-based approach on the 
Performance Capacity Meter that describes their performance capacity using measurement 
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method and payment/penalty structure as the metrics. It is evident from the use of this tool that 
substantial variability exists in terms of the potential for incorporating performance into agri-
environmental policy approaches. The Performance Capacity Meter may also be applied as a tool 
to identify a region's capacity to implement a performance-based approach based on the same 
metrics of measurement and payment/penalty structure. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXAMINING THE SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR IMPLEMENTING 
PERFORMANCE-BASED POLICY APPROACHES TO MANAGE WATER 
QUALITY IN AGRICULTURAL AREAS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Incentive-based programs have been the primary mechanism used by governments in Canada to 
encourage agricultural practices that produce ecological goods and services (EG&S), which are 
positive environmental outcomes from agricultural landscapes that are not valued by the market. 
Many of these programs have focused on reducing negative impacts on water quality, with good 
water quality as one of the desired EG&S outcomes. Incentive-based programs are based on the 
perception that agricultural landowners should be paid to reduce their negative impacts to water 
quality. These programs are not necessarily cost-effective means to provide payments for 
environmental outcomes: incentive-based programs focus on changing management practices 
(practice-based); however, the link between practices and environmental outcomes can be weak 
(Heimlich and Claassen 2004).  
 
An alternative to practice-based environmental policy and programs is a performance-based 
approach (NRTEE 2005; Kennedy 2009; Weber 2001; Weinberg and Claassen 2006). In a 
performance-based approach, the landowner realizes some type of economic incentive (e.g., a 
payment or penalty) based on production of EG&S (ecosystem outputs, or performance) rather 
than on simply adopting a practice. Performance-based approaches focus on outcomes rather 
than particular practices, where producer flexibility is a key component of programs (Winsten 
2009; Weinberg and Claassen 2006; Keeney and Boody 2005). Performance-based approaches 
require that environmental outcomes must be well-defined and program responses (payments or 
penalties) are conditional on outcome delivery (Wunder et al. 2008). The expected performance 
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of a particular practice can be estimated based on mechanisms such as simulation models 
(Lowell et al. 2007) and indicators (Weinberg and Claassen 2006), while actual performance can 
be measured through on-site or remote monitoring (Hanley et al. 2004; Cohen and Goward 
2004). These performance-based approaches are considered to be a more efficient method of 
incentivizing agricultural landowners to reduce their negative impact on the environment 
(Weinberg and Claassen 2006). 
 
The broad objective of this manuscript is to evaluate the potential, from a social context 
perspective, for performance-based approaches to be implemented in the study region of 
southwest Alberta. This objective supports the assumption that social norms and values change 
over time, and a discrepancy between the environmental reference level agricultural landowners 
are obligated to provide and the environmental target level expected by society may develop. 
This results in a situation where new policy approaches (such as performance-based approaches) 
may be implemented to better align policy with social norms and values.  
3.1.1 Social perceptions of agricultural property rights  
 
The perceived rights and responsibilities of agricultural landowners by society (i.e.,, social norms 
and values) are often reflected in the agri-environmental policy approaches of a region (Hodge 
2001). Property rights to agricultural land exist as a result of social acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of an ownership claim (Bromley 1991). The historical view of property rights in 
Canada and elsewhere in developed nations was that agricultural producers had the right to do as 
they please on their land and should be given incentives to change (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann 
2005; Hodge 2001, 2007). This historical view of society's willingness to rely on agricultural 
landowners to manage the land without interference was supported by Pond (2009) in a review 
of an Ontario land use policy. Conversely, Klintman (2010) stated that the public has always 
expected a level of environmental stewardship from agricultural landowners and suggested that 
increasing public distrust of the state to ensure the provision of environmental benefits from 
agriculture has been the reason for a perceived shift in social values. Regardless of whether or 
not there has been a shift in the public's perception of agriculture, a traditional view of property 
rights endures through many of Canada’s agri-environmental programs and agricultural 
producers have often been compensated to some degree for costs associated with adopting 
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BMPs. For example, trees have been provided, free of charge, for agricultural landowners to 
construct shelterbelts to reduce soil erosion and enhance snow retention (AAFC 2008). These 
practices have been developed to improve environmental conditions on agricultural land. In 
addition, education and technical assistance are offered to agricultural producers free of charge. 
Agri-environmental incentive programs infer implicitly that landowners have a right to 
compensation for providing social benefits by changing their practices or adopting new 
technology (Tovey 2008); transferring resources from the public to private landowners 
(MacIntosh and Denniss 2004). This is equivalent to incentive programs implying that the public 
has the responsibility to ensure that agricultural operations produce environmental benefits and 
prevent environmental harm. 
 
Social expectations of the rights and responsibilities of agricultural landowners are reflected in 
environmental reference levels, enforced or promoted through regulations and agri-
environmental programs. The reference level is defined by the obligations agricultural producers 
have to provide environmental quality at their own expense (OECD 2010). The environmental 
reference level for water quality in Canada is low. There are some restrictions on practices that 
can impact water quality; for example, setback requirements for pesticide application and 
manure handling and storage, however water quality is managed through guidelines rather than 
standards and these are often exceeded (AAFC 2011; Environment Canada 2010). 
Environmental references levels may not accurately represent the social demand for the 
provision of EG&S; however, and the OECD (2010) describes an "environmental target level" 
that may be higher than the reference level and represents society's preferences for 
environmental quality. The environmental target level will change with shifting social norms and 
values and the corresponding demand for environmental benefits from agriculture (OECD 2010). 
 
Two principles for responsibility emerge from environmental reference and target levels: the 
'polluter pays' principle applies below the reference level; and the 'beneficiary pays' principle 
applies above it (Figure 3-1). The polluter pays principle was first articulated by the OECD in 
1972 and in 1990 it was applied by the OECD as an important principle in agricultural policy 
(OECD 2010). The principle is based on the notion that polluters should bear the cost of 
preventing or mitigating environmental damage to ensure the environment is maintained in an 
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acceptable state (OECD 1972). The beneficiary pays principle is warranted where society desires 
environmental benefits from agriculture beyond the demand for reduction of harm caused by 
agricultural activities (Grossman 2007). This concept has also been described and further 
developed in a Canadian climate change adaptation report directed toward policy options for 
agricultural producers (Eco Resources and International Institute for Sustainable Development 
2010).  
 
Figure 3-1. The polluter pays and beneficiary pays principles for changing social expectations of 
EG&S production by agricultural producers. Adapted from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2010) . 
 
This study is based on a “social process” view of property rights; that is, property rights change 
over time (Gosnell and Travis 2005; Macpherson 1978). Based on this view of property rights, 
agricultural landowners’ practices, and the agri-environmental policy that guides them, will need 
to adapt to society’s perceptions of acceptable practices. The success of a new agri-
environmental policy approaches, including performance-based approaches, can be impacted by 
society’s perceptions of the scope of property rights of agricultural landowners, and whether the 
policies conform to society’s views (Davies and Hodge 2006). The perception of legitimacy of 
the new policy approaches by agricultural landowners will potentially increase adherence (or 
compliance) to the policy and motivation in relation to the aim of the policy.  
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3.1.2 Social norms and values in southwest Alberta 
 
Efforts have been made to understand the motivations of agricultural producers in adopting 
BMPs (Banack and Hvenegaard 2010), and barriers to their adoption in Alberta (Alberta 
Research Council 2006). While these studies are important for the advancement of practice-
based programs, they do not provide the needed guidance in the development of a progressive, 
cost-effective performance-based policy. There appears to be no recent literature that provides an 
understanding of current perceptions of agricultural property rights in Alberta. Before new policy 
approaches are implemented that have the potential to alter agricultural property rights (e.g., 
limit the rights producers have to release pollutants into water bodies) the social norms and 
values of the region should be examined for compatibility with the principles of the policy 
approach (Davies and Hodge 2006; Lejano et al. 2007). This study examines if and how values 
differ between agricultural producers and the public, as well as how perceptions align with 
current policy and potential performance-based approaches. 
 
The perception of property rights and responsibilities of agricultural landowners from the 
viewpoints of agricultural landowners, rural residents and urban residents in southwest Alberta 
was investigated. The objective was to assess the potential to implement performance-based agri-
environmental policy instruments by evaluating the prevailing perspectives of water quality 
stakeholders related to: 1) responsibility for effects of agricultural activities on the environment; 
2) agricultural property rights and responsibilities; and 3) preferences for policy approaches. 
 
3.2 Methods 
 
3.2.1 Study site description 
 
Opinions of agricultural landowners representing the range of agricultural activities in Alberta 
were solicited regarding water quality and agri-environmental policy. To obtain the perspectives 
of agricultural producers for a wide variety of management activities, three watersheds were 
included in this study. The main study site was the Indianfarm Creek Watershed in southwest 
Alberta, situated within the foothills fescue subregion in the Black Chernozem soil zone (Figure 
3-2). The area of the watershed is approximately 14,500 ha (Olson and Kalischuk 2008) and all 
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land is privately owned except for 65 ha of leased Crown land. This watershed was chosen 
because it represents a range of agricultural activities: native and tame pasture, annual and 
perennial crops and livestock production. Though it is a relatively small watershed, there are two 
distinct regions where activities differ: the upper reaches of Indianfarm Creek are in the foothills 
of the Rocky Mountains where the area is used primarily for pasture and tame hay, along with 
some annual crops and one feedlot; the lower region is dominated by annual crops and livestock 
operations including beef cattle confined feeding operations, cow-calf production, and one dairy. 
The primary land uses in the watershed are annual crops (40%), pasture (44%) and confined 
feedlot operations (CFOs) (8%) (Olson and Kalischuk 2008).  
 
Additionally, the Indianfarm Creek watershed was chosen because of existing water quality 
concerns. Water tends to flow heavily in spring from snowmelt, during and after rain events, and 
significant flows can also be triggered by releases from a dam built near the top of the watershed. 
These intermittent flows result in stream bank erosion, which results in sedimentation and 
reduction of water quality. Water quality monitoring data indicate that during particular times of 
the year fecal coliform, nitrogen, and phosphorus levels are substantially higher than water 
quality guidelines recommend (Olson and Kalischuk 2008). Alberta Agriculture and Rural 
Development (AARD) reported that total phosphorus and total nitrogen values in the creek in 
2007 averaged 0.16 mg L-1 and 1.68 mg L-1, respectively. These concentrations are 3 and 1.6 
times higher than the provincial guidelines for the protection of aquatic life (Science and 
Standards Branch 1999). In addition, fecal coliform bacteria concentrations exceeded the 
recommendations for irrigation water quality during high flow periods after rain events, at 
snowmelt, and at a few monitoring sites during base flow (Olson and Kalischuk 2008). Average 
total coliforms were three times higher than the guideline of 1000 cfu 100 ml-1 (Olson and 
Kalischuk 2009). Fecal coliforms, including Escherichia coli (E. coli), originate from manure 
sources and can cause disease in animals and humans.  
 
Finally, the Indianfarm Creek watershed was a good fit for the current research since AARD is 
performing a study in the watershed to quantify the impacts of BMPs on water quality. The 
agency has developed relationships with many of the agricultural landowners in the watershed  
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Figure 3-2. Location of Indianfarm Creek, Battersea Drain and Whelp Creek watersheds in 
Alberta (Source: Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development. Used with permission). 
 
 
and provided access to them through advertising in their newsletter and attendance at field days 
and watershed meetings.  
 
Two additional watersheds were included to obtain a more complete representation of 
agricultural landowner attitudes within this region. These watersheds, Battersea Drain and Whelp 
Creek (Figure 3-2), were chosen for two reasons. First, they included agricultural activities not 
found in Indianfarm Creek watershed. Second, AARD was actively working within these 
watersheds on the same project as in Indianfarm Creek Watershed. AARD facilitated access to 
watershed residents with contact information where possible, and promoted this study through 
their watershed newsletters that were distributed to all landowners in all three watersheds.  
 
The Battersea Drain is part of an area of southern Alberta known as ‘Feedlot Alley’, with a high 
concentration of livestock (over 1 million) in a 500km2 area (Environment Canada 2010). All 
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land in this watershed is privately owned. This watershed is situated 25 km north of the city of 
Lethbridge in the mixed grass subregion and has brown to Dark-Brown Chernozemic soils 
(Figure 3-2). The main agricultural activities within Battersea Drain are confined feeding 
operations for beef cattle and annual, irrigated cropping (Rodvang 2009). Fecal coliform 
concentrations are of particular concern in this watershed (Acharya et al. 2008), due in part to the 
high quantities of manure produced and applied to crop land and to the high incidence of 
gastroenteritis from fecal bacteria (Johnson et al. 2003). Fecal coliform concentrations in 
Battersea Drain were measured over three years from 1998-2000 and levels in surface water 
were found to be more than double the provincial guidelines for the protection of aquatic life in 
30% of the samples (Hyland et al. 2003).  
 
The Whelp Creek watershed has an area of approximately 4500 ha, with 1% of the area occupied 
by Crown land. It is located 6 km west of the town of Lacombe, in the black soil zone and the 
central parkland subregion of central Alberta (Figure 3-2). This watershed is approximately 400 
km north of the Indianfarm Creek Watershed and the Battersea Drain. The watershed supports a 
variety of agricultural activities, but is also used by other industries. Land is used mainly for 
annual grain and forage crops, with some hog and dairy production. There is a strong oil and gas 
industry presence, and the eastern part of the watershed has been zoned for industrial 
development (Olson and Kalischuk 2009).  
 
3.2.2 Data collection 
 
Interviews and surveys were used to collect the opinions of residents in the three watersheds, and 
other residents of southern Alberta regarding agricultural landowner rights and responsibilities 
for water quality. These instruments were approved by the University of Saskatchewan Ethics 
Review Board. Questions posed to respondents, whether through interview or survey, were 
identical. Interviews were used in the watersheds to gain additional information about 
agricultural practices, participation in agri-environmental programs, and motivations for 
participation or reasons for non-participation in those programs. For the broader societal 
opinions, interviews were not a feasible method to collect respondent views, so surveys were 
used in selected southern Alberta communities to obtain urban and rural perspectives. Stratified 
59 
 
sampling was used to select communities at varying distances from the Indianfarm Creek 
Watershed, and stratified random sampling (using a random number generator) was used to 
select postal codes within the city of Lethbridge to, as accurately as possible, represent the three 
main regions of the city.  
 
Respondents were divided into three groups for comparisons: 1) agricultural producers 
(watershed residents plus survey respondents who identified themselves as producers); 2) rural 
residents (respondents from the five rural communities that did not identify themselves as 
producers); and 3) urban residents (all respondents from Lethbridge that did not identify 
themselves as producers). This approach was used to investigate potential differences between 
groups at varying social distances from agricultural activities (Boulanger et al. 2004; cited in 
Vera-Toscano et al. 2007), although Vero-Toscano et al. (2007) found that geography and 
dominance of agriculture in the region also played an important role in respondents' perceptions 
of agriculture, whether rural or urban.  
 
Interviews 
All agricultural landowners in the three watersheds (N = 120) were sent information about the 
study using the quarterly AARD watershed newsletter that provides watershed news and 
highlights upcoming events. Potential respondents were then contacted by mail with a letter 
outlining the study and requesting participation using comprehensive sampling (provided in 
Appendix A). Approximately two weeks after the letter was sent, phone requests were made for 
interviews. Thirty phone calls were answered or returned, and 19 interviews were conducted. 
Interviews were semi-structured allowing for specific questions to be asked of all respondents, 
but also providing opportunities for further discussion. Questions in the interview were focused 
primarily on eliciting attitudes towards participation in cost-sharing agri-environmental 
programs, experiences and attitudes toward these programs, measures undertaken to manage 
water quality without compensation, respondents’ local knowledge of the watershed and water 
quality challenges, and individual farm characteristics (interview script provided in Appendix B).  
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Surveys 
The survey instrument was composed primarily of Likert scale questions, where respondents 
rated their degree of agreement with statements provided in the survey. Respondents were asked 
to provide their perceptions of local surface water quality, their concern for water quality, the 
responsibility that various groups held for water quality, their priorities regarding concerns that 
should be addressed by agri-environmental policy and preferences for policy instruments. 
Respondents were also asked to provide demographic information and voluntary additional 
comments (survey instrument provided in Appendix C). These questions were asked of all 
respondents. The questions were asked in interviews with watershed residents in Indianfarm 
Creek, Whelp Creek, and Battersea Drain watersheds, and asked by survey for all other 
respondents residing outside of the three watersheds. Surveys were mailed with a description of 
the research project, consent form and postage-paid return envelope by unaddressed mail using 
Canada Post for distribution to all potential participants. 
 
The survey was pre-tested with a sample of ten individuals: five university students and five 
people from a variety of occupations, including agricultural production. The survey was 
modified to accommodate uncertainties in language, structure and instructions that were revealed 
during this piloting process.  
 
3.2.3 Sampling 
 
Five communities were chosen at increasing distance from Indianfarm Creek Watershed, using 
stratified sampling of a list of communities between Indianfarm Creek Watershed and the city of 
Lethbridge in southern Alberta. These communities, in order of increasing distance from the 
watershed, were: Brocket, Granum, Nobleford, Monarch and Shaughnessy. They are all located 
in close proximity to the Oldman River, to which Indianfarm Creek is a tributary. Brocket is a 
hamlet situated within the Piikani First Nation reserve, located adjacent to the watershed. The 
rest of the communities surveyed are small rural towns with agricultural activities occurring 
around them. The main agricultural activities that occur in this region range from extensive 
livestock production (mostly cattle) on native and tame pasture and crop production in the west 
(Brocket, Granum) to intensive confined livestock operations and feed production in the east 
61 
 
(Nobleford, Monarch and Shaughnessy) (Table 3-1). This range of agricultural activities is 
consistent with a change in soil type from Black Chernozem in the west to Dark Brown 
Chernozem in the east (Figure 3-2) and average annual precipitation ranges from 515 mm in the 
west to 365 mm in the east (Environment Canada 2010). 
 
Table 3-1. Characteristics of agricultural activities of municipalities where surveyed 
communities are located (data from 2006). 
Municipality Average farm size Crops Pasture Irrigated land Livestock  
 (ha) (% of total agricultural land) (no. of head) 
 
Pincher Creek 
(Brocket) 
649 27 65 1 123,900 
 
Willow Creek 
(Granum) 
561 40 56 4 245,000 
 
Lethbridge County 
(Nobleford, Monarch, 
Shaughnessy) 
277 70 19 37 646,700 
Source: Statistics Canada (2006) 
 
Each mailing address within selected communities received a survey to meet the research 
objective of collecting a broad range of rural opinions. The number of surveys sent to each 
community and response rates are reported in Table 3-2. No surveys were returned from Brocket. 
Canada Post confirmed distribution of the surveys to the community. Inquiries to a local 
authority regarding possible reasons for the lack of responses went unanswered. 
 
Residents of the city of Lethbridge were included to provide a representative urban perspective, 
as Lethbridge draws water from the Oldman River for household use. Indianfarm Creek is a 
tributary of the Oldman River. Lethbridge is the largest urban centre in southern Alberta with a 
population of 95,200 (Statistics Canada 2006). Lethbridge developed as a coal-mining town in 
the mid-1800’s; however, agriculture has become an important industry for the community since 
that time (Ellis 2001). Lethbridge has a university, a strong agricultural service sector and a 
federal agricultural research facility. Within Lethbridge, surveys were sent to each mailing 
address in a stratified random sample of postal codes that represented the three main districts in 
the city (north, south and west), representing approximately 7% of all households in the city.  
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3.2.4 Data analysis 
 
Principal components analysis was performed for exploratory data analysis to determine how 
respondents were grouped according to their priorities for water quality program outcomes; 
social, economic, and environmental. Principal components analysis was used to explain the 
variance in respondents’ responses to a number of questions with a reduced number of 
components (Moran et al. 2007; Field 2005). Component coefficient scores, calculated for each 
respondent as part of the PCA, were plotted on axes that represented the two components to 
assess how priorities varied among and between groups at varying social distances from 
agriculture (Figure 3-7). The analysis was run using SPSS 18 (SPSS, Inc.) with a Varimax 
rotation with Kaiser Normalization and achieved convergence in three iterations (Field 2005; 
Moran et al. 2007). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure confirmed sampling adequacy with a 
reported statistic of 0.854. The PCA was run on non-normally distributed data; however, this 
analysis is considered acceptable for descriptive purposes (Jolliffe 2002). 
 
The open-ended questions in the interviews and comments were evaluated to identify themes 
using content analysis (Gillham 2008). Comments provided by watershed residents in interviews 
and by survey respondents were queried and coded into categories describing commonalities 
called ‘nodes’. Some of the nodes, such as reasons for and against participation in agri-
environmental programs, were developed a priori. Others developed as content was reviewed. 
The software package NVivo 8 (QSR International, Inc.) was used for this analysis. 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Response rates 
 
The response rate varied between 8 and 13% for most locations, with a total of 19 interviews 
conducted and 249 completed surveys returned (Table 3-2).  
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Table 3-2. Survey and interview response rates 
Location Number of 
surveys delivered 
Number of 
responses 
Response rate 
(%) 
Proportion of total 
responses (%) 
Watersheds1 1202 19 16 6 
Brocket 228 0 0 0 
Granum 190 17 9 7 
Monarch 156 20 13 8 
Nobleford 293 27 9 10 
Shaughnessy 134 11 8 4 
Lethbridge 2260 174 8 66 
1
 Includes interviewees from Indianfarm Creek (n=15), Whelp Creek (n=1) and Battersea 
Drain (n=3) watersheds 
2
 Number of residents contacted by mail in all three watersheds 
 
There was a very low response rate from the Whelp Creek watershed (Table 3-2). The contact 
with this watershed was unavoidably delayed for three months between delivery of invitation 
letters and calling for interviews. When phone calls were made, many went unanswered and 
landowners who answered the phone often were unable to recall the letter sent out. The lone 
respondent from Whelp Creek stated, at the end of the interview, that there had been many 
inquiries from government, students and the oil and gas industry for information and that he was 
tired of being asked to take time to answer questions. The combination of interview fatigue and 
confusion around previous information sent out resulted in a decision that sufficient data were 
obtained from other watersheds at that point, and no further contact was made with Whelp Creek 
watershed residents.  
 
Characteristics of the sample population were compared to characteristics of the provincial 
population based on the 2006 census of Alberta to determine how representative the study 
sample population was of the provincial population. The sample population had an under-
representation of 18-45 year olds and overrepresentation of 46-75 year olds, with an average 
difference in proportion of 40%. The same comparison was made for occupations of 
respondents. General groups of occupations were created, as some occupation descriptions 
provided by respondents were difficult to assess and the proportion of Albertans that consider 
themselves retired is not provided by Statistics Canada. Given these limitations, the agriculture 
and resource-based industries were overrepresented, as were the health care and education 
industries.  
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When survey response demographic proportions were compared to the community census data3, 
18-25 year olds were consistently under-represented and 46-65 year olds were over-represented. 
There were instances where occupations were highly over-represented, such as in health care in 
Monarch, education in Nobleford, and construction in Shaughnessy (more than quadruple the 
census proportion in all cases). In general, agricultural and natural-resource based occupations 
were over-represented by the highest margin (average of triple the census proportion across 
communities) (Statistics Canada 2006). The over-representation of agricultural producers may 
have created a bias in favour of the dominant agricultural perspective; however, respondent 
groups were divided by social distance from agriculture, so perspectives of rural and urban 
residents with no agricultural affiliation were represented.  
 
Table 3-3. Survey questions and responses grouped by agricultural producers (n = 52), rural 
residents (n = 50) and urban residents (n = 166).  
  Median response 
Question  Ag. producers Rural Urban 
1. Rate surface water quality in your area 
(Scale: 1-71 ) 
5.5(±0.2)7 4(±0.4) 5(±0.1) 
2. Rate your concern for water quality  
(Scale: 1-72 ) 
6(±0.2) 6(±0.2) 6(±0.1) 
3. How much do groups benefit from changing agricultural practices to improve water 
quality? (Scale: 1-43 ) 
   General public 4(±0.2) 4(±0.2) 4(0) 
   The producer that adopts the practice 4(±0.2) 3.5(±0.2) 4(±0.1) 
 Those downstream from the producer 4(0) 4(0) 4(0) 
4. Who should be responsible for ensuring water quality is at an acceptable level on 
agricultural landscapes? (Scale: 1-44 ) 
   Governments 3 (±0.2) 4(0) 4(0) 
   Agricultural landowners 4(0) 4(0) 4(0) 
 Non-governmental organizations 2(±0.2) 3(±0.2) 3(0) 
 General public 3(±0.2) 3(±0.2) 3(0) 
5. Rate statements based on your feeling about them (Scale: 1-75 ) 
 Governments should create water quality 
programs for agricultural producers 
6(±0.2) 6(±0.2) 6(±0.1) 
   Producers are stewards of the land 7(±0.2) 7(±0.2) 7(±0.1) 
   Producers are responsible for the 
environmental effects of their practices 
6(±0.2) 7(±0.2) 7(0) 
 Public should pay producers based on the 
degree of water quality improvement 
5(0) 5(±0.2) 5(±0.1) 
                                                           
3
 Community census data were available for Granum, Nobleford, and Lethbridge. For the communities of Monarch 
and Shaughnessy, Lethbridge county census data were used. 
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   Producers should be able to choose whether 
they participate in programs 
5(±0.2) 3(±0.7) 3(±0.1) 
 Producers have the right to use any practice 
they want 
2(±0.2) 2(±0.2) 2(0) 
 My taxes should not be increased to pay for 
EG&S 
5(±0.4) 5(±0.4) 4(±0.1) 
 Public should pay more for food produced 
in a way where EG&S are also produced 
5(±0.4) 4(±0.7) 4(±0.1) 
 Good actors should not be paid 5(±0.2) 4(±0.2) 4(±0.1) 
 Producers should be paid for EG&S, 
regardless of whether costs were incurred or 
not 
5(±0.2) 5(±0.4) 4(0) 
6. Rate list of characteristics for their importance as a priority focus of agricultural 
programs (Scale: 0-106 )                                 
   Financial incentives 8(±0.7) 7(±0.7) 7(±0.4) 
   Survival of rural communities 8(±0.8) 8(±0.7) 8(±0.4) 
 Water quality for animals and aquatic life 9(±0.5) 10(±0.4) 10(±0.2) 
 Human health risk decreased 10(±0.2) 10(±0.2) 10(±0.1) 
 Lowest cost to taxpayers 6(±0.9) 6(±0.7) 7(±0.6) 
   No negative financial impact to producers 7.5(±1.1) 7(±0.9) 7(±0.5) 
 Most environmental benefit with least cost 9(±0.7) 10(±0.4) 9(±0.4) 
 All producers should be eligible  9(±0.4) 10(±0.7) 9(±0.4) 
   Water quality for recreation 8(±0.7) 8(±0.7) 8(±0.4) 
 Sustaining quality for future generations 9(±0.4) 10(±0.2) 10(0) 
Explanation of rating scales: 
1
 1 = Very poor …7 = very good 
2
 1 = Completely unconcerned …7 = very concerned 
3
 1 = No benefit, 2 = benefit somewhat, 3 = benefit moderately, 4 = benefit significantly 
4 1 = Not responsible at all, 2 = somewhat responsible, 3 = moderately responsible, 4 = very responsible 
5
 1 = Strongly disagree… 7 = strongly agree 
6
 Number of points given to each item indicated its importance (0 = not important at all…10 = extremely 
important) 
7
 95% confidence interval for the median. The 95% confidence interval for the median is a distribution free 
statistic. It is derived as follows using the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile, or Tukey's upper 
and lower hinges (H-spread): median +/- (1.58 x (H-spread)/sqrt n) (Velleman and Hoaglin 1981) 
 
3.3.2 Water quality perceptions 
 
Agricultural producers and urban residents felt that surface water quality in the area was 
‘somewhat good’, while rural residents gave water quality a lower ‘neutral’ rating (Table 3-3). A 
nonparametric independent samples Kruskal Wallis test (Chi square = 8.3, df = 2, sig = 0.016) 
confirmed a significant difference (at the 95% confidence level) among ratings of water quality. 
Further investigation of how individual communities rated water quality showed that respondents 
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from the rural community of Shaughnessy rated water quality the poorest (median rating was 
‘somewhat poor’, while the median rating at other locations was ‘good’).  
 
Respondents made a number of additional comments related to agricultural practices and their 
effect on water quality. Some (n = 10) thought that confined livestock operations (CLOs) were a 
major source of pollution, while others (n = 4) made specific comments about extensive cattle 
grazing and stream contamination. The high degree of concern about CLOs may be related to the 
proximity of most respondents to ‘Feedlot Alley’. The comments related to cattle in streams 
were mostly first-hand accounts of events witnessed by the respondent. Though a few of the 
respondents relayed personal experiences, most comments related to CLOs and other industrial 
contaminants made reference to acquiring the information from second-hand sources (e.g., media 
sources). Ten respondents identified other industries as more significant sources of water 
contamination (e.g., the oil and gas industry, coal mining, golf courses and users of household 
chemicals).  
 
3.3.3 Responsibility and property rights 
 
Many ratings related to perceptions about responsibility of ensuring adequate water quality were 
similar between groups. For example, all groups agreed that agricultural producers and 
governments hold the greatest responsibility for water quality on agricultural lands, followed by 
the public and non-governmental organizations (Table 3-3). However, agricultural producers 
were less willing to give governments a ‘very responsible’ rating than other groups (Figure 3-3) 
and indicated a lower expected degree of responsibility by governments than rural or urban 
residents (Table 3-3). Almost all (98%) agricultural producers acknowledged the need for 
government involvement at some level, and nearly 40% of interview respondents made a 
comment in support of governments acting as an authority to oversee water quality. Interview 
respondents identified establishing standards as important for controlling abuse of the watershed. 
Several survey and interview respondents (interview n= 5; survey n = 13) made comments that if 
governments expected improvements beyond a minimum standard, there should be a 
compensation mechanism. One producer noted that giving governments responsibility did not 
mean that they had the right to dictate management decisions for producers (what he termed 
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“over-legislating”). The reluctance to involve government in agri-environmental matters by 
agricultural producers was reinforced by respondent comments. For example, one producer 
commented that he made management decisions related to the environment that were “common 
sense”, and that he did not need the government to give him money for that purpose.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Perceived responsibility of governments and agricultural producers for water quality 
by respondent group. Agricultural producers n = 52; Rural residents n = 50; Urban residents n = 
166. 
 
Agricultural producers were generally willing to accept responsibility for the environmental 
effects of the management practices they use, but ranked their level of responsibility lower than 
other groups did (Table 3-3). Most also felt that they should not be able to use whatever 
management practice they want, preferring instead that a condition be placed on producers to 
adhere to a certain standard. This belief was shared among respondents from all groups where 
the suggestion was made that agricultural producers must use “appropriate” or “good” 
management practices and as long as that condition is satisfied, they can choose their practices. 
Approximately 50% of watershed interview respondents provided comments concerning using 
‘proper’ management. Comments were made in the surveys (rural n = 3 ; urban n = 10) 
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suggesting that bad practices be penalized and good practices rewarded, and that there should be 
standards in place to ensure water quality is not degraded by agricultural practices.  
 
Statements made by interview respondents around property rights indicated that respondents 
were strongly in favour of maintaining the exclusive set of property rights currently upheld. One 
producer commented that "landowners should have the freedom to manage”. Other statements 
related to property rights included: "farmers own the land", "farmers should be rewarded for 
good management", "ranchers should receive rewards for not polluting", and "if people like 
things a certain way, they should pay".  
 
Society’s willingness to recognize landowners' rights to manage the land as they see fit was 
addressed by asking respondents whether agricultural landowners should be able to use whatever 
management practice they want. No group felt that producers should be unrestricted in their 
management decisions, but rural and urban groups were neutral on the topic of whether 
agricultural programs should be voluntary, while agricultural producers were in greater favour 
(Table 3-3). There was a lot of variation around the rural response to this question, indicating a 
lack of consensus on the issue (Noble 2004). Some interview respondents (n = 3) commented 
that regulations would not work, as enforcement would be too difficult, while others (n = 7 ) 
thought ‘bad’ farmers should be regulated, but again, only to a reasonable standard. Several rural 
and urban respondents agreed that regulation was necessary; 48% of rural respondents and 42% 
of urban respondents indicated that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with environmental 
programs remaining voluntary for agricultural producers. Comments made by rural and urban 
respondents indicated stances in agreement and in opposition of the idea of increasing regulation 
in the interest of environmental quality. One respondent from the community of Monarch stated 
“no one has the ‘right’ to poison my water”. Seven other comments were made that referenced 
regulation as acceptable. Many emotional written comments related to water quality were made 
within the surveys, demonstrating the importance of the water quality issue to southern 
Albertans: 
“The water [is] being contaminated with no thought, other than profit!” (4L) 
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“The people on this planet right now who have the most influence on the water quality don’t care 
what condition they are leaving the water in for their grand children!” (5S) 
 
“While I recognize there will be a financial cost in implementing any program, I do not feel 
programs and policies on something as essential as water should be limited or guided, first and 
foremost, by cost. The bigger cost would be the loss or contamination of vital resources for years 
or generations to come. We are ethically responsible for our planet’s health!” (23L) 
 
“Water is one of our most important natural resources. Taking care of it should be top priority! It 
should not become a dumping ground for garbage and harmful chemicals. We have a new 
generation of children to inherit our earth and let’s hope it’s worth inheriting.” (53L) 
 
Despite the high degree of concern expressed by some respondents, there was an equivalent 
number of responses that favoured voluntary measures (such as incentives and providing 
education to producers) to responses favouring regulation. Overall, agricultural producers rated 
maintaining voluntary participation in agri-environmental programs significantly more 
favourably than rural and urban respondents (Figure 3-4).  
 
Several watershed residents (n = 7) indicated in specific comments that they did not agree that 
the public should have the capacity to influence local agricultural policy. Two respondents 
commented that the public should not dictate or be consulted about agricultural policy. Another 
respondent stated that "if they are going to complain (be whistleblowers or police agriculture), 
then they have responsibility to ensure good water quality". There seemed to be a strong feeling 
of public misunderstanding about agricultural practices. Interview respondents equated giving 
the public responsibility for making policy decisions with giving them a right to demand how 
agriculture is practiced. All of these statements indicate that the watershed residents feel very 
strongly about their property rights and are unwilling to give up any of their perceived rights to 
manage the land.  
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Figure 3-4. Respondent ratings by group for maintaining the voluntary nature of agri-
environmental programs. Agricultural producers n = 52; Rural residents n = 50; Urban residents 
n = 166. 
 
3.3.4 Policy and programs for agricultural producers 
 
A number of options around payments for EG&S (particularly those pertaining to water quality) 
were proposed to respondents including higher food prices, increases in public taxes to pay for 
improvements and a range of questions about the structure of a payment program. Median 
responses were generally in the neutral range for several of these mechanisms, including tax 
increases and higher food prices (Table 3-3). This was an unexpected response, and further 
investigation revealed that the number of respondents who agreed and disagreed with tax 
increases was equivalent, with few ambivalent respondents. However, increased food prices 
generated little support or opposition, with most responses in the range of ‘somewhat disagree’ 
to ‘somewhat agree’. Urban respondents were less willing to pay more for food, and agricultural 
producers tended to agree with price increases, while rural residents showed more variation in 
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their responses as indicated by the larger confidence interval (Table 3-3). In comments provided 
by interviewees, watershed residents commented about food prices, stating that food prices do 
not reflect the true cost of food and that profit margins are small for small farms. Some specific 
comments were also made by survey respondents about the possibility of increased food prices. 
Most respondents that commented on this mechanism thought that food prices were already high, 
but a few suggested that we pay much less than many other countries for groceries.  
 
There was support for a performance-based program, such as payments for EG&S. Agricultural 
producers were the group most in favour of this type of policy instrument, though their level of 
approval for it was less than for practice-based incentive programs (Table 3-3). The distribution 
of ratings for performance-based payments shows that 75% of agricultural producers agreed to 
some degree, while 55% of rural respondents and 60% of urban respondents agreed (Figure 3-5). 
Respondents from all groups commented that this type of payment structure was unlikely to 
work. This sentiment may have resulted in the cautious agreement to this mechanism. Many 
interviewees commented that this type of program would be nice, but was not feasible. The main 
concerns about this type of program were difficulty in measuring water quality output and 
monitoring and enforcement.  
 
A final policy question focused on the problem of the good actor; that is, agricultural producers 
who have independently made improvements to their land and management practices that 
positively affect water quality without compensation. Overall, respondents felt neutral or 
somewhat agreed that good actors should not be paid for actions in the past, and surprisingly, 
agricultural producers agreed more strongly than other groups for not paying good actors (Table 
3-3). Where additional comments were made, some suggested specific time periods for 
retroactive payments. Many of the watershed residents interviewed indicated that the cost of 
paying good actors was too great and therefore not feasible. This viewpoint from watershed 
residents is interesting, as approximately 80% of them reported that they have made changes to 
their operations without financial assistance (i.e., they are good actors).  
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Figure 3-5. Response distribution related to whether performance-based payments should be 
provided for ecological goods and services, by respondent group. 
 
In general, urban and rural residents did not display a strong opinion on most policy instruments 
proposed by the survey. This is unlikely a result of a lack of concern for water quality, as over 
80% of both groups indicated they were at least ‘somewhat concerned’ about water quality.  
3.3.5 Age trends 
 
Frequency of responses were divided by age to gain some insight into how differing age groups 
perceive agricultural responsibility, rights, and water quality and potential trends in future social 
norms and values. The results show some important differences among groups. Respondents 
between the ages of 18 and 35 years were more likely than any other age group to strongly agree 
that governments should create environmental programs for agricultural producers, though the 
difference between young and older respondent groups diminished when ratings included 
'somewhat agree' and 'agree'. The same group of respondents were generally less likely than 
other age groups to agree that agricultural producers should be able to choose whether to 
participate in government programs, and were less likely than other age groups to rate 
agricultural producers as stewards of the land. Respondents between the ages of 18-35 also 
perceive the public to be less responsible for water quality on agricultural lands than older 
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respondents; however, government responsibility for the same was equivalent across age groups. 
This may indicate decreasing trust in agricultural producers to maintain an acceptable production 
level of EG&S by younger generations and an increasing acceptance of regulatory methods to 
manage water quality on agricultural landscapes by the same age group. This possibility is 
further strengthened by a decrease in the willingness to pay agricultural producers incremental 
payments for improving water quality by 18-35 year olds (Figure 3-6).  
 
 
Figure 3-6. Proportion of each age group that agreed or strongly agreed with the notion of 
paying agricultural producers based on the degree of water quality improvement achieved 
(incremental payments). 
 
3.3.6 Policy priorities 
 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of a variety of economic, ecological and social 
priorities for agri-environmental policy. Social priorities, such as sustaining rural communities 
and ensuring water quality for future generations, were ranked the most important by all groups, 
followed closely by cost-effectiveness of the program. Financial incentives were ranked higher 
by agricultural producers than other respondents (Table 3-3). All groups seemed to accept that 
some negative financial impact could occur to agricultural producers that participate in agri-
environmental programs, as this characteristic was ranked near the bottom of the list of priorities. 
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Respondents from all groups also acknowledged that implementing programs at the lowest 
possible cost to the taxpayer was not an important priority in relation to the other characteristics 
presented (Table 3-3). 
 
3.3.6.1 Respondent groupings based on policy priorities 
Social, economic and environmental priorities of respondents related to agri-environmental 
programs (variable n = 10) given in Table 3-3 were used to create groups of respondents defined 
by their priorities using principal components analysis (PCA). A PCA reduces the number of 
variables needed to describe respondents using variance in variable values around theoretical 
means (components) applied to the data (Field 2005; Moran et al. 2007). In the present study the 
respondents could be described by two components: those who valued social and ecological 
priorities more highly (referred to as the socio-ecological group hereafter) and those who valued 
agricultural property rights and economic priorities more highly (referred to as the agri-economic 
group hereafter). The PCA was performed for two reasons: 1) to understand the balance of 
priorities of the respondents; and 2) to examine the demographics of each quadrant to identify 
trends in age, occupation, location and perspectives on water quality.  
 
Two components were identified that explained 58% of the response variance. The addition of 
another component only improved the explained variance by nine percent and therefore was not 
included. The components, and the variance of each variable explained by each component 
(using a cut-off of 40% of variance) is shown in Table 3-4. Some variables, such as 'human 
health risk decreased' were strongly oriented within one component, while others, such as 
'survival of rural communities', were described almost equally by both components.  
 
When assessing individual scores for each component, the further from the mean in a positive 
direction, the more strongly the respondent felt about one or both sets of priorities. The further 
from the mean in a negative direction, the less strongly the respondent felt. More respondents fell 
within the upper right quadrant, which indicates that they felt strongly about both sets of 
priorities (Figure 3-7). 
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Table 3-4. Component matrix (rotated) for Principal Component Analysis using policy priority 
rankings 
Variable Socio-environmental 
component 
Agri-economic 
component 
Financial incentives  0.67 
Survival of rural communities 0.40 0.55 
Water quality for animals and aquatic life 0.83  
Human health risk decreased 0.84  
Lowest cost to taxpayers  0.68 
No negative financial impact to producers  0.86 
Most environmental benefit with least cost 0.49 0.55 
All producers should be eligible  0.44 0.53 
Water quality for recreation 0.66  
Sustaining quality for future generations 0.74  
 
 
 
Figure 3-7. Principal components analysis coefficient scores for respondents. The line of origin 
represents the mean coefficient score for each component. 
n = 47 
n = 80 
n = 88 n = 55 
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The demographics of each quadrant are reported in Tables 3-5,3-6. For the upper right quadrant, 
where multiple priorities were important (n=88), the proportions of respondents from each 
community, age group and job type were similar to the demographic proportions of all 
respondents as a whole. However, the group had the lowest proportion of farmers and ranchers 
of any group identified (Table 3-5). The upper left quadrant (the agri-economic group) (n=55) 
had significantly higher proportions of farmers and ranchers and less urban residents than the 
total respondent population. A comparison of occupations showed that the proportion of retirees 
was somewhat lower for this group as well (Table 3-6). The lower right quadrant (the socio-
environmental group) (n=80) was characterized by a lower proportion of farmers and ranchers, 
less respondents in the age group of 76+, more professionals and tradespeople and less 
respondents with jobs requiring no advanced training such as support roles. Finally, the lower 
left quadrant (n=47), where no priorities given were ranked highly (unidentified priorities), was 
characterized by more unemployed respondents (Table 3-6), and more respondents with children 
than for respondents as a whole (Table 3-5). 
Table 3-5. Proportion of respondents in each priorities group and their family status 
 Proportion of each group (%) 
--------------------------Respondent type---------------------- ---------Family status--------- 
Group Farmer/Rancher Rural resident Urban resident Has children No children 
Unidentified 
priorities 19 14 67 86 14 
Agri-economic 33 20 47 67 33 
Socio-
environmental 12 22 65 78 23 
Multiple priorities 18 16 66 76 24 
All respondents 19 19 62 76 24 
 
Table 3-6. Proportion of each priorities group by occupation 
 Proportion of each group (%) by occupation 
Group Retired Student Trades Professional Unemployed 
Support 
position 
Farmer/ 
Rancher 
Unidentified 
priorities 24 3 14 24 2 23 8 
Agri-
economic 10 4 11 24 0 24 17 
Socio-
environmental 21 4 24 33 0 12 7 
Multiple 
priorities 23 3 14 27 1 30 4 
All 
respondents 22 3 16 28 1 22 8 
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Further investigation of how concern for, and ratings of, water quality differed among groups 
also showed some differences (Table 3-7). The group with unidentified priorities were less likely 
than the overall sample population to rate water quality as 'good'. Interestingly, this group also 
had the highest proportion of respondents that were concerned about water quality in the region. 
Conversely, the group that ranked multiple priorities highly was more likely to rate water quality 
as 'good'. The socio-environmental group was significantly more likely to rate water quality as 
'poor' than the overall sample population and had the highest proportion of any group to do so. 
The agri-economic group ratings of water quality reflected the overall sample population, but the 
level of concern about water quality expressed by this group was lower than the total sample 
(Table 3-7).  
 
Table 3-7. Rating and concern about water quality by proportion of each priorities group  
 Water quality rating 
Group Poor1 Neutral Good2 
Unidentified 
priorities 29 15 48 
Agri-economic 20 13 67 
Socio-
environmental 36 10 54 
Multiple priorities 16 8 76 
All respondents 25 11 64 
 
 
Concern for water quality 
Group Unconcerned3 Neutral Concerned4 
Unidentified 
priorities 7 2 91 
Agri-economic 19 11 70 
Socio-
environmental 8 4 89 
Multiple priorities 10 5 85 
All respondents 11 5 84 
1Combined proportions of each group that rated water quality as very poor, poor, or 
somewhat poor 
2Combined proportions of each group that rated water quality as somewhat good, 
good, or very good 
3Combined proportions of each group that rated their concern for water quality as 
completely unconcerned, unconcerned, or somewhat unconcerned 
4Combined proportions of each group that rated their concern for water quality as 
somewhat concerned, concerned, or very concerned  
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3.4 Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Response rates 
 
The demographic differences between provincial statistical averages and respondents in the 
sample population for this study may have been a result of the method used in administering the 
survey. In addition, survey recipients who feel they have insufficient knowledge, or trouble 
reading the text are unlikely to return surveys (Rea and Parker 2005). This was expressed by 
three respondents who returned blank surveys with short notes explaining the reasons why the 
survey was not completed. Completion of surveys by those with strong opinion on the issue of 
water quality may have been more common.  
 
Response rates for the survey portion of data collection were low. There are two potential 
reasons for these response rates: 1) the survey was sent as unaddressed mail, so it was a 
significant challenge to entice recipients to open the mail and read the contents; and 2) survey 
fatigue may have played a role, as the study region has been used by previous researchers. 
Unaddressed mail was the only viable option for the survey, as the quantity of surveys was large 
and there was strong concern that an internet-based survey would not be accessible to all targeted 
respondents. Several attempts were made to ensure survey recipients were aware of the nature of 
the survey from the envelope, including placing the University of Saskatchewan name and logo 
on the envelope and placing a short phrase in place of the address indicating that participation 
was requested for a short survey; however, the number of surveys that were undeliverable or 
delivered to vacant households cannot be determined. An additional consideration was made for 
the time of year the survey was administered; surveys and interviews were conducted during 
December and January when agricultural activities are less demanding compared to other times 
of the year.  
 
Low response rates have been reported by other researchers in southern Alberta. Nicol et al. 
(2010) conducted telephone interviews with randomly selected farmers in southern Alberta in 
2007 and achieved a response rate of 11.5%. Johnston et al. (2001) sent addressed mail surveys 
to irrigation districts in southern Alberta in 1998-99 and achieved a response rate of 36%. These 
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surveys, along with several government agencies and non-governmental organizations 
conducting research in the study area (Olson and Kalischuk 2008; AAFC 2008) may have led to 
survey respondent fatigue. Respondent fatigue leading to non-response is a documented survey 
research challenge. This problem may result from a number of potential sources: 1) past survey 
experiences where results were not shared (respondents felt that their opinions did not matter); 2) 
a large quantity of surveys requesting their participation in the past; and 3) past experiences with 
poorly-written surveys (Porter et al. 2004; Sinickas 2007). When non-respondents were 
questioned by researchers about their reason for not participating in a survey in the US targeted 
to college graduates from a variety of institutions, most indicated a lack of time or interest in the 
survey (Sosdian and Sharp 1980). Respondent fatigue was suggested by one interviewee and 
likely played a role in the low response rate achieved by this study. To reduce the risk of apathy 
for future survey attempts in the area, results were shared with all interview respondents and the 
survey respondents that provided contact information in order to receive a summary of findings. 
In addition, presentations were made to the government agency cooperating with this study and 
to the residents of the Indianfarm Creek Watershed, where most of the interviews were 
conducted at completion of data analysis in December 2010. Approximately one-third of the 
respondents attended the presentation in Indianfarm Creek Watershed. 
 
Respondents rated water quality similarly, but when ratings were compared among rural 
communities, Shaughnessy residents rated water quality significantly lower than other 
communities did. When these results were presented to residents of the area, some suggested that 
this rating may have been related to a contaminated drinking water incident that occurred in the 
past and that residents of the area may be more inclined to rate water negatively for that reason. 
A media search confirmed a single contamination event in 1997 where residents of the town 
were advised to boil drinking water (Avram 1997). Stream water monitoring results show that 
bacterial contamination of the Oldman River, the source for drinking water in Shaughnessy, 
often exceeds water quality guidelines (Lorenz et al. 2008). The Oldman River receives return 
flow from irrigation water applied to the North Lethbridge Irrigation District and also receives 
runoff from surrounding fields which are high in phosphorus, a result of high manure application 
rates due to high density livestock production (Olson and Kalischuk 2008).  
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3.4.2 Balancing the polluter pays and beneficiary pays principles 
 
Willingness to pay for agricultural production of EG&S varied widely; however, a common 
theme identified in the results was a willingness to pay only for EG&S beyond an expected 
minimum standard of provision. There is an expectation that agricultural landowners will comply 
with providing the expected minimum standard of EG&S, and that the public will pay for EG&S 
produced beyond the minimum standard (OECD 2010). Thus, there are elements of the polluter 
pays principle, evident below the minimum standard, and of the beneficiary pays principle that 
applies above the standard. 
 
The concept of a minimum standard of care, or reference level for good agricultural practices, is 
well-established in the literature (Claassen et al. 2001; OECD 1997). It has been applied through 
codes of practice in the European Union and through cross-compliance measures in the US 
(OECD 2010). Incorporating a minimum environmental standard or reference level may be 
socially acceptable, as respondents from all groups expressed a desire for this approach to agri-
environmental policy. Further research is required to evaluate the appropriate level of EG&S 
provision, or specific practices, expected by the public to implement this approach to agri-
environmental policy in Alberta.  
 
The respondents generally adopted the polluter pays principle below the minimum standard, 
indicating that agricultural producers should internalize the costs of abating pollution to an 
acceptable level. This principle is widely applied in environmental policy, but is difficult to 
apply to agriculture due to the non-point source nature of agricultural impacts on water quality 
(Grossman 2007; OECD 2010). 
 
The responses to questions related to rights and responsibilities indicate that agricultural 
producers, rural residents and urban residents share the opinion that producers do have a high 
degree of responsibility for the effects of their production methods on society and the 
environment. However, when changes to the perceived suite of property rights afforded to 
agricultural landowners was suggested, agricultural landowners exhibited strong opposition to 
any change that reduced these rights. Property rights are held in high regard by agricultural 
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landowners in this region, and challenges to those rights is strongly opposed by them (The 
Minister of Sustainable Resource Development 2011) . It may be that agricultural producers 
understood the question of ‘responsibility’ to indicate whether they were responsible landowners 
(i.e., good stewards). Whereas other respondents may have viewed the question to ask whether or 
not agricultural landowners should accept financial responsibility for the effects of production 
methods. The question of acceptability of regulation provides further evidence for this theory.  
 
Regulation was generally considered acceptable to ensure minimum standards were maintained, 
and government involvement was recognized as being important to these program objectives. 
Calls for mandatory agricultural nonpoint source pollution have been made by researchers as 
well; Epp and Shortle (1985) criticize voluntary measures as inadequate and call for 
performance-based, mandatory programs based on modeling the impacts of practices on water 
quality. The use of regulatory standards compared to voluntary measures was modeled by 
Weaver et al. (1996), and the authors found that standards could be more efficient to promote 
improved environmental outputs; however, it was important to understand and account for 
differences in farm-level information. Agricultural producers however, were not enthusiastic 
about the possibility of regulatory measures to manage water quality. In their responses, 
agricultural producers tended to equate regulation with additional pressure, a loss of autonomy in 
their business and on their land, and further economic hardship. These findings are similar to 
findings from an assessment of Ontario farmers and participation in the Environmental Farm 
Plan program (Robinson 2006). Farmers from the study indicated that the threat of regulation 
spurred them to participate in the program in order to avoid further regulation  
 
Respondents displayed ambivalence toward most policy instruments presented. A likely reason is 
that the public does not have well-formed opinions about, or knowledge of, water quality policy 
(Moran et al. 2007) and what their rights and responsibilities should be related to EG&S (Hall et 
al. 2004). Preferences however, can be inferred through the collective responses to the other 
questions posed in the surveys and interviews. Respondents’ opinions align with the foundations 
of some performance-based approaches. Cross-compliance and payment schemes for EG&S are 
potential policy approaches that have been implemented in other regions (Chapter 2) and that, in 
combination, may be appropriate for the area based on respondents' perceptions. Cross-
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compliance sets an environmental standard that must be met in order to qualify for payments, 
and has been implemented in the United States to conserve highly erodible land (Claassen 2005). 
This approach is often used in combination with other instruments. Payments for EG&S can be 
administered in a variety of ways and most require that the public pay, in some capacity, based 
on environmental outcomes. This group of approaches may compliment cross-compliance when 
administered above the environmental standard. The views of respondents support these policy 
approaches as most expressed that payments to agricultural producers for the production of 
EG&S were acceptable. Water quality was a prominent concern for the majority of respondents 
from all groups, and particularly for those who reside near ‘Feedlot Alley’, indicating that 
payments for improvements to water quality in particular are warranted. Further research to 
assess the opportunities and barriers to implementing these policy approaches is required to fully 
understand the potential of cross-compliance and/or a payment scheme for the region. 
3.4.3 Good actor dilemma 
 
The findings from the question about paying good actors were particularly unexpected. There 
was general agreement within the watershed, where all respondents were agricultural 
landowners, that good actors should not be paid for previous efforts. This finding minimizes a 
significant dilemma in making payments for EG&S to agricultural producers both efficient in 
terms of outcomes, and equitable in terms of effort. Some research has shown that paying good 
actors, or paying to maintain current water quality, could drastically reduce the cost-effectiveness 
of a performance-based policy (Weinberg and Claassen 2006). Alternatively, failing to pay good 
actors introduces a perverse incentive to reduce or halt BMPs that have a positive impact on 
water quality in order to become eligible for payments. In addition, failing to pay good actors can 
be perceived as a reward to those landowners who did not undertake any BMPs because they are 
often the landowners who can have the largest impact on water quality (Claassen et al. 2001). 
Targeted performance-based approaches that did not pay good actors might be successful in the 
study region as a result of the ambivalence from respondents towards payments for good actors. 
However, many of the respondents had taken measures to manage water quality without 
incentives and this could lead to a lack of 'additionality' (or payments for practices that would 
have been implemented anyway) in payment-based programs (Engel et al. 2008). 
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Interestingly, the minimum standard concept that emerged from the results of the study 
minimizes the good actor dilemma. Though there are other challenges associated with 
implementing a minimum environmental standard (e.g., water quality regulation, monitoring, 
measurement), it ensures all agricultural producers internalize the costs of achieving the standard 
and is potentially a more equitable option than other targeted performance-based approaches. 
3.4.4 Priorities for agri-environmental policies 
 
The responses to priorities for agri-environmental policy reinforced findings from many of the 
other questions; most indicated that social and environmental objectives were important, but that 
maintaining payments to agricultural producers was also an important factor to consider. The 
demographic breakdown of how groups ranked priorities was not surprising in many cases; 
agricultural producers were more likely to rank priorities related to payments and maintaining 
strong property rights more highly than respondents of other occupations, while respondents with 
a potentially higher level of education were more concerned with social and environmental 
priorities. It was surprising that, in a largely agricultural region, more respondents prioritized 
social and ecological goals above agricultural and economic goals for agri-environmental policy. 
This finding, together with those from questions related to agricultural producers' rights and 
responsibilities confirms that there is an understanding and high degree of concern for the 
environmental impacts of agricultural production. A shift in public opinion cannot be confirmed, 
as no previous studies assessing public opinion in the region could be found. However, there is a 
discrepancy between the assumptions of current agri-environmental approaches and respondents' 
perceptions of agricultural rights and responsibilities. The findings from the study region, both in 
terms of the discrepancy and the respondents' perceptions are similar to those reported by studies 
from the United Kingdom and the United States (Hall et al. 2004).  
 
The range of priorities for agri-environmental policy presented were all ranked relatively high in 
importance (Table 3-3). The PCA allowed a stratification of respondents into groups that had 
similar priorities and another analysis of responses to selected survey and interview questions by 
age provide some insights into how social norms and values and distributed and potential 
changes based on perceptions of younger respondents. There were few surprises in the groups 
identified: those with agricultural and economic priorities were more often agricultural 
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producers; those with social and environmental priorities were more often urban residents and 
more highly educated. The majority of respondents (63%) valued social and environmental 
priorities highly (i.e., the socio-environmental group and the multiple priorities group, where 
socio-environmental priorities scores were positioned to the right of the mean line) (Figure 3-6). 
This dominant viewpoint that acknowledges the importance of sustaining water resources for the 
future and maintaining water quality for a variety of human and ecological health purposes. 
Those in the multiple priorities group also held financial considerations for agricultural 
producers and cost-effective policies as equally important.  
 
These results are important to understand in assessing potential water quality policies; 
respondents want policies that ensure good water quality for the long term, but many respondents 
also placed importance of reducing the burden of this objective on agricultural producers. This is 
particularly important to recognize in light of the considerable lobbying power that agricultural 
producers have in the province of Alberta, and in Canada. Understandably, agricultural 
producers were more likely to be a part of the agri-economic group and prioritize financial 
incentives and reducing negative impacts of environmental programs on agricultural producers 
over social and environmental considerations. While these economic priorities may be important 
objectives for maintaining the status quo with agricultural producers, there is a significant 
proportion of respondents that perceive water quality and sustainability as the key priorities as 
well. Maintaining a balanced approach in acknowledging the interests of the majority and the 
interests of agricultural producers who wield political power is key in the development and 
implementation of future agri-environmental policies in the region.  
3.4.5 Future trends in social norms and values and implications for agri-environmental 
policy 
 
Theories related to stability in social values with age are numerous; a common theory is that 
social values follow an aging stability mode (Alwin 1994; Glenn 1980). Young people tend to 
have more malleable values that are subject to change based on both individual personality and 
on outside forces, such as historical events and the general paradigm of that period in time 
(Alwin 1994). Older people tend to be more entrenched in their values; they have surrounded 
themselves with like-minded people, have careers and families, and experience less change and 
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less exposure to alternative value systems (Kirkpatrick Johnson 2001). While there are certainly 
differences among individuals within a 'cohort' (or generation), there are also similarities based 
on the external forces that help shape values.  
 
Social change often occurs with cohort succession, as different world views are represented 
between younger and older cohorts (Alwin 1994). As a result, it is useful to assess the responses 
of the youngest age groups to identify of potential changes to social norms and values in younger 
generations that will, in time, shape agri-environmental policies. Based on their responses to 
some of the survey and interview questions, younger respondents were generally more in favour 
of regulatory approaches to water quality management for agriculture and less likely to endorse 
incremental payments for improved water quality. These findings may indicate a shift in the 
perceptions of the rights and responsibilities of agricultural producers related to water quality. 
Indications are that there are somewhat greater expectations of younger respondents that 
agricultural producers ensure water quality is adequate without compensation and welcome 
government involvement in this matter.  
 
Some caveats must be made in the interpretation of these data. First, while there does seem to be 
a trend, the number of young respondents was less than other groups (there were 42 respondents 
between the ages of 18 and 35). Second, young adults continue to develop their personal beliefs 
and are likely more prone to influence; their values are not as stable as those who are older 
(Alwin 1994; Alwin et al. 1992; cited in Kirkpatrick Johnson 2001; Glenn 1980).  
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This study evaluated the perceptions of agricultural producers and rural and urban residents 
related to agri-environmental policy for water quality, and assessed whether those perceptions 
were aligned with the implementation of performance-based approaches. Based on the responses, 
a general program framework can be developed for agricultural water quality policy in southern 
Alberta. A summary of the findings indicates that all groups call for a water quality standard of 
care that is reasonable, and the continued financial support for agricultural producers who wish 
to improve water quality beyond the standard. This finding has been described by other social 
studies of environment and agriculture (OECD 2010; Grossman 2007), but contrasts with the 
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current policy approach where no water quality standard exists for agricultural landowners. 
Younger respondents were more likely to favour regulatory measures than older respondents, 
and this may have policy implications in the future.  
 
This study was performed at a significant time in Alberta’s land use policy development. Water 
quality is an important concern in the study area and the Alberta Land Use Framework is 
facilitating regional plans where consideration and development of new approaches for the 
provision of EG&S is explicitly incorporated into the framework (Government of Alberta 2008). 
Based on the responses to the surveys and interviews, respondents felt that incorporating 
payments for EG&S was an acceptable means to manage environmental quality on agricultural 
land. However, a recent amendment to the Framework (The Minister of Sustainable Resource 
Development 2011) limits the use of any approaches that might have a negative impact on 
property rights, and presents a potential barrier to the implementation of a water quality standard. 
Further investigation of possible barriers (and opportunities) to implementing performance-based 
approaches is required. 
 
This study provides a basis for understanding how the public’s perceptions compare with 
agricultural producers’ views of agricultural property rights and how these views can be used to 
determine the potential for new policy approaches, and specifically performance-based 
approaches. As public knowledge and concerns change, and as generational cohort succession 
occurs, the expectations placed on agricultural producers will undoubtedly change as well. At 
present, the public are generally willing to provide aid to agricultural producers for the provision 
of EG&S, supporting a subset of performance-based agri-environmental policy approaches. 
Maintaining and incorporating a current understanding of how the public views agricultural and 
public rights and responsibilities into policy development and adaptive management will 
improve the alignment of public perceptions and policies, and may open windows of opportunity 
for new approaches. 
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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR POLICY 
TRANSFER OF PERFORMANCE-BASED APPROACHES TO THE 
INDIANFARM CREEK WATERSHED IN SOUTHWEST ALBERTA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Canadian federal and provincial governments have largely relied upon voluntary, practice-based 
policy approaches in agri-environmental programs to manage water quality. The most commonly 
used approaches include cost-sharing incentives, education, and moral suasion to encourage 
agricultural producers to adopt beneficial management practices (BMPs). The intent in adopting 
BMPs is to improve the environmental outcomes of agriculture, or reduce the negative 
environmental impacts of it. However, the link between practice adoption and environmental 
outcome is influenced by many variables and is often uncertain.  
 
Performance-based approaches to water quality management on agricultural landscapes have the 
potential to improve the production of ecosystem services on agricultural land and have garnered 
significant interest in recent years (e.g., Weinberg and Claassen 2006; Selman et al. 2008; 
Morton et al. 2006; OECD 2010). These approaches link environmental outcomes (measured 
directly or estimated using models) directly to payments or charges. Performance-based 
approaches for agriculture have been implemented in other regions, but are rarely used in Canada 
and have not been used at all in Alberta.  
 
A variety of performance-based approaches have been implemented outside of the province of 
Alberta to manage non-point source agricultural pollution and water quality. Approaches used 
for this purpose include water quality trading, differentiated payments for ecological goods and 
services, cross-compliance, and emissions charges (Chapter 2). These policy approaches have 
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potential to be implemented in Alberta, provided that the necessary contextual factors are in 
place (Rose 1993). Context - the enabling conditions and drivers for implementing the policy 
approach - is important for assessing fit when transferring an existing approach to a different 
jurisdiction.  
 
Similarity of institutional and social context is especially important in assessing fit when 
considering a new policy approach. Rules imposed on society, both formal and informal, are an 
integral part of the policy context of a region (Roland 2004). The social norms and values of a 
region are generally slow to change over time, and thus require particular attention (Roland 
2004). The dominant societal views of agriculture and the environment change incrementally 
over time and influence policy as they become incompatible with past policies (Roland 2004).  
 
In the context of agri-environmental programs, social norms and values represent the 
environmental expectations that society places on agricultural producers. Past policies in Canada 
have, at times, reinforced the notion that agricultural producers should be paid to reduce 
environmental harms of their practices; these policies are indicative of a social belief in the 
'beneficiary pays' principle and a tradition of agricultural exceptionalism where agricultural 
landowners are exempt from environmental regulations and standards that impact other 
industries (OECD 2010; Montpetit 2002). Few studies have attempted to assess whether more 
recent social norms and values in Canada are aligned with these principles. One Ontario study 
suggested that the province was moving away from these principles, as evidenced by the 
'Greenbelt' policies implemented in Ontario4 (Pond 2009). However, no attempt to assess social 
norms and values from a spectrum of public respondents had been undertaken in Canada until 
the study performed as a part of this thesis (Chapter 3).  
 
The objective of this study was to synthesize a review of performance-based approaches, the 
focus of Chapter 2, with a field study evaluation of social norms and values in southwest Alberta 
                                                           
4
 The Greenbelt Act was enacted in 2005 in Ontario as a protective measure taken by the province to ensure 
urbanization and development did not move into important agricultural land. It protects 1.8 million acres in southern 
Ontario that extend around the city of Toronto. The Greenbelt Act is considered by Pond (2009) to be a "formal 
embrace by Canada's largest province of a multifunctional paradigm for agriculture". Development rights have been 
expropriated from agricultural landowners within the Greenbelt, effectively reducing property values without 
compensation.  
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(Chapter 3) in order to evaluate institutional capacity in terms of the potential to transfer policy 
instruments from other regions to the study region. Context similarity was used as the indicator 
of relative probability of success, and barriers to the implementation of specific performance-
based approaches were discussed. 
4.2 Background 
 
Policy transfer allows policy-makers to learn and apply lessons from other regions to their own. 
The term ‘policy transfer’ encompasses the transfer of policies, policy instruments, structures, 
and concepts (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). It can be described as a process where past or present 
policies, institutions, and ideas in one political system are used in the development of policies, 
institutions and ideas in another (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). The region where the policy has 
been implemented is considered the 'exporter' and the region where the policy is transferred to is 
considered the 'importer'.  
 
There are several degrees of policy transfer that may occur. The first is a complete transfer where 
a policy is taken from an exporting region and implemented in the importing region without 
alteration. This method is unlikely to be successful except in transfers within nations (Rose 
1993). The second type of transfer is adaptation, where the policy is altered to fit the context of 
the importing region. Hybrid transfers combine two or more policies from separate regions to 
create a specialized policy for the importing region. Finally, ideas or inspiration for a policy in 
the importing region can be developed as a result of policies implemented elsewhere (Rose 
1993).   
 
Transferring and adapting policies from one region to another is common and has occurred 
throughout history (Benson 2009). Policy transfer literature indicates that many policy transfers 
are performed with an unsystematic approach and rely on anecdotal evidence, paying inadequate 
heed to the considerable complexity when conducting policy analyses (Wolman 1992). Where 
policy transfers have failed, importing regions may have neglected to adequately assess 
suitability. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) list several specific reasons why policy instrument 
transfers may fail. First, the importing region may not have sufficient information about the 
instrument and its operation in the exporting region (uninformed transfer). The second reason 
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transfers may fail is incomplete transfer, where some of the important elements from the host 
region are not transferred. Finally, the importing region may not pay sufficient attention to the 
context of the exporting region which can result in an incomplete transfer. Many of these reasons 
for policy instrument transfer failure can be avoided with sufficient attention and evaluation of 
the instrument and to the broader contextual factors that drive and enable it (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000; Mossberger and Wolman 2003; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).  
 
Contextual factors are the economic, environmental, economic, institutional, and social 
conditions and drivers surrounding policy approach implementation and operation (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000; Wolman 1992). Dwyer and Ellison (2009), in a review of recent policy transfer 
literature, emphasized the importance of understanding the context surrounding policies prior to 
policy transfer, and state that there is currently a lack of consideration of policy context. Where 
differences in context are substantial, policy transfers may be limited to the hybrid or inspiration 
transfer types. Where contextual differences are minimal, complete or adaptive policy transfers 
may be possible (Benson 2009). 
4.3 Analysis framework 
 
4.3.1 Institutionalist perspective 
 
The institutionalist view of policy transfer considers that goodness of policy fit depends on 
where, when and how it is adopted in a specific setting (Manning 2006). This perspective is 
summarized by Dwyer and Ellison (2009), who in a policy transfer review, stated that "'Context', 
then, is the thing". This approach is based on a belief that institutions, as a significant contributor 
to context shape preferences, transfer processes, and outcomes (Bulmer and Padgett 2004). 
'Institutions' have been defined in several ways; however, for the purposes of this discussion, 
institutions are the formal and informal rules that guide society's actions (Roland 2004). As such, 
institutions include social norms and all other constraints that society imposes through rules, 
beliefs, and values (i.e., the social, legal and political contexts). 
 
To further guide the analysis, the relative importance of specific institutions for successful policy 
transfer can be defined. Institutions have varying capacities to be altered, so it follows that it is 
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most important for the importing region to align with the exporting region on institutions that do 
not rapidly change and therefore hold a lower capacity for alteration. Political institutions are 
generally shorter term in nature and can change rapidly and discontinuously, and are referred to 
as 'fast-moving institutions' (Roland 2004). Conversely, social values tend to change slowly and 
continuously over time and are considered 'slow-moving institutions'. Legislative institutions are 
situated between these two ends of the spectrum, though they tend toward the slower side. There 
are always exceptions, but these classifications generally hold (Roland 2004).  
 
Slow-moving and fast-moving institutions influence each other and create change over time. For 
example, a fast-moving institution such as a new political party in power can impact slower 
moving institutions such as legislation. Conversely, social pressure for change builds over time 
(due to the continuous nature of slow-moving institutions) and eventually causes a rapid change 
in a fast-moving institution (e.g., a new law is passed). Roland (2004) uses the analogy of 
pressure building along fault lines over time and suddenly causing an earthquake. The slow-
moving institutions revealed by the Alberta study of social norms and values are not well-aligned 
with the faster-moving legislative and political institutions in Canada (Chapter 3). Past and 
present agri-environmental policies are indicative of a social context where society supports the 
'beneficiary pays' principle; that is, the beneficiaries of public benefits (positive externalities) of 
agriculture are willing to pay for them. However, results from the Alberta study indicate that a 
combination of 'polluter pays' and 'beneficiary pays' is a more accurate portrayal of current social 
context. Briefly, respondents' general perceptions were that agricultural producers had a personal 
responsibility to achieve a minimum standard of care for water quality, below which no financial 
compensation or incentives should be applied ('polluter pays' principle). Above the standard; 
however, respondents were generally willing to continue to provide financial assistance or 
incentives to agricultural producers to improve water quality (Chapter 3). This presents an 
opportunity to investigate the potential contextual fit of new, performance-based policy 
approaches for the study region that were reviewed in Chapter 2.  
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4.3.2 Framework development 
 
There are a number of frameworks for policy analysis. A well-known policy transfer framework 
created by Rose (2005) provides a broad and prescriptive 10-step guide to policy transfer. The 
guide covers a wide variety of issues when considering transferring a policy from another region, 
but dedicates only a brief section to the issue of context (Rose 2005) and only one page to 
cultural context. Policy transfer analysis, according to Rose (1993), should identify those factors 
that are significant to a policy's implementation and success, rather than listing all contextual 
factors for a given policy. Rose's minimization of the importance of culture and social context 
has been criticized as avoidance of necessary messiness in policy transfer (de Jong 2009) and 
overly rational in nature (Dwyer and Ellison 2009). However, rationalization in itself may not be 
undesirable. Runhaar and Driessen (2007), in developing a framework for strategic 
environmental assessment and policy making, describe rationalization as inclusive of both 
scientific knowledge and knowledge of the values of stakeholders. Other frameworks for 
assessing policy transfer suitability align with this notion and are less prescriptive and more 
inclusive of social context as a relevant consideration (e.g., Mossberger and Wolman 2003; 
Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). 
 
The policy analysis framework developed by Mossberger and Wolman (2003) provides a set of 
criteria for assessing potential policy approaches and potential suitability for transfer, and will be 
used as a guide for the analysis in this paper. This framework draws from Rose's rational guide 
to transfer but is less prescriptive in its approach. The policy analysis includes three stages. The 
first is to build awareness; this stage of the analysis was completed in Chapter 2 for the exporting 
regions, where a review of approaches, and specific instances where the approaches were 
implemented, was performed and evidence of program evaluations and success were identified 
and discussed. This paper will focus on the second and third stages of the analysis framework. 
The second stage of the analysis is to perform an assessment of social and institutional context 
similarity between potential exporting regions and the importing region, focusing on enabling 
conditions and drivers. The third and final stage of the analysis is to assess the potential fit of 
policy approaches to the importing region, including an assessment of barriers to implementation 
and degree to which a policy approach could be transferred. 
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4.3.3 Policy approach transfer analysis 
 
4.3.3.1 Assessment of study region context 
 
The environmental, institutional, and social contexts of the study region as they relate to 
agriculture are described below. The environmental context is included to provide a brief 
description of the physical conditions and drivers that influenced the choice of the region for this 
study. This discussion provides an understanding of the conditions under which the policy 
instrument would be implemented. 
 
Environmental context 
The Indianfarm Creek Watershed is the focus of the study. This watershed is located in the 
southwest part of Alberta, in the foothills of the Rocky Mountains. Indianfarm Creek runs south 
to north through the watershed and flows into Pincher Creek, a tributary of the Oldman River 
and a primary source of drinking and irrigation water in the southern part of the province. Land-
use in the watershed is almost exclusively agricultural (annual and perennial crop production and 
cow-calf operations). There are also four confined feeding operations. Alberta Agriculture and 
Rural Development (AARD) identified lack of access to pasture for cattle grazing as a main 
obstacle to healthy riparian areas and improved water quality (Olson and Kalischuk 2010); cattle 
are fenced into riparian areas to graze while flatter land is used for crop production to maximize 
productivity. A detailed description of the study site, including geography and agricultural 
activities, is given in Chapter 3.  
 
The Indianfarm Creek watershed is prone to water quality problems as a result of agricultural 
management practices and seasonal flows. Water quality data collected by AARD in 2008 
describe seasonal water quality (Table 4-1) (Olson and Kalischuk 2009). During snowmelt, 
phosphorus concentrations at times have exceeded the guidelines for the protection of aquatic 
life. These data indicate that water quality became substantially worse during runoff, often 
exceeding guidelines. During base flow, water quality guidelines were still exceeded at times.  
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AARD concluded, based on their measurements that water quality deteriorated from the 
headwaters to the outlet of Indianfarm Creek (Olson and Kalischuk 2009), and this pattern was 
exacerbated by rainfall events, where nutrient, sediment, and bacterial coliform loading of the 
creek was much higher (Table 4-1). As a result, management of the water quality impacts of 
seasonal and discrete weather events is a key focus for the watershed. 
 
Table 4-1. Water quality parameter averages for seasonal flows in the Indianfarm Creek 
Watershed as measured by AARD in 2008 
Timing 
Total 
phosphorus1 
(mg L-1) 
Total 
nitrogen2  
(mg L-1) 
Suspended solids 
(mg L-1) 
Bacterial coliforms 
(MPN3 100 mL-1) 
Snowmelt   (6 
samples) 
0.01-0.304 
(0.15)5 
0.39-2.98 
(1.25)5 2-125 
50-800 
(1,000)6 
Rainfall     (2 
samples) 0.06-1.39 1.10-5.72 20-1600 10,000-56,000 
Base flow   (2 
samples) 0.03-0.08 0.55-0.85 2-23 250-3,300 
1
 Sum of particulate phosphorus and total dissolved phosphorus 
2
 Sum of organic nitrogen and dissolved inorganic nitrogen 
3
 Most Probable Number 
4
 Represents the range of averages for each monitoring station 
5
 Guideline for the protection of aquatic life  
6
 Guideline for the protection of agriculture 
 
 
Institutional response to water quality concerns 
Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development is working within the watershed on a project that 
attempts to quantify the impacts of beneficial management practices (BMPs) on water quality 
(Olson and Kalischuk 2009). As part of this project, several BMPs have been implemented at 
sites that may have been contributing to poor water quality. Six sites were originally established 
where BMPs have been used including providing off-stream watering to improve riparian zones 
and reduce fecal coliforms in the creek; improved manure application timing and incorporation, 
as well as the development of setbacks from the creek for application; improved pasture 
management to avoid overgrazing and erosion; movement of overwintering sites for livestock 
out of a floodplain to reduce water contamination during high flows; and manure storage 
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capacity for livestock production to reduce the need to apply large amounts of manure to the land 
at inopportune times. 
 
The most recent progress report from AARD stated that there was a "tendency of improved water 
quality" at two of the sites after one year of monitoring (Olson and Kalischuk 2010). Some 
improvements were noted, such as cattle preferring off-stream watering stations to direct creek 
access which suggest water quality improvement. A comparison of Nutrient Water Quality Index 
scores (an index that accounts for nutrient and bacterial coliform loading in water bodies) from 
2007 to 2009 indicated that water quality had improved slightly, though not at all monitoring 
stations and seemed to be heavily influenced by water flows (Olson and Kalischuk 2010).  
 
AARD is developing a model to simulate the site-specific effects of agricultural practices on 
water quality in southern Alberta. This model combines physical and economic models to 
estimate impacts of BMPs on water quality. The model is still under development; recent efforts 
to calibrate the model resulted in large differences between simulation output of water quality 
and actual water quality (Olson and Kalischuk 2010). There have been efforts at the federal level 
as well to estimate impacts of BMPs on water quality using an integrated economic-hydrologic 
model under the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) project in Canada (Boxall et al. 2007). 
It assesses the potential impacts of adoption of BMPs on water quality at a farm-specific level 
and also can be scaled up to model an entire watershed. In most cases, the provincial government 
has jurisdiction over private land management; however, the federal government sets broad 
policies and provides financial and research assistance for the benefit of provincial government 
departments. 
 
At the local level, AARD formed a watershed group comprised of several landowners in the 
watershed. This group has no formal decision-making authority, but serves as a means to 
maintain connections between AARD and the local landowners for the duration of their research 
project and to provide information and access to experts regarding possible changes to 
management practices (Olson and Kalischuk 2009). Organizations with services available to the 
watershed landowners include the Alberta Environmentally Sustainable Agriculture Program, 
which provides local field representatives for extension and awareness related to environmental 
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sustainability. Non-governmental organizations such as "Cows and Fish" also provide education 
and assistance in managing and improving environmental impacts from agricultural landscapes 
at the request of landowners or groups, and are particularly concerned with water quality 
(Alberta Riparian Habitat Management Society 2011).  
 
Social context of study area 
The social context of the study area was evaluated and described in detail in Chapter 3. Briefly, 
perceptions of agricultural producers in the Indianfarm Creek Watershed as well as those of 
stakeholders beyond the borders of the watershed were assessed by interview and survey. 
Perspectives of agricultural landowners' rights and responsibilities in relation to water quality 
were sought, as well as respondents' degree of concern for water quality in their region. Finally, 
respondents' priorities (social, economic, and/or environmental) were assessed using the surveys 
and interviews. 
 
The findings from the study indicate that the respondents were generally willing to pay for 
improvements to water quality beyond a minimum standard of provision that they thought should 
be provided by all agricultural landowners (Figure 4-1). This finding describes a shift from 
traditional property rights perspectives where society believed that agricultural landowners were 
the best stewards possible given their circumstances and demands upon them. The traditional 
property rights perspective endorsed the beneficiary pays principle, where the public pays for 
provision of EG&S from agricultural land. While this traditional view still exists, it is tempered 
by an expectation from many respondents that agricultural landowners hold a responsibility to 
manage their land in a way where environmental damage is reduced and ecosystem goods and 
services (EG&S) are provided. This perspective endorses a limited polluter pays principle, where 
agricultural producers are expected to pay the costs of providing a level of water quality 
expected by the public (Grossman 2007; OECD 2010).  
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Polluter pays
Beneficiary pays
Agricultural 
producer’s economic 
optimum level
Minimum standard 
expected by society
EG&S 
production
Target level of EG&S 
provision
 
Figure 4-1. Use of the polluter pays and beneficiary pays principles for societal expectations of 
EG&S production by agricultural producers. Adapted from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2010) . 
 
Agricultural producers, rural residents and urban residents who participated in the study share the 
opinion that producers do have a high degree of responsibility for the effects of their production 
methods on others. However, when changes to the perceived suite of property rights of 
agricultural landowners was suggested, agricultural landowners exhibited strong opposition to 
any change that reduced these rights. Property rights are held in high regard by agricultural 
landowners and challenges to those rights are strongly opposed (Bromley and Hodge 1990). A 
recent amendment5 to the Alberta Land Stewardship Act, based on public pressure to ensure 
landowner property rights were not at risk, provides a good example in support of this finding 
(The Minister of Sustainable Resource Development 2011).   
 
Agricultural producers were very apprehensive about both government involvement in farm 
management and the possibility of regulatory measures to manage water quality, though many 
watershed respondents acknowledged that establishing standards was important to control abuse 
of the watershed. Respondents who identified themselves as agricultural producers tended to 
favour lower responsibility for governments for water quality on agricultural lands than other 
respondent groups. One respondent expressed the opinion that giving governments responsibility 
did not mean that they had the right to dictate (or "over-legislate") management decision for 
                                                           
5
 The Alberta Land Stewardship Amendment Act ensures that private property rights are protected and provides a 
mechanism for challenging actions taken as a result of the Alberta Land Stewardship Act that may have a negative 
impact on property rights.  
103 
 
agricultural producers. In general, younger respondents (18 to 35 years old) were the most open 
to using regulation as a mechanism to ensure adequate water quality was maintained on 
agricultural landscapes.  
 
When asked about agri-environmental policy outcomes, ecological and social priorities were 
ranked as superior in importance, or of equal importance, to agricultural rights and economic 
priorities by approximately two thirds of respondents (Chapter 3). These findings support a series 
of Alberta surveys that ranked a range of issues in order of importance to residents. In 2007, the 
environment ranked second in importance (below health care, but above education, the economy 
and oil sands/royalties), but that ranking was reduced to least important of all issues presented by 
late 2009, and was most recently ranked second-to-last in January, 2011 (Environics 2011). 
Rankings tended to fluctuate with confidence in the general health of the economy.  
 
Canadian context 
The importance of the environment to Canadians tends to fluctuate over time, and demand for 
EG&S may follow. The Strategic Council administered national surveys on a semi-yearly basis 
from 2005-2009 to obtain an understanding of the issues the public cares most about. The 
environment, as one topic among others such as taxes, gas prices and economic issues, moved 
from the third most important issue in 2005 with 9% of votes, to the most important in early 
2007 with 26% of votes, and back to third with 9% of votes in 2009 (The Strategic Council 
2009). From the data presented, the environment becomes an important issue to Canadians when 
the economy is strong, as the drop in votes for the environment corresponds closely with a 
dramatic increase in votes for economic issues (The Strategic Council 2009). 
 
Canadian agricultural policy supports a productivist model of agriculture where intensive 
production is encouraged (Robinson 2006). The productivist model ideology sees agriculture 
(i.e., the production of food and fibre) as the primary function and ideal rural land use. 
Stewardship is considered a function of the continued production of food and fibre. The model is 
supported by strong farm lobby groups and generally marginalized conservation ‘fringe’ groups. 
Productivist agriculture is focused on the intensification and industrialization of production. 
Finally, the policies under a productivist agricultural model are focused on financial support and 
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the maintenance of strong property rights for agricultural producers (Wilson 2001). A tradition of 
agricultural exceptionalism exists, where agricultural producers are exempt from many of the 
regulatory measures imposed on other industries (Skogstad 1998). The environmental impacts of 
productivist agriculture are strongly negative; intensification of production and greater use of 
biochemical inputs result in erosion, pollution and other negative effects (Brundtland 
Commission 1987).  
 
The federal government sets a general policy direction for agriculture that is renewed every four 
years (the current policy framework is titled "Growing Forward") (AAFC 2009). Within the 
framework, areas of focus are identified; some federal programs are administered as a result, but 
the majority of actions are taken by provincial governments and funded by the federal 
government.  
 
There are a few key federal and provincial acts that create opportunities for implementing 
performance-based approaches. These are summarized in Table 4-2. Further discussion of the 
legislative context of Canada and the province of Alberta is provided in Appendix D. 
 
The OECD has criticized Canada for not using market-based instruments to incorporate 
environmental concerns into policies. The organization stated that too much emphasis was given 
to voluntary measures (Appendix D). Transaction costs for deviation from the norm of voluntary 
measures can be very high in this type of system (Adamowicz 2007) and this may be a limiting 
factor in Canada because there are several levels of government competing for expertise in 
economic and market-based policy analysis which spreads resources thinly.  
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Table 4-2. Summary of Canadian and Alberta legislative context that enables the use of 
performance-based approaches 
Act Capacity created Scope 
Canadian 
Environmental 
Protection Act 
(CEPA) 
 
•Created capacity to regulate land-based 
sources of pollution, including diffuse 
pollution, into water bodies 
•Substances deposited 
into water bodies 
Canadian 
Water Act 
•Created capacity for intergovernmental 
committees to manage water quality 
  -research 
  -management plans 
  -monitoring 
 
•National waters or 
other water bodies 
where there is an 
"urgent national 
concern" 
Water Act 
(Alberta) 
•Created the necessary legislation for water 
management planning at the watershed scale 
•Created legislative capacity for Water For 
Life provincial water management strategy 
 
•Water allocation and 
conservation in Alberta 
Alberta Land 
Stewardship Act 
•Created the necessary legislation for the 
Alberta Land Use Framework 
•Each of seven regions must institute a land 
use plan that may include market-based 
instruments and actions on private lands to 
achieve conservation and stewardship goals  
•Province of Alberta 
with the seven regions 
delineated by 
watershed boundaries 
•Manages economic, 
environmental and 
social goals 
 
4.4 Application of the Performance Capacity Meter to the study region 
 
Given that the social and institutional context of the study region is known, the capacity to 
implement performance-based approaches can be assessed. The Performance Capacity Meter, 
developed in Chapter 2, may be used for this purpose (Figure 4-2). The Performance Capacity 
Meter provides rankings in terms of the capacity of a region to implement a performance-based 
approach, using measurement method and payment/penalty structure as ranking variables. 
Performance-based approaches reviewed in Chapter 2 have also been ranked using the Meter, 
which provides the additional potential to choose appropriate approaches based on similarity in 
rank with the capacity of the region. The ranking of the study region and the performance-based 
approaches that fit within the region's capacity are shown in Figure 4-2. The ranking for 
measurement method is based on the current capacity of the study region to measure water 
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quality at various points within the watershed, including the headwaters and the outlet, but not to 
evaluate the impacts of individual parcels of land throughout. The ranking for payment/penalty 
structure is based on social context findings from Chapter 3 summarized above. Fixed payments 
based on expected outcomes minimizes the economic risk to agricultural landowners and does 
not threaten their property rights, which were preferred by agricultural respondents. This ranking 
indicates that all performance-based approaches that occur at or below the ranking level for the 
study region may be suitable for it, as they correspond to the performance capacity exhibited by 
the study region. The performance-based approaches that occur at or below the performance 
capacity ranking on the Performance Capacity Meter will be assessed for similarity of social and 
institutional context. This includes all performance-based approaches reviewed, except reverse 
auctions. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Performance Capacity Meter ranking for the study region in southwest Alberta 
(denoted by shaded arrows), and the performance-based approaches that match the performance 
capacity. 
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4.5 Performance-based approaches in other regions 
 
The context surrounding performance-based approaches to agri-environmental policy for water 
quality from member countries of the OECD was discussed in Chapter 2. Several common 
factors emerged around each instrument and are presented in Tables 4-3 through 4-6. The 
discussion in Chapter 2 was constrained by availability of literature related to context; it follows 
that the data in Tables 4-3 through 4-6 are not exhaustive but provide an overview of selected 
examples where literature was available. The tables also briefly identify the successes and 
failures of each program within an approach where more than one example is reviewed. 
Successes are identified where there were reports of environmental, economic, and/or social 
improvements as a result of the approach. Failures are identified where the literature has 
described the inability to attain goals set out for a program or reasons why a program was not 
implemented or was discontinued. These factors are only identified where they have been 
explicitly stated in the literature. While there are a number of policy items that may be 
transferred, including policy goals, instruments, institutions, ideologies, and others (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 2000), this discussion will focus on program transfer. 
 
  
Table 4-3. Context for implementation of water quality trading as a performance-based policy approach in selected regions to manage 
agricultural water quality 
 Institutional context Social context 
Main program reviewed: Ontario - South Nation 
Watershed 
  
Successes: environmental, social, economic 
Conditions: Regulatory measures for 
drinking water; maximum allowable 
concentration of P established; 
Regulations established as a result of 
Walkerton tragedy, pressures 
Condition: Well-organized farm 
groups that support maintaining strong 
property rights 
Driver: Stoppage of permits to deviate 
from exceeding maximum 
concentrations; removal of legal 
liability of agricultural producers 
through formal "Statement of Roles 
and Responsibilities" 
Driver: Stakeholder buy-in through 
mediator; absence of risk for 
stakeholders; use of trusted 
organization as credit broker 
United States - many examples 
 
Successes: environmental, economic 
 
Failures: programs not implemented in some 
watersheds due to lack of drivers  
Condition: Previous success with other 
emissions trading; Federal government 
impetus to promote 'unique 
approaches' to watershed goals; 
individual state authority to regulate 
non-point source pollution 
 
Drivers: Trading policy approved by 
EPA1 and well-funded; individual state 
regulations to encourage trading; 
existing or imminent nutrient caps 
 
1
 Environmental Protection Agency 
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 Table 4-4. Context for implementation of differentiated payments for ecological goods and services (PES) as a performance-based 
policy approach in selected regions to manage agricultural water quality. 
 Institutional context Social context 
Main program reviewed: United States - 
Performance-based Policies for Agriculture 
Successes: social, environmental 
Condition: Listed as an impaired 
watershed under the Clean Water Act 
 
Drivers: Watershed ranked high on 
list of impaired watershed - 
scheduled for regulation; financial 
support of local farm bureaus 
Driver: Threat of regulation, fear of 
government intervention, and peer 
pressure all drove participation 
United States - Cullers Run (group-based 
program) 
Successes: Social, environmental 
Conditions: Impaired watershed, 
listed under Clean Water Act  
 
 Driver: Stakeholder buy-in; researcher 
interest 
France - Vittel water company 
Successes: Social, environmental, economic 
  
Driver: Political will - potential loss 
of major employer; company 
required actions at the farm level to 
maintain viability 
Driver: Stakeholder buy-in; fear of job 
losses in region 
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 Table 4-5. Context for implementation of cross-compliance as a performance-based policy approach to manage agricultural water 
quality. 
 Institutional context Social context 
United Kingdom - Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones 
Success: Some environmental 
Failure: Stakeholder buy-in not 
attained 
Conditions: history of zonal water protection; 
inclusion in European Commission directives 
Condition: belief in agricultural 
compliance with environmental standards  
Driver: pressure to conform to subsidy types 
approved by World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
Table 4-6. Context for implementation of emissions charges as a performance-based policy approach to manage agricultural water 
quality 
 Institutional context Social context 
The Netherlands - Mineral 
Accounting System 
Success: some environmental 
Failure: largely unsuccessful in 
reducing P pollution 
 Condition: agriculture focused heavily on 
livestock production where excess 
manure results in water pollution 
Driver: failed attempts to manage pollution with 
input-based regulations 
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The information in Tables 4-3 through 4-6 show a range of social and institutional enabling 
conditions and drivers that contribute to selection and implementation of performance-based 
approaches to manage agricultural water quality. Each factor is specific to the region, though 
regions may share similar contexts, or similar contexts may emerge in relation to the use of a 
specific approach. When assessing programs outlined in Tables 4-3 through 4-6, there were some 
shared contexts within approaches. Common contextual factors are discussed below.  
 
Water Quality Trading 
Agri-environmental programs using water quality trading exhibited one necessary common 
factor: a water quality standard (or the threat thereof) (Table 4-3). The policy instrument also 
tended to be implemented more readily where there was a point source polluter and several 
agricultural non-point source polluters. Many of the failed attempts to set up water quality 
trading programs resulted from a lack of one of these two factors (Selman et al. 2009). 
 
Differentiated payments for ecological goods and services 
A main contextual factor indicated by literature related to the implementation of differentiated 
payments for ecological goods and services (PES) as a performance-based approach was the 
recognition of an environmental problem. All programs reviewed identified the deterioration of 
water quality as an important factor (Table 4-4). This type of policy instrument has been used by 
the example cases as a watershed-based program. Stakeholder buy-in within the watershed was 
another important factor in the successful implementation of the programs. In fact, program 
administrators for the two US programs reviewed considered the pilots to be successful enough 
to share their frameworks in other parts of the country (Winsten 2009; Maille et al. 2009). 
 
Cross-compliance 
Where cross-compliance was used, legislation and previous policies to support the compliance 
component were important contextual factors. To implement cross-compliance, some standard of 
water quality, or of acceptable practices must be established in the policy framework of the 
region. In the UK, this was through the Nitrates Directive which sets nitrogen concentration 
standards (Table 4-5). Another enabling condition was a response by the government to public 
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awareness and increasing demand for environmental outcomes from agricultural practices. 
However, the social successes of the program were negligible; it became clear in the review of 
the UK scheme that there was a lack of stakeholder buy-in and a sense of distrust among 
agricultural producers. There was a disconnect between the demands of the public at large for 
multifunctional agriculture and the agricultural producers who maintained a productivist view of 
their role (Barnes et al. 2009; Nielsen et al. 2009).  
 
Emissions charges 
Emissions charges reviewed in Chapter 2 and described in Table 4-6 have not been successful. 
The one example from a member country of the OECD identified was a Dutch program that 
penalized agricultural producers for surplus production of manure. The program did not achieve 
the objectives set out and will not be discussed further, as conditions where success occurs are 
not available.  
 
4.6 Comparison of social and institutional drivers and enabling conditions 
 
Fitting a performance-based approach to the study region requires some understanding of how 
the contextual factors create opportunities or limit the transfer of performance-based approaches. 
The assessment stage of the analysis calls for an evaluation of the similarity of enabling 
conditions and drivers between individual cases and the study region. The conditions and drivers 
do not have to coincide entirely, but must show some degree of similarity based on researcher 
judgment (Table 4-7). Close similarity was marked as (++); some similarity was marked as (+); 
and dissimilarity, or incompatibility was marked as (-).  
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Table 4-7. Contextual similarity between performance-based approaches in other regions and the 
study region in Alberta. 
 Social context Institutional context 
Approach/case Drivers Enabling 
conditions 
Drivers Enabling 
conditions 
Water quality trading     
Ontario - South Nation * + -  
US - many examples 
  - + 
Differentiated PES     
US - PEPA +  -  
US - Cullers Run +    
France - Vittel company -  +  
Cross-compliance     
UK - Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zones 
 ++ + - 
* Cannot be determined from the literature 
 
4.6.1 Social context similarity 
 
The assessment of contextual similarity begins with the similarity of social context among the 
study region and regions where performance-based approaches have been implemented. Where 
social context was mentioned in the literature describing performance-based approaches, most 
have at least some similarity to the study region. The one exception is the Vittel, France case 
(Table 4-7) where the approach was based on a private water bottling company buying water 
quality through changes in practices from farmers within the watershed feeding the water source. 
This was an unusual case where governments did not play a significant role in the program and a 
social context misalignment was expected for this particular case.  
 
The closest alignment in social context between regions with existing approaches and the study 
region was with cross-compliance (Table 4-7). The main enabling conditions for using cross-
compliance as a policy approach were social awareness of the environmental impacts of 
agriculture and the belief that agriculture should comply with environmental standards (Table 4-
5). Environmental standards have been specifically called for by respondents of a study we 
conducted in the study region. Many respondents were also at least somewhat in favour of 
regulating agriculture to maintain the minimum environmental standard for water quality. Many 
expressed an unwillingness to pay for agricultural producers to achieve the minimum standard 
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(Chapter 3). These expectations by society align well with the enabling conditions of the 
approaches using a cross-compliance policy instrument.  
 
4.6.2 Institutional context similarity 
 
Much of the discussion around context in the literature was related to institutional capacity: 
social factors and also political and legislative factors. The cross-compliance based program 
reviewed in Chapter 2 described political pressure from an intergovernmental body and the 
public as a driver for the use of this approach (Table 4-5). These political pressures are likely 
weaker in Canada; provincial governments, rather than federal or international bodies, manage 
most environmental issues (Montpetit 2002). In addition, Alberta agricultural producers have 
been successful in maintaining strong property rights; agri-environmental programs to date have 
been voluntary and have provided cost-sharing incentives to provide EG&S in agricultural 
landscapes. The most recent legislation enacted in Alberta was the Alberta Land Stewardship Act 
(ALSA), which had provisions within it to explore the use of new policy instruments to manage 
agricultural land. However, changes to the ALSA since its enactment were required to emphasize 
that property rights will not be affected by the Act and to make provisions for alternative actions 
where proposed land use plans may affect property rights (The Minister of Sustainable Resource 
Development 2011).  
 
4.6.3 Barriers to implementing cross-compliance 
 
Several contextual factors from the study region correspond well to performance-based programs 
that have been implemented using a cross-compliance approach. However, there are some 
potential barriers to implementing this policy instrument in the study region of southern Alberta. 
First, cross-compliance operates as an approach that requires achievement of a standard to access 
government income support programs and/or agri-environmental payments. These programs and 
payments are generally currently available to agricultural producers without the achievement of a 
standard. Some agri-environmental cost-sharing programs do require the completion of an 
Environmental Farm Plan, such as the Grazing and Winter Feeding Management Plan and the 
Manure Management Plan offered in Alberta (AAFC 2011). The Environmental Farm Plan, 
however, is a whole-farm environmental assessment completed by the agricultural producer with 
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guaranteed confidentiality and with no requirement to take any action as a result of completion 
of the assessment (Alberta EFP 2011).  
 
Another potential barrier to implementing cross-compliance as part of a performance-based 
approach in the study area is the absence of a water quality standard. The UK NVZ program had 
water quality standards for specific agricultural pollutants. In contrast, Alberta does not adhere to 
a water quality standard (Montpetit 2002). Water quality guidelines exist for many pollutants, 
and may serve as a measure for compliance in the study area. However, an agricultural producer 
who participated in the field study to assess social norms and values indicated that the water 
quality guidelines were sometimes unachievable due to flow volumes and uncontrollable weather 
events, and should be tailored to individual watershed conditions (Respondent 3W).  
 
The alternative to holding all agricultural producers to a water quality standard is to use the 
approach of the UK NVZ scheme and assess individual watersheds for water quality. Where 
pollutant levels are exceeded, all watershed landowners must adhere to a set of management 
practices that are designed to reduce pollutant levels. This approach reduces the amount of 
'performance' incorporated into it, and it also creates an obligation for all watershed landowners 
to participate. As stated earlier, the literature available for the UK NVZ scheme indicate that the 
watershed approach to cross-compliance has not been effective in reducing agricultural pollution 
in a consistent manner, nor has it been accepted by landowners within the watersheds (Barnes et 
al. 2009). Where perceptions of legitimacy of a policy approach are absent, uptake and 
adherence to it are likely to be low (Davies and Hodge 2006). Macgregor and Warren (2006) 
report that Scottish agricultural producers maintain a productivist view of agriculture (i.e.,, 
agriculture should maximize production of food and fibre and environmental benefits are not 
prioritized) and many fail to acknowledge agricultural contributions to water quality. This view 
was echoed by respondents to the study described in Chapter 3; evidence that there are some 
parallels in social norms and values between the Scottish agricultural producers and those within 
the study region. Several respondents in the study region noted that there were other sources of 
contamination that deserved study more than agriculture. Viewpoints toward agriculture were 
dominantly productivist, though respondents, including agricultural producers, rural residents 
and urban residents had a range of perspectives regarding the role of agriculture in environmental 
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sustainability (Chapter 3). Davies and Hodge (2006) state that how the approach is presented to 
agricultural producers may have a significant impact on how it is perceived. For example, if 
cross-compliance is presented as a 'contract with society' and a way to continue to provide 
payments to agricultural producers, rather than a limitation on their 'right to farm', producers may 
be more accepting. 
 
The final barrier to implementing cross-compliance is that the incentives to comply must exceed 
the benefits of failing to comply. That is, government income support and environmental 
payment programs must provide enough of an incentive to, at least, offset the costs of achieving 
a set water quality standard for agricultural producers to act (Claassen et al. 2004). Canada has a 
relatively low level of income support compared to other OECD countries (OECD 2007), and 
payments for agri-environmental programs are being reduced over time (AAFC 2010). Ensuring 
agricultural producers comply with water quality standards would require an economic 
assessment of the required compliance terms to adequately incentivize producers. 
 
4.6.4 Context comparison for other performance-based approaches 
 
The assessment of social norms and values of the study region in southern Alberta identified a 
general willingness among respondents to pay agricultural producers to improve water quality 
beyond a minimum environmental standard (Chapter 3). Water quality trading and differentiated 
PES pay agricultural producers for water quality improvements, though the mechanisms for 
payment are different. Payments for water quality improvements are 'beneficiary pays' 
instruments and align with the general social willingness to pay for water quality beyond a 
minimum standard indicated by field study respondents (Chapter 3). 
 
4.6.4.1 Water quality trading 
 
The social context of water quality trading in the South Nation Watershed of Ontario 
acknowledged the importance of stakeholder buy-in for the success of the program, as well as 
organized farm groups that lobbied to maintain voluntary programs with payments for EG&S 
(Table 4-3). The programs from the US were assessed together and social context was not 
mentioned in the literature. The programs were gene
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South Nation program), but several programs were not implemented in the US, though 
frameworks were in place, due to a lack of drivers (Table 4-3). 
 
A study of the potential to use water quality trading to manage agricultural non-point source 
pollution in Canada found that there were no strong political or legislative barriers to using the 
policy instrument (Cantin et al. 2005). The study highlighted the increasing establishment of 
watershed-based organizations that could facilitate use of the instrument.  
 
Barriers to implementing water quality trading 
Common contextual factors for existing performance-based approaches to water quality trading 
included the implementation of a water quality standard, or threat thereof, and the presence of 
point source and non-point source polluters in the watershed. The water quality standard served 
as an important driver for agricultural producers to participate in the programs. Regulation, or the 
threat of regulation, appeared to be an effective motivator for agricultural producers to accept 
alternative and voluntary performance-based approaches, as they seemed preferable to further 
regulation in the cases reviewed. Water quality standards do not exist for the study region in 
southern Alberta and there is no indication that standards are being considered. As a result, it 
may be difficult in the study region to motivate agricultural producers to participate in a water 
quality trading scheme, as was demonstrated in several US states where the framework for water 
quality trading was put in place, but the lack of enforceable standards resulted in inadequate 
drivers to implement the approach (Selman et al. 2009). Water quality in the study watershed 
exceeds federal guidelines for the protection of aquatic life, sometimes by a large margin (Table 
4-1). However, exceeding current water quality guidelines does not carry any penalty.  
 
The presence of at least one point-source polluter in each watershed where water quality trading 
was implemented was an important enabling condition. These point source polluters were 
usually wastewater emitters with a high cost of pollution emission reduction. Where water 
quality was compromised, it was less costly for the wastewater emitters, through transactions in 
an emission permit market, to pay agricultural producers to reduce pollution emissions than to 
implement the technology needed for equivalent emission prevention (even where pollution 
reduction estimation uncertainty resulted in payments of four times the likely actual emission 
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reduction, as in the South Nation watershed). The study region in southern Alberta is not home to 
any wastewater point source polluters; however, there are four CFOs within the watershed 
boundaries: three house beef cattle and one is a dairy operation. While CFOs are considered 
point source polluters (the emissions can be traced more easily from a CFO than from diffuse 
pollution from more extensive activities) (Ribaudo and Nickerson 2009), there is currently no 
requirement for the CFO owners to adhere to a maximum pollutant load entering waterways.  
 
Several additional constraints have been identified for Canadian implementation of water quality 
trading. A study published in 2005 found that the capacity to estimate site-specific water quality 
impacts of beneficial management practices was not strong, and the water quality data needed for 
start-up and on-going monitoring were often not available. Social acceptance of the approach, 
willingness to pay and demand for improved water quality outcomes from agriculture were also 
questioned (Cantin et al. 2005). The study region of southern Alberta lacks some of the 
important enabling conditions and drivers that were demonstrated to be necessary for 
implementation of water quality trading in existing programs, including the presence of a water 
quality standard and regulations such as total maximum daily load (TMDL) limits for specific 
water pollutants from point source emitters. As a result, this instrument is unlikely to achieve any 
level of buy-in from agricultural producers. This has been demonstrated in several cases in the 
US where TMDL limits were not enforced and therefore the threat of regulation of agricultural 
sources of water pollution was low (Selman et al. 2009).  
 
4.6.4.2 Differentiated PES 
 
Existing approaches using differentiated PES as a policy instrument shared some common 
context. Stakeholder buy-in was important, as the instrument has been implemented as a 
voluntary program in all reviewed cases. To achieve stakeholder buy-in, the major social drivers 
were the interest and time devoted to the programs by researchers and fear of worse outcomes 
from a lack of participation (Table 4-4). The cases in the US were both pilot projects where 
researchers were actively involved in the process of implementing a performance-based 
approach, and where funding was available to pay for water quality improvements (Winsten 
2009; Morton 2008; Perrot-Maȋtre 2006). The potential for time dedication and funding 
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availability are unknown for the study region. Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development is 
currently conducting a research study in the study region titled "Nutrient Beneficial Management 
Practices Evaluation Project" that assesses the water quality outcomes from BMPs (Olson and 
Kalischuk 2010). Future plans to supply further funding for the region have not been indicated 
by AARD.  
 
Stakeholder buy-in was also influenced by the amount of 'ownership' of the program given to 
agricultural producers. In all three cases, agricultural producers were an important part of the 
development of the program structure. In the Cullers Run and PEPA programs, agricultural 
producers formed advisory committees and were given decision-making power. If the type of 
resources (time and financial) provided in these cases were provided to the study region, a 
differentiated PES program may work. Indications of this are provided from the results of the 
field study that assessed social norms and values of the region (Chapter 3). Agricultural 
producers in the study region were cautiously interested in performance-based approaches, and 
particularly differentiated PES (Chapter 3). Further, for the duration of the AARD research 
project in the region, a watershed stewardship group has been formed (Olson and Kalischuk 
2011). The purpose of the group is to disseminate information to watershed landowners and to 
match agricultural producers and funding for environmental improvements they wish to make to 
their operation (mostly through government-funded cost-sharing opportunities) (Olson and 
Kalischuk 2011). At the conclusion of the study AARD will no longer organize watershed group 
meetings and the fate of this group is unclear. 
 
As with most performance-based approaches, water quality monitoring data and models that 
provide reasonable site-specific estimates of water quality changes are important. For the cases 
reviewed using differentiated PES as a policy instrument, these factors helped create the 
necessary enabling conditions for the success of the programs (Chapter 2; Table 2-2). These are 
conditions that the study region meets, as AARD has actively monitored water flow and quality 
over several years at many locations in the region and the agency is also adapting an economic 
and physical process model to the region to be able to assess the impacts of individual BMPs on 
water quality (Olson and Kalischuk 2011).  
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Barriers to implementing differentiated PES 
Fitting the policy to the social norms and values of respondents from the study region to the 
extent possible is important for the improved chance of success of transfer of an existing 
approach elsewhere (Mossberger and Wolman 2003; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). Often, when 
approaches were successful, there was a recognition of the importance of stakeholder buy-in, and 
where approaches were not effective, lack of stakeholder buy-in was noted as a key factor 
(Chapter 2). 
 
The pressure on agricultural producers to participate in voluntary programs in order to avoid 
regulatory measures (as was the case for PEPA in the US) or economic difficulties (the case for 
Vittel in France) were important drivers for the approach (Morton 2008; Perrot-Maȋtre 2006). As 
discussed with previous approaches, these drivers do not exist within the study region of 
southern Alberta. However, the Cullers Run Watershed in the US did not describe this situation 
as a driver for the approach and was still regarded as highly successful; researchers cited the pilot 
project as a model for further efforts nation-wide (Maille et al. 2009). The unique group 
approach to this program may be feasible within the study region, as a watershed stewardship 
group exists; however, the group's formation resulted from an AARD study and meetings are 
scheduled and run by AARD staff. The group's continued operation is unclear after the 
conclusion of AARD's work in the region in 2012 (Olson and Kalischuk 2011). If the group were 
to maintain its cohesion and form a viable self-governance structure, the potential for a group 
PES approach to water quality management in the watershed may be possible.  
 
4.6.5 Suite of instruments 
 
Many researchers have acknowledged that there is no 'silver bullet', or single instrument, for 
managing agri-environmental issues (e.g., Engel et al. 2008; Claassen et al. 2008; OECD 2006; 
Weersink et al. 1998). Rather, a suite of instruments is needed depending on the nature of the 
environmental concern and the institutional, economic, social, and knowledge contexts of a 
region. Indications from the field study that assessed social norms and values of respondents in 
the study region are that there is an expectation that agricultural producers will adhere to a 
minimum water quality standard where no payments are provided to achieve the standard, but 
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payments for water quality improvements above the standard are acceptable. Therefore, two 
types of policy approaches are required to meet the expectations of the respondents: first, an 
approach that supports a minimum environmental standard requirement; and second, an approach 
that encourages further environmental improvements beyond the standard through a system of 
payments.  
 
The two performance-based approaches reviewed where payments were conditional on 
environmental quality were cross-compliance and water quality trading. Both of these are 
successful where a water quality standard has been implemented. Water quality trading has the 
additional constraint for success of a threat of enforcement of the standard. As noted in the 
previous discussion, the institutional capacity to implement water quality trading does not exist 
at present; that is, a water quality standard does not exist for the study region, and social norms 
and values assessed from agricultural producers in and beyond the study region do not strongly 
support a water quality standard (Chapter 3). The willingness and ability of farmers to take on 
the role of steward where productivism is the dominant paradigm is also identified by Latacz-
Lohmann and Hodge (2003) as an impediment to implementing an environmental reference level 
as a policy approach. Should this capacity be created in the future, the conditions would be suited 
to utilizing cross-compliance or water quality trading. However, at present, the lack of 
institutional capacity is a substantial constraint to implementing these approaches.  
 
Implementation of the water quality trading instrument has the additional constraint of a need to 
identify the most significant source(s) of water pollution within the watershed. The instrument 
works on the premise that the costs of adhering to a water quality standard by point source 
polluters are high, and that the purchase of credits is a cost-effective alternative for point source 
polluters to meet the standard. There are some point source polluters (CFOs) in the watershed, 
and although water quality is monitored at 21 stations throughout the watershed (Olson and 
Kalischuk 2008), none of these stations are set up to assess CFO contributions to water pollution. 
 
There was a performance-based approach reviewed that could be used to pay agricultural 
producers. Differentiated PES was used in other cases for this purpose, is subject to only a few 
barriers to implementation. This approach requires the measurement or modeling capacity to 
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estimate water quality outcomes from BMPs. This is being addressed by AARD in the 
development of a model appropriate for the study region (Olson and Kalischuk 2011). The 
economic capacity to implement this approach is uncertain; funding availability for payments is 
likely subject to change over time with yearly budgets, agricultural policy frameworks, and with 
changes in the governing political party.  
 
4.7 Future potential 
 
Chapter 3 described the prevailing perceptions of respondents to the field study conducted in 
southern Alberta in terms of four groups: agri-economic priorities, socio-environmental 
priorities, multiple priorities, and unidentified priorities. A dominant social perspective of 
balance among agricultural, economic, social, and environmental concerns emerged from the 
study in southern Alberta. The results related to social norms and values around agricultural 
property rights and water quality reflected this finding. Differences based on the age of the 
respondents were slight and there were few indications of a shift in thinking, save a lesser 
willingness to make incremental payments for water quality improvements from younger 
respondents (ages 18-35 years) and a greater acceptance of regulatory measures (Chapter 3). The 
current perceptions seem to be fairly evenly distributed among age groups and, based on the field 
study data, will be maintained unless events occur that motivate a change, including legislative 
changes (Roland 2004; O'Grady 2011). The recent implementation of the Alberta Land Use 
Framework could create change among agricultural landowners. The Alberta Land Stewardship 
Act (ALSA) created the legal capacity to implement the Framework. When the ALSA was first 
enacted, it created a sense of fear around possible losses of property rights as a result of new 
policy approaches to land management. However, this was soon tempered by an amendment that 
assured landowners of no reduction in property rights as a result of the ALSA (The Minister of 
Sustainable Resource Development 2011). The fear of reduced property rights may still exist and 
this could potentially create a driver similar to those described in some of the performance-based 
approaches where agricultural producers participated in programs to avoid further government 
intervention related to water quality. This is an observation that warrants further investigation, as 
an opportunity to implement performance-based approaches may exist as a result of the 
circumstances around property rights and the Land Use Framework. 
123 
  
 
The South Saskatchewan Regional Profile (wherein the study region is located), an informational 
document preceding the development of a Regional Plan through the Land Use Framework, has 
cited increasing land use pressures, including rural and urban residential development, oil and 
gas extraction activities, increasing recreational demand, intensive livestock production facilities, 
and other industrial uses as competing for land currently used for agriculture, resulting in further 
fragmentation and reduction in rangeland and crop land (Government of Alberta 2009). 
Balancing increasing pressures from human activities and the maintenance of quality water 
supplies will become more of a challenge as these land use pressures are predicted to grow over 
time (Government of Alberta 2009). The Regional Profile also stated that within the Oldman 
River Basin (where the study region is located) agricultural activities are responsible for the 
water quality concerns along smaller tributaries, such as Indianfarm Creek. Increasing pressure 
to produce crops on all available agricultural land has been cited as a major reason for direct 
cattle access to, and deterioration of, streambanks and riparian areas (Olson and Kalischuk 
2011). As agricultural land becomes increasingly fragmented and unavailable over time due to 
increasing land demands from other activities, there may be increasing pressure on agricultural 
producers to use marginal lands around streams for livestock production. This could cause a 
decrease in water quality over time and should be taken into consideration in policy planning 
under the Regional Plan. 
 
4.8 Limitation to the policy transfer assessment 
 
Capacity to assess the suitability of performance-based approaches for the study region was 
constrained by the availability of literature describing and analyzing the approaches. Many of the 
performance-based approaches are relatively new in their application to water quality and 
agriculture. As these approaches become more widely used, and as existing approaches are 
studied over time, literature related to these approaches will likely become more abundant and 
allow for a more thorough assessment. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS FOR INTRODUCING PERFORMANCE-BASED 
APPROACHES FOR MANAGING WATER QUALITY ON AGRICULTURAL 
LANDSCAPES: USING INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AS A GUIDE FOR POLICY 
TRANSFER 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Performance-based approaches have the potential to be efficient and effective in the provision of 
EG&S (Weinberg and Claassen 2006), and more specifically in the provision of adequate water 
quality, as compared to practice-based approaches, which represent the current policy approach 
used in Canada. However, performance-based approaches require greater information about 
water quality and the capability to model or directly measure the impacts of individual BMPs on 
water quality.  
 
In addition to technical and informational requirements, social acceptance of performance-based 
approaches is an important consideration when assessing the feasibility of implementation 
(Chapter 3). In fact, policy alignment with the prevailing social norms and values, and/or with 
strongly held perceptions of well-organized interest groups is important for its success (Wolman 
1992; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Barnes et al. 2009). Social norms and values, or social context, 
are often under-examined in policy implementation, and more specifically in the policy transfer 
literature (Wolman 1992; Dwyer and Ellison 2009). Policy transfer is a mechanism to take 
existing policies, parts of policies, or lessons drawn from them and apply them to another 
location. Policy transfer provides a way to avoid 're-inventing the wheel' or creating an entirely 
new policy, where an existing one might serve the purpose.  
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The purpose of this thesis was to address the lack of consideration given to context in policy 
transfer, with a focus on social context, and to assess the transferability of performance-based 
agri-environmental approaches to water quality management implemented elsewhere. To achieve 
this, three objectives were set out:  
i. Identify performance-based approaches implemented in other regions to manage water 
quality on agricultural landscapes and assess the drivers and enabling conditions of that 
implementation; 
ii. Assess the social norms and values of the study region related to agricultural landowners' 
rights and responsibilities for water quality; and 
iii. Synthesize the findings of objectives i and ii to evaluate the capacity of the study region 
to implement a performance-based approach, and provide recommendations based on 
contextual alignment of the study region to the host regions. 
 
While all three of these objectives were achieved to some extent, the scope of the analysis must 
be considered when evaluating the results. First, the objectives were addressed from a social 
science perspective. Contextual factors important in policy transfer range from social to 
biophysical to economic; social context is an important, and insufficiently-studied factor in 
context, but limiting the analysis to social factors does result in a less than comprehensive 
assessment for a policy transfer. Second, the research budget limited the quantity of data 
collected. Significant efforts were made to insure that the highest possible response rate was 
achieved within the budget constraints; however, surveys were sent by unaddressed mail and this 
may have reduced the response rate and potentially created a greater bias in the participant 
demographics than might otherwise have been the case with personally-addressed mail. Finally, 
upon conducting the literature review for performance-based approaches, it became evident that 
there was a dearth of peer-reviewed literature that was focused on these approaches in 
applications that were relevant to the study. The review was expanded to include 'grey' (non-peer 
reviewed) literature in order to be able to draw from sufficient resources for the discussion. This 
lack of peer-reviewed resources is the direct result of the novelty of applying performance-based 
approaches to agricultural management of water quality. Despite these limitations, I believe that 
the thesis is successful in achieving the objectives set out and makes a meaningful contribution 
to the policy planning literature. 
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5.2 Systematic assessment of applicability of performance-based approaches for water 
quality management 
 
Performance-based approaches differ from practice-based approaches in that they focus on 
outcomes rather than on inputs. The structure of these approaches can vary markedly and this 
represents a challenge in classifying an approach as clearly 'performance-based'. Further, a single 
performance-based approach can, in some cases, be implemented in a variety of ways that results 
in a more or less performance-based implementation. As a result of these characteristics of 
performance-based approaches as a group, and the implications in choosing an appropriate 
approach for a given region, a systematic characterization of performance-based approaches was 
undertaken. The approaches varied around two key factors: measurement capability (or 
preference) and payment/penalty structure (Chapter 2). The types of measurement and payment 
structures that characterize the range of performance-based approaches represent a spectrum 
from very weakly performance-based to strongly performance-based approaches.  
 
The organizational model created, called the 'Performance Capacity Meter', identifies 
benchmarks for increasing measurement and payment/penalty structure capabilities as the 
approaches become more focused on outcomes and less focused on inputs. The Meter provides a 
useful tool to classify policy approaches and assess not only whether they are performance-
based, but also by relative degree. As a result, it contributes to the literature related to 
performance-based approaches and their use for non-point source pollution in agricultural 
settings specifically, but also contributes to the understanding and application of these 
approaches in broader EG&S applications. 
 
The Performance Capacity Meter has an additional application as a tool to select appropriate 
approaches for a region where the measurement capacity and desired payment/penalty structure 
is known. The literature review and assessment of current performance-based approaches in use 
provided the necessary data to rank the approaches on the Meter (Chapter 2). The Meter creates a 
simple organizational structure for a complex mix of approaches that facilitates the classification 
and selection of appropriate approaches where the regional capacity is known. Measurement 
capacity is a relatively straightforward metric; however, payment/penalty structure must be 
informed by social norms and values that will influence the acceptability of the structure chosen. 
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As payment/penalty structure becomes more strongly performance-based, it becomes more 
strongly targeted to those landowners that affect the greatest improvement in water quality and 
thus may have implications in terms of perceptions of fairness and equity. The literature related 
to good actors in agri-environmental policy acknowledges that an unfortunate trade off exists 
between cost-effectiveness and fairness (Claassen et al. 2001). That is, paying only those actors 
who can affect the greatest change (usually 'bad actors', or those that do not adopt BMPs) results 
in inequity and unfairness for those who have been good stewards in the past; however, ensuring 
fairness and equity by paying all actors, including early adopter of BMPs (the good stewards, or 
'good actors'), results in reduced cost-effectiveness and lesser environmental outcomes for a 
given budget (Engel et al. 2008). Additional social concerns of validity of the science used to 
measure water quality and the risk involved in payments only where outcomes are realized are 
significant considerations when choosing a payment/penalty structure .  
 
5.3 Social norms and values: informing policy decisions 
 
The social norms and values of the study region were assessed by interview and survey to 
understand how agricultural producers, rural residents and urban residents perceived the rights 
and responsibilities of agricultural landowners in relation to water quality. This line of 
questioning was used as an indirect approach to identify whether performance-based approaches 
would fit within the social context of the study region, and if so, which approach(es) would best 
align with the norms and values of the region. However, public preferences for particular policies 
or programs are not necessarily well-formed. The methodology used to extract preferences relied 
on perceptions of the rights and responsibilities of agricultural landowners; this was 
communicated by rating degree of (dis)agreement statements and by answers to multiple-choice 
questions. This method allowed at least partial circumvention of the problem of poorly-formed 
opinions about policies and programs and assessed the underlying social norms and values, or 
social context, that inform those opinions.  
 
There has been much discussion in the agricultural policy literature about the paradigm in which 
we are currently situated. Several researchers suggest that there is a divide between North 
American agriculture, which is productivist and focused primarily on food and fibre production; 
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and European agricultural practices, considered post-productivist (or multi-functional) (e.g., 
Burton 2004; Burton and Wilson 2006; Pond 2009; Wilson 2001). Based on the results of the 
social context evaluation in Chapter 3, I conclude that, from the respondents' perspective, 
agricultural landowners have a responsibility not only to provide food and fibre, but also to 
provide a socially-acceptable level of EG&S. This indicates a misalignment with the productivist 
perspective of agriculture where the primary objective is to produce the greatest yield possible 
from the land (Robinson 2006), and the tradition of agricultural exceptionalism that has 
dominated policy decisions in the past and persists in the present (e.g., Alberta Land Stewardship 
Amendment Act) . While the results of this study cannot conclusively prove that a paradigm 
change is occurring, it is evident that social norms and values do not entirely coincide with the 
social context assumptions implicit in current agri-environmental policy approaches. The 
respondents rejected the notion that agricultural landowners should be offered financial 
incentives to make changes to agricultural practices without regard for an environmental 
standard of care (Chapter 3).  
 
There were indications of a shift in norms and values in younger respondents (Chapter 3). There 
was increased acceptance of agricultural water quality regulation and decreased willingness to 
pay agricultural producers for EG&S for respondents who were 18-35 years old. The groups 
identified with the principal components analysis showed that a majority of respondents ranked 
social and environmental priorities more highly than agricultural and economic ones when 
developing agri-environmental policy. Multiple perspectives (relative closeness to agriculture, 
demographic patterns and priorities groups) all demonstrated a misalignment between reported 
norms and values and the norms and values assumptions current agri-environmental policies 
support. The analyses described a respondent population that demands a standard of care for 
water quality on agricultural landscapes, a population that is sensitive to the production 
economics of agriculture and therefore willing to provide positive incentives for improvements 
to water management; but also a population that will increasingly expect (as younger 
respondents become politically influential) that agricultural producers will provide a standard of 
water quality and are willing to penalize those producers who fail to meet this expectation.  
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This study provides a snapshot in time of the social norms and values of respondents in southern 
Alberta, a largely agricultural region, and further assessment of a broader range of Canadians 
would provide an understanding of whether current policies are indeed misaligned with social 
norms and values, or whether we as a country are still firmly situated within the agricultural 
productivist paradigm.  
 
A broad application of the survey format used within this thesis (for example, at the provincial or 
federal scale) could provide policy makers with the social context information required to shift 
policy development toward performance-based approaches. The application of public funds for 
the provision of EG&S from agriculture could be enhanced with a given budget using 
performance-based approaches (Weinberg and Claassen 2006). This may provide a sufficient 
incentive for policy makers to consider a paradigm shift in policy. Information about water 
quality and potential models under development in Canada provide much of the institutional 
context for the implementation of performance-based approaches. An appropriate first step may 
be to implement performance-based approaches where water quality monitoring has been 
ongoing for several years as a result of federal and/or provincial research efforts, such as the 
federal Watershed Evaluation of Beneficial Management Practices project (AAFC 2011) and the 
Alberta Nutrient Beneficial Management Practices Evaluation Project (Olson and Kalischuk 
2011). Alberta is particularly well-situated for the development and implementation of 
performance-based approaches as a result of previous and ongoing efforts to increase 
institutional capacity to manage water resource in the province through the Water For Life 
strategy (AENV 2008), and more recently the Land Use Framework (Government of Alberta 
2008).  
 
5.4 Social context as an indicator of potential for implementing performance-based 
approaches 
 
As emphasized in the previous section, social context is an important factor to consider when 
implementing a performance-based approach. When the social norms and values of a region are 
known, there is an opportunity to use social context as an indicator of the potential for 
implementing performance-based approaches. The final analysis of the study combined the 
identification of existing performance-based approaches to manage water quality on agricultural 
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land, the drivers and enabling conditions that were common to each approach, and the social 
context of the study region (informed by evaluation of social norms and values) to assess the 
potential to implement the existing performance-based approaches. I approached this assessment 
from a social context perspective because social norms and values are slow to change as 
compared to other contextual factors, such as economic and physical factors (Roland 2004). 
Allowing social context to guide the selection of potential performance-based approaches 
ensured alignment with norms and values of the region. Respondents in the study region 
generally agreed that a minimum standard of environmental care should be required of 
agricultural landowners and that, above and beyond that standard, financial incentives for water 
quality improvements should still apply. From a performance-based approaches perspective, this 
finding created an opportunity to implement a suite of policy instruments to satisfy the 
expectations of respondents.  
 
5.5 Conclusions and future directions for research 
 
This thesis seeks to improve the understanding of how social context can serve as a useful and 
appropriate indicator of potential to implement performance-based approaches, and also to 
advance the literature and methodology related to the assessment of social context. Previous 
studies focused on agri-environmental policy in Alberta, and in Canada, have questioned barriers 
and motives to adopt BMPs, or more generally to participate in government-administered 
programs. However, there have been few efforts to assess the (mis)alignment of current and 
future policies with the existing social context. This thesis contributes to that void in the policy 
planning process in Canada. 
 
Internationally, evaluations of social acceptability for policies have directly queried preferences 
for policies and/or policy instruments while acknowledging that often these preferences are not 
well formed. This thesis presented a novel approach to understanding social context through an 
indirect line of questioning around agricultural landowners' environmental rights and 
responsibilities. Using this approach, the issue of poorly-formed preferences was circumvented 
and the responses provided were directly applicable and comparable to the enabling conditions 
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and drivers in regions where performance-based approaches had been implemented. This 
approach provides a unique, social context approach to studies of policy transfer feasibility.  
 
The use of social context as an indicator of policy preference and for the development of policy 
requires an adaptive management approach. Responses to surveys and interviews may not fully 
reflect the population's true norms and values as a result of a number of factors including 
question format, question misinterpretation, discrepancy between responses and practices, and 
through the characteristics of the sample population. Individual responses and the broader 
interpretation of results must account for these issues of clarity, discrepancy, and bias possible in 
this type of research. In addition, social norms and values change over time, so policies must 
remain responsive to these changes. Adaptive management, or "gradual institutional reform", 
provides a framework for policy development using social context as an indicator (Roland 2004). 
Adaptive management acknowledges the complexity of social and ecological systems and 
encourages action despite uncertainty about the outcomes of policy decisions, with a continual 
process of monitoring and re-assessment (Noble 2004). The capacity for adaptive management is 
largely a function of social context, as it is the human-developed institutions that guide actions 
that impact the environment (Walker et al. 2004). An adaptive, or gradual institutional reform, 
process for performance-based policy development will acknowledge the uncertainty associated 
with social context and provide a mechanism for critical reflection on the impacts of new 
policies from social and ecological perspectives.  
 
Agricultural non-point source impacts on water quality in the study region was approached from 
two perspectives: the social context where norms and values at the local and regional scales were 
assessed; and the biophysical effects of BMPs where water quality was assessed by Alberta 
Agriculture and Rural Development (AARD). The two perspectives were complimentary. 
Although water quality studies and AARD are ongoing, preliminary results from a short term 
assessment of BMP impacts on water quality highlights the challenges associated with 
performance-based approaches. Water quality was not uniformly impacted by BMPs; often water 
quality did not improve, or showed improvement in one year but not in another (Olson and 
Kalischuk 2011). The findings highlight the important role that landscape variability and climate 
play in the link between agricultural practices and environmental outcomes. Modeling the 
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potential influence of factors that are not accounted for in current policies and programs and 
using that information to guide future policy and program development could improve funding 
efficiency in terms of environmental outcomes (Weinberg and Claassen 2006). The improved 
efficiency occurs as a result of accounting for some of the uncertainties associated with 
landscape and climate variability and incorporating those uncertainties into payment or penalty 
structures. The Performance Capacity Meter developed within the thesis (Chapter 2) explicitly 
recognizes the importance of both the capacity to measure environmental (specifically water 
quality) outcomes from practices and the payment or penalty structure used to deliver the 
programs as key determinants of the capacity to incorporate performance into policy approaches. 
 
5.5.1 Future research directions 
 
A possible avenue of research extending from the findings in this thesis is further development 
of the Performance Capacity Meter to improve the robustness of the tool. The tool is currently 
based on a relatively small subset of performance-based policy approaches as they have been 
applied within OECD member countries for the purpose of managing water quality on 
agricultural landscapes. The tool has potential usefulness for selecting policy approaches for 
other environmental issues, in other institutional and social contexts, at variable scales, and for a 
broad range of sectors. The current body of literature related to performance-based approaches 
for water quality management has not been systematically organized and the Performance 
Capacity Meter is a potential tool for that purpose. Further testing of the tool framework to 
ensure the ranking factors chosen (measurement and payment/penalty structure) are satisfactory 
for other applications of the tool is necessary for broader use.  
 
A second direction for further research acknowledges the challenges of implementing a 
performance-based policy approach at the watershed scale. Issues raised in the review of existing 
approaches included balancing risk management for both program providers and participants and 
the potential to use a group approach instead of targeting individual landowners for watershed 
scale concerns (Chapter 2). These issues were briefly described within this thesis; however, they 
represent important and highly relevant concerns in development and implementation of policy 
approaches and warrant further study through the lens of performance-based approaches.  
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Development of a socially-acceptable risk management approach between program providers 
and participants clearly was a strong driver where performance-based approaches were socially 
successful. However, the result was often a transfer of the majority, or all, of the risk to the 
program provider. Accordingly, payments were made with little regard for actual environmental 
outcomes and performance capacity of these programs was severely diminished. While beyond 
the scope of this study, a potential solution to this problem may be a slow introduction of risk, 
rather than an abrupt change to current program structures. Drawing from the institutional 
change literature, Roland (2004) suggests that gradual, experimental institutional changes 
(discussed briefly in terms of adaptive management above) can have an impact on social norms 
and values, just as social norms and values influence formal institutions. Using incremental 
increases in risk, allowing for water quality model development to improve in accuracy over 
time, may have two advantages: 1) improved potential to gain public support; and 2) improved 
accuracy of models to predict impacts of agricultural practices, which has the additional 
advantage of reducing perceived risk.  
 
The group approach to performance-based water quality policy has immediately recognizable 
benefits over individual actions. First, agricultural water pollution is largely diffuse, and 
therefore many landowners' management practices impact a single water body and these 
individual impacts cannot be easily distinguished. Second, there has been a trend towards 
watershed-based governance, rather than the traditional, top-down government approach to 
environmental management (Rogers and Hall 2003; Nowlan and Bakker 2010), and a group, or 
collaborative watershed-based, approach provides a fitting structure. Finally, an individual effort 
to reduce pollutant loading within a watershed generally has a negligible effect on water quality 
(with the caveat that major emitters may have a substantial impact). A group, or watershed, 
approach, however, ensures that many landowners within a watershed are reducing pollutant 
loads and is more likely to have a positive impact on water quality. There are less obvious 
benefits as well, such as the peer pressure mechanisms that can work to increase program uptake, 
as was demonstrated in a payment program in Cullers Run Watershed in the United States where 
the group received incentives for increased participation within the watershed (Maille et al. 
2009). There are also potential disadvantages, such as the incidence of moral hazard where 
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watershed landowners do not participate but share in the benefits created by the rest of the group 
(Vossler et al. 2007). However, the structure of group, or collaborative watershed-based, 
programs are well-suited to water quality concerns in terms of dealing with the problem at an 
appropriate (watershed) scale. There are further measurement and monitoring efficiencies that 
could be realized as a result of a watershed scale program. In fact, this issue is not entirely 
separate from risk management, and may reduce the risk borne by individuals and distribute it 
among the group. There is the potential to use current watershed stewardship groups in 
agricultural areas that have been developed as a result of common interests or as a product of the 
Water For Life and Land Use Framework in Alberta to initiate this type of program structure. 
 
Finally, there are some interesting intersections between findings and theoretical concepts that 
emerge from discussions within this thesis and provide opportunities for additional research 
trajectories. Specifically, concepts of path dependence and transformation (discussed in greater 
detail below) have potential application to some of the findings from the study region and from 
the review of performance-based approaches. Both of these concepts are embedded within the 
social-ecological systems resilience literature, but are not exclusive to it. The social-ecological 
systems concept embraces the notion that social systems are inextricably linked to ecological 
systems; therefore, they cannot be considered separately. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
social ecological system of the study region would encompass the range of actors, institutions, 
and water quality and management issues. Social-ecological systems are considered to move 
through adaptive cycles over time (Holling 2001). Adaptive cycles can be visualized as a loop 
that has two general parts: a forward and back loop. These two sections of the adaptive cycle 
manage for production and sustainability, respectively (Walker et al. 2002). Social ecological 
systems move through these cycles repeatedly over time. The forward, or production, phase of 
the cycle is more highly controlled and regulations for increases to efficiency are often 
implemented. The forward loop is representative of a period of relative stability in terms of 
policy. The back loop, or sustainability, phase of the cycle represents times of greater turbulence 
where novel approaches may be introduced. It is a time of greater susceptibility and rapid change 
(Holling 2001) and presents opportunities for new policies. There are many adaptive cycles 
occurring within a region at different scales that interact with one another (Walker et al. 2002). 
How the social-ecological systems move through these cycles is influenced by many factors and 
139 
  
is complex. However, two of these factors - path dependence (and the associated phenomenon of 
"lock-in traps") and transformations - are particularly applicable to the findings discussed within 
this thesis.  
 
Path dependence occurs during the stable phase of the adaptive cycle and describes the tendency 
for policies and society to maintain the status quo and resist divergence or change from the 
current path as a result of positive feedback (where each successive decision makes the current 
path more attractive and harder to diverge from) (Pierson 2004). Self-reinforcing factors (such as 
historical decisions and high costs to change) maintain a specific, unchanging institutional 
trajectory that may not adequately adapt to changing external conditions (Burch 2011; Pierson 
2004). Eventually, a failure to respond to changing conditions can result in a phenomenon called 
a "lock-in trap" where sustainability of the social-ecological system continues to decline. Lock-in 
traps are characterized by high connectivity, high resilience and low adaptability, and may occur 
in agricultural landscapes where economic welfare is dependent on the state (Allison and Hobbs 
2004; Walker et al. 2004). The role that path dependency has played in the policy context of the 
study region is clear, governments have continuously supported a model of practice-based policy 
approaches for water quality management on agricultural landscapes. Change that was put 
forward by governments, such as the creation of legal capacity to use new (and potentially 
performance-based) approaches in Alberta was quashed - with a return to only marginal changes 
to the status quo - by concerns about eroding property rights as a result of the change (The 
Minister of Sustainable Resource Development 2011; Government of Alberta 2008). Further 
investigation of the roles of path dependence, the factors that have created lock-in traps, and how 
these factors interact within the study region would provide a complementary perspective to the 
findings in this thesis. An investigation of the intersection of policy planning and social norms 
and values within the study region would enrich discussions of social and policy context in the 
policy transfer literature and contribute to the resilience literature as well. This thesis contributes 
an illustrative example of that interaction, and provides a reference point for further 
investigation. 
 
The concept of transformation is the act of movement from one social-ecological system 
configuration to another (i.e.,, changing a trajectory of a social-ecological system) that may 
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occur during a phase of rapid change in the adaptive cycle (Walker et al. 2004). 
Transformational change can be based on choice, and therefore deliberate, or else it can be 
forced by shifting ecological, social, institutional, or economic factors (Folke et al. 2010). 
Implementation of performance-based approaches to managing water quality on agricultural 
landscapes is constrained by several institutional and social barriers. Some of these barriers may 
be removed as a result of the emergence of a 'window of opportunity' for transformation. 
Transformations may occur at different scales which means that the opportunities for 
transformation may occur at the watershed scale, or arise from a broader scale (e.g. regional, 
national, or even global) (Folke et al. 2010). The current paradigm of productivist agriculture 
that is supported by agri-environmental policies in Alberta, and more broadly in Canada, may be 
challenged. The reported social context from the field study is not well-aligned with the 
underlying assumptions of social norms and values that these policies represent. Following 
Roland's (2004) description of building tension as slow-moving institutions (social norms and 
values) become increasingly misaligned with those supported by policies, eventually a threshold, 
or opportunity for transformation, is reached and policy change occurs that may lead to a new 
paradigm, such as (but not necessarily) post-productivist agriculture. Policies are modified or 
new policies are implemented that create a better alignment between social context and policy. 
The degree of dissonance between social norms and values and policy that is required to reach 
the threshold is unclear. Also unclear is the potential for ecological and economic thresholds that 
may create transformational opportunities. Application of other cases where thresholds were 
reached and transformations occurred, including the thresholds database maintained by the 
Resilience Alliance (Walker and Meyers 2004), would provide a clearer picture of how 
important current barriers in the study region are to implementing performance-based approaches 
and where thresholds may exist within the social-ecological system of the region. 
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 Appendix A: Pre-interview letter sent to watershed 
Indianfarm Creek Watershed, Battersea Drain, and Whelp Creek 
 
School of Environment and Sustainability
 
January 21, 2010 
 
Dear _______; 
 
My name is Julia Baird; I am a graduate student at the University of
my PhD thesis, I am working on a project titled “A performance
environmental policy: Development and comparative assessment”. As a part of this project, I 
invite your participation in a short interview tha
convenience.  
 
Your opinions and attitudes toward water quality issues and agriculture will be an important part 
of the project. The responses you provide will guide the development of an effective approach to 
environmental policy for agriculture that will be compared to the current programs available to 
agricultural producers.  
 
You have been chosen as a participant based on your location. There are three sub
that will be studied: Indianfarm Creek and Batters
near Lacombe, AB. I am interested in understanding how your opinions may compare to those in 
other watersheds and to rural and urban residents that do not reside in any of the three sub
watersheds. 
 
I have attached a standard University of Saskatchewan ‘participant consent form’ for your 
review. I will call you to follow up in a week to determine your interest in participating in 
this research and to schedule a time and place to complete the interview
questions at any time, please feel free to contact me by phone at (403) 454
julia.baird@usask.ca. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Julia Baird 
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Appendix B: Consent form and interview script 
 
Consent Form for Researcher-Administered Survey 
 
“A performance-based approach to agri-environmental policy: Development and 
comparative assessment” 
 
Please read this letter carefully, and feel free to ask any questions you might have. I will review 
this information with you at the time of survey administration. 
 
Researcher:  Julia Baird, School of Environment and Sustainability, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK. Phone: 403-454-6556, E-mail: 
julia.baird@usask.ca 
 
Supervisors:  Dr. Ken Belcher, School of Environment and Sustainability, University of 
Saskatchewan. Phone: 306-966-4019, E-mail: ken.belcher@usask.ca 
 
Dr. Mike Quinn, Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Calgary, 
Calgary, AB. Phone: 403-220-7013, E-mail: quinn@ucalgary.ca 
 
 
Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to understand and evaluate the viewpoints 
of residents of southern Alberta regarding water quality and environmental policies for 
agriculture. You are invited to participate in an interview to convey your opinions on the 
importance you place on water quality, your perception of how agriculture contributes to water 
quality, and how you think environmental policy can be best designed to manage water in 
agricultural regions. 
 
The survey will take approximately 30 minutes to complete, and will be audio taped as a 
secondary source of information where clarification is needed. Results of the interview will be 
aggregated and be used to evaluate similarities or dissimilarities between direct stakeholders, 
rural and urban residents. Overall, the results will guide the development of an alternative 
approach to environmental policy for agriculture with the Indianfarm Creek sub-watershed as the 
case study, and will be scaled up to a whole watershed level. Your participation in this survey 
will provide valuable insight into how stakeholders and the public can participate in the 
development of public policy. This research is funded federally by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council and also by the University of Saskatchewan. 
 
Potential Risks: There are no potential risks in participating in this study. Your name will not be 
used and results will be aggregated so that individual responses cannot be identified.  
 
Potential Benefits: There are no direct benefits in participating in this study to you as an 
individual. The results in aggregate form will be shared with other respondents, federal and 
provincial agencies, academics and in thesis form for the School of Environment and 
Sustainability at the University of Saskatchewan in order to advance the sustainability of 
agricultural environmental policy. 
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Storage of Data: Completed interviews, researcher notes and results saved on a dedicated hard 
drive will be stored in the researcher’s office during data analysis. Once complete, these data will 
be stored in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s possession for a minimum of five years and until 
all reports, presentations, publications and the thesis have been produced and distributed. Only 
the researcher and supervisors will have access to this data.  
 
Confidentiality: The responses you provide will be aggregated with others and used only in 
aggregate form. Your identity will be kept confidential at all times. If direct quotations are to be 
used, you will be asked to verify the quotation and give consent for the researcher to use it. No 
names will be used at any time. 
 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary and you may 
withdraw from this study for any reason, at any time. If you withdraw, any information provided 
to that point will be used unless you request that all information provided be removed. 
 
Questions: You may contact the researcher with questions at any time using the contact 
information listed above. This study has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on November 10, 2009. Any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant can be directed to the Board through the Ethics office (306-
966-2084). You may call collect. All participants will receive a summary of the results once the 
study is complete and results will be presented at watershed meetings by the researcher. 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above. I have been 
provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered 
satisfactorily. By completion of this interview, I consent to participate in the study described 
above; understanding that I may withdraw this consent under the terms outlined above. 
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Researcher-Administered Survey for Watershed Residents 
 
Name ________________________________________    Audio record? Yes  No     
 
 
1) Tell me a bit about your farm/ranch (what crops do you grow, what type of livestock do you 
raise, how much land do you farm, do you farm with family) 
 
READ: I’m going to give you some background information before we go on. Agriculture has 
been credited with producing “ecological goods and services” in addition to crops or livestock. 
Ecological goods and services are environmental and social benefits that are either by-products 
of agricultural activities, or else they are purposely produced on agricultural land. Some 
examples of ecological goods and services are things like carbon storage (from zero tillage or 
pasture management), wildlife habitat (from conserving natural areas) and water filtration (from 
grassed waterways and wetlands). Some believe that farmers and ranchers should be 
compensated for producing ecological goods and services, including compensation for water 
quality improvements. 
 
We’ll use water quality as a focus for our discussion.  
 
2) How would you rate surface water quality in your area? Examples of surface water are creeks, 
rivers, ponds and lakes. (Choose one) 
 
__ very bad 
__ bad 
__ somewhat bad 
__ neutral 
__ somewhat good 
__ good 
__ very good 
 
3) I’m going to read a list of activities that use surface water. Which of the following activities 
do you personally use surface water for? (choose all that apply) 
 
__ recreation (examples are fishing, swimming, boating) 
__ water source for livestock 
__ visual enjoyment 
__ irrigation of crops 
__ drinking water for human consumption 
__ other: (please specify): _______________________________________ 
__ do not use surface water 
 
*Give scale for question 4* 
4) How important is it to have good surface water quality for each of the activities you chose? 
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Please use the scale I gave you to rate the importance of good water quality for each use that I 
read.  
 
Scale: 
1 = not important at all 
2 = somewhat important 
3 = moderately important 
4 = very important 
 
___ recreation (examples are fishing, swimming, boating) 
___ water source for livestock 
___ visual enjoyment 
___ irrigation of crops 
___ drinking water for human consumption 
___ other: (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
5) How concerned are you about surface water quality in your area? (Check one) 
 
__ completely unconcerned 
__ unconcerned 
__ somewhat unconcerned 
__ neutral 
__ somewhat concerned 
__ concerned 
__ very concerned 
 
READ: Now I have a few questions about changes in management practices that you’ve made to 
your operation for improving water quality. There will be separate opportunities to discuss 
changes supported by financial incentives and changes that were voluntary.  
 
(An example if needed to clarify: spring fertilizer/manure application rather than fall application) 
 
6) Have you participated in any government cost-sharing programs WHERE YOU WERE 
REIMBURSED to improve water quality? (Some examples are the Shelterbelt Program, 
Greencover Canada and the Canada-Alberta Farm Stewardship Program) 
 
Yes     No 
 
7) If so, what changes have you made (please list/briefly explain)? 
 
If not, why not? 
 
8) Have you noticed any differences because of those changes (yes/no for each change and brief 
description)? 
(Some examples of differences might be lower fertilizer costs or less topsoil erosion)  
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9) Have you made changes to your management practices to improve water quality WITHOUT 
receiving any compensation (for example, based on information from government or from non-
profit groups like the nature conservancy or ducks unlimited, by participating in an 
environmental farm plan, or on your own)? 
 
Yes    No 
  
a) IF YES, what were the changes (list)? Why did you decide to make these changes (brief 
explanation for each one, or if there are many, an overall sense)?  
 
b) IF NOT, would you make changes that would improve water quality even if no compensation 
were offered (briefly explain answer)? 
 
Yes    No 
 
10) If the respondent HAS participated in programs: 
 
a) In your opinion, what was the best program you participated in? Why was it the best? 
 
b) What was the worst program you participated in? What made it the worst? 
 
11) If the respondent HAS NOT participated in any programs: 
 
a) Are there any programs that you’ve heard about that sounded like good programs? Why did 
they sound good? 
 
b) Are there any programs that you’ve heard about that you think were poorly designed? Why? 
 
*Give scale for question 12* 
12) When farmers and ranchers use practices that improve water quality, how much do different 
groups benefit, in your opinion? I’ll give you a list of different groups, please rate each group 
with a number from the scale given to you: 
 
Scale: 
1 = does not benefit at all 
2 = benefits somewhat 
3 = benefits moderately 
4 = benefits significantly 
 
 
___ the general public 
___ the farmer or rancher that adopts the practice 
___ those downstream that use the water 
___ other, specify:________________________________________________________ 
 
*give scale for question 13* 
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13) Who should be responsible for making sure that water quality is maintained at an acceptable 
level on agricultural land? (Please rate each group with a number from the scale given to you): 
 
Scale: 
1 = not responsible at all 
2 = somewhat responsible 
3 = moderately responsible 
4 = very responsible 
 
___ government 
___ agricultural landowners  
___ those downstream that use the water 
___ non-profit organizations that are concerned about water quality 
___ general public 
___ other: (please specify) __________________________________________________ 
 
*Give scale for question 14* 
14) People have a range of different opinions about agriculture and the environment. I am going 
to read some statements to you that represent these different opinions. I’d like you to rate how 
you feel about the statements on a scale of 1-7 given to you. (Provide the respondent with a 
description of the scale on a separate paper so that they have a reference) I am also interested to 
hear the reasoning behind your answer. 
 
Scale: 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Somewhat disagree 
4 = Neutral 
5 = Somewhat agree 
6 = Agree 
7 = Strongly agree 
 
___ The government should create policy and programs for farmers and ranchers to make sure 
that water quality is maintained at an acceptable level 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers are stewards (or, put another way, caretakers) of the land 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers are responsible for the environmental effects of their production 
methods 
 
___ When the public benefits from ecological goods and services produced by farmers and 
ranchers, the public should pay for these benefits. (For example, if a farmer or rancher makes a 
change to improve water quality, the public should pay the producer based on how much water 
quality is improved.) 
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___ Farmers and ranchers should be able to choose whether or not they participate in programs 
that aim to increase ecological goods and services. 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers have the right to use any management practice they choose on their 
land 
 
___ My taxes should not be increased to pay for ecological goods and services produced by 
agriculture 
 
___ The public should pay more for food that is produced using methods where ecological goods 
and services are also produced 
 
___ Payments should be made for ecological goods and services produced in the future, not those 
produced in the past. 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers should be paid for the ecological goods and services they produce, 
regardless of whether or not they incur additional expenses in producing them. 
 
READ: In the past, the government has provided some incentive programs for farmers and 
ranchers to improve environmental conditions. These have mainly taken the form of payments to 
offset the costs associated with adopting management practices that are more environmentally 
beneficial or less environmentally damaging. There are, however, many different ways that 
environmental improvements can be encouraged. 
 
15) Let’s say a government program was introduced for farmers and ranchers that encouraged 
improvements to water quality. In your opinion, what characteristics would be important to have 
as a part of the program?  
 
Instructions: Rate the following list of characteristics for their importance in being included in 
an environmental program. You have up to 10 points to give each characteristic. The number of 
points you give each characteristic will indicate its importance to you (more important 
characteristics should receive more points). If you feel some characteristics are not important at 
all, give them 0 points.  
 
______ provides financial incentives for farmers and ranchers 
______ helps ensure survival of rural communities 
______improves water quality to meet safety guidelines for animals and aquatic life 
______reduces health risk to humans from water contamination 
______lowest possible cost to taxpayers 
______no negative financial impact to farmers and ranchers 
______provides the most environmental benefits possible with the least cost 
______all farmers and ranchers should be eligible for program 
______improves water quality for recreation (examples: swimming, fishing, boating) 
______sustains water resources for future generations 
______other: (please specify)______________________________________________ 
______other: (please specify) ______________________________________________ 
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Demographics 
 
I have just a few more questions about you and your household. 
 
16) Watershed respondent resides in: (Check one)  
a) Indianfarm Creek 
b) Battersea Drain 
c) Whelp Creek 
 
17)What is your age? (Check one) 
a) 18-25 
b) 26-35 
c) 36-45 
d) 46-55 
e) 56-65 
f) 66-75 
e) 76+ 
 
18)Main occupation (if more than one, the occupation that provides the majority of your 
income): 
  
19) What is the percentage of total household income that comes from agricultural production? 
 
20)Do you have children? 
 
Yes    No 
  
If so, what are their ages (please list)? 
 
21) Do you think that someone from your family (children or grandchildren) will eventually take 
over the farm/ranch? 
 
Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
 
Thank you for your time! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix C: Consent form and survey instrument
 
School of Environment and Sustainability
 
 
I am a graduate student at the University of Saskatchewan. As a part of my PhD thesis, I am 
working on a project titled “A performance
Development and comparative assessment”. As a part of this project, I invi
in a short questionnaire.  
 
Your opinions and attitudes toward water quality issues and agriculture will be an important part 
of the project. The responses you provide will guide the development of an effective approach to 
environmental policy for agriculture that will be compared to the current programs available to 
agricultural producers.  
 
You have been chosen as a participant based on your location. This research study will focus on 
three watersheds in Alberta: Indianfarm Creek and
Creek in central Alberta. These watersheds represent the range of agricultural activities that take 
place in Alberta and together will provide a good understanding of the views of agricultural 
producers in the province. 
 
I have attached a standard University of Saskatchewan ‘participant consent form’ below for your 
review. Please read the form carefully before proceeding with the questionnaire. A self
addressed, stamped envelope has been provided for you to return th
you.  
 
Participant Consent Form
 
Please read this letter carefully, and feel free to ask any questions you might have.
 
Researcher:  Julia Baird, School of Environment and Sustainability, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon,
julia.baird@usask.ca
 
Supervisors:  Dr. Ken Belcher, School of Environment and Sustainability, University of 
Saskatchewan. Phone: 306
 
Dr. Mike Quinn, Faculty of Environmental Design,
Calgary, AB. Phone: 403
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Letter of Invitation 
-based approach to agri-environmental policy: 
te your participation 
 Battersea Drain in the south, and Whelp 
e questionnaire at no cost to 
 
 SK. Phone: 403-454-6556, E-mail: 
 
-966-4019, E-mail: ken.belcher@usask.ca
 University of Calgary, 
-220-7013, E-mail: quinn@ucalgary.ca 
 
-
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Purpose and Procedure: The purpose of this study is to understand and evaluate the viewpoints 
of residents of southern Alberta regarding water quality and environmental policies for 
agriculture. You are invited to participate in a questionnaire to convey your opinions on the 
importance you place on water quality, your perception of how agriculture contributes to water 
quality, and how you think environmental policy can be best designed to manage water in 
agricultural regions. 
The questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Results will be 
aggregated and be used to evaluate similarities or dissimilarities between agricultural producers, 
and rural and urban residents. Overall, the results will guide the development of an alternative 
approach to environmental policy for agriculture. Your participation in this survey will provide 
valuable insight into how stakeholders and the public can participate in the development of 
public policy. This research is funded federally by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council, the Agriculture-Environment Policy Research Network and also by the University of 
Saskatchewan. 
Potential Risks: There are no potential risks in participating in this study. Your name will not be 
used and results will be aggregated so that individual responses cannot be identified.  
Potential Benefits: There are no direct benefits in participating in this study to you as an 
individual. The results in aggregate form will be shared with other respondents, federal and 
provincial agencies, academics and in thesis form for the School of Environment and 
Sustainability at the University of Saskatchewan in order to advance the sustainability of 
agricultural environmental policy. 
Storage of Data: Questionnaires and results on a dedicated hard drive will be stored in the 
researcher’s office during data analysis. These data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the 
researcher’s possession for at least five years until all publications have been distributed. Only 
the researcher and supervisors will have access to this data.  
Confidentiality: The responses you provide will be aggregated with others and used only in 
aggregate form. Your identity will be kept confidential at all times. 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this questionnaire is completely voluntary and you 
may withdraw from this study for any reason, at any time.  
Questions: You may contact the researcher with questions at any time using the contact 
information listed above. This study has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on November 10, 2009. Any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant can be directed to the Board through the Ethics office (306-
966-2084). You may call collect. All participants may receive a summary of the results once the 
study is complete. 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above. I have been 
provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered 
satisfactorily. By completing this questionnaire, I consent to participate in the study described 
above; understanding that I may withdraw this consent under the terms outlined above. 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
  
Survey 
 
Water quality can be a concern in agricultural areas. The first few questions of this survey will 
focus on surface water quality. Examples of surface water include creeks, rivers, ponds and 
lakes.  
Surface water quality can be negatively affected by agricultural fertilizers and animal manure. 
For example, fertilizers can increase concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus in surface water, 
which can affect the survival of aquatic life and increase the growth of algae. Manure can 
contribute bacteria to surface water that is harmful to human health if ingested.  
 
1. How would you rate surface water quality in your area (water that you see or use regularly)? 
(Check one) 
 
__ very bad 
__ bad 
__ somewhat bad 
__ neutral 
__ somewhat good 
__ good 
__ very good 
 
2. What do you use surface water for? (check all that apply) 
 
__ recreation (examples are fishing, swimming, boating) 
__ water source for livestock 
__ visual enjoyment 
__ irrigation of crops 
__ drinking water for human consumption 
__ other: (please specify)_____________________________ 
__ I do not use surface water 
 
3. How important is it to have good surface water quality for each of the following uses? 
Please use the scale in the grey box on the right to rate the importance of good water quality for 
each use. Write the number from the scale that corresponds to the importance you place on water 
quality for each use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__ recreation (examples: fishing, swimming, boating) 
__ water source for livestock 
__ visual enjoyment 
__ irrigation of crops 
__ drinking water for human consumption 
__ other: (please specify)_______________________ 
 
Scale: 
1 = completely unimportant 
2 = unimportant 
3 = somewhat unimportant 
4 = neutral 
5 = somewhat important 
6 = important 
7 = very important 
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4. How concerned are you about surface water quality in your area? (Check one) 
 
__ completely unconcerned 
__ unconcerned 
__ somewhat unconcerned 
__ neutral 
__ somewhat concerned 
__ concerned 
__ very concerned 
 
Please read before answering questions below: Agriculture has been credited with producing 
“ecological goods and services” in addition to crops or livestock. Ecological goods and services 
are environmental and social benefits that are by-products of agricultural practices, or else 
benefits purposely produced on agricultural land. Some examples of ecological goods and 
services are things like carbon storage (from zero tillage or pasture conservation), wildlife habitat 
(from conserving natural areas) and water filtration (from grassed waterways and wetlands). 
Often, the production of ecological goods and services has benefits that extend beyond the farm 
that produces them to the general public. 
 
5. Different groups may benefit when agricultural producers adopt management practices that 
improve surface water quality. In your opinion, how much do the groups below benefit? Please 
rate each group with a number from the scale in the grey box on the right. 
 
 
__ the general public 
__ the farmer that adopts the practice 
__ those downstream of the farmer 
__ other: (please specify) _____________________ 
 
6. Who should be responsible for ensuring that water quality is maintained at an acceptable level 
in agricultural landscapes? (Please rate each group with a number from the scale in the grey box 
on the right) 
 
__ governments 
__ agricultural landowners  
__ those that use the water directly 
__ non-profit organizations focused on water quality 
__ general public 
__ other: (please specify) ______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale: 
1 = not responsible at all 
2 = somewhat responsible 
3 = moderately responsible 
4 = very responsible 
 
Scale: 
1 = does not benefit at all 
2 = benefits somewhat 
3 = benefits moderately 
4 = benefit significantly 
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7. People have different perspectives about agriculture and the environment. Some statements 
that represent these different perspectives are presented below. I’d like you to rate how you feel 
about the statements using the scale in the grey box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please read each statement carefully and put the number corresponding to your feeling next to 
each statement. 
 
___ The government should create policy and programs for farmers and ranchers to make sure 
that water quality is maintained at an acceptable level 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers are stewards (or, put another way, caretakers) of the land 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers are responsible for the environmental effects of their production 
methods 
 
___ When the public benefits from ecological goods and services produced by farmers and 
ranchers, the public should pay for these benefits. (For example, if a farmer or rancher makes a 
change to improve water quality, the public should pay the producer based on how much water 
quality is improved.) 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers should be able to choose whether or not they participate in programs 
that aim to increase ecological goods and services. 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers have the right to use any management practice they choose on their 
land 
 
___ My taxes should not be increased to pay for ecological goods and services produced by 
agriculture 
 
___ The public should pay more for food that is produced using methods where ecological goods 
and services are also produced 
 
___ Payments should be made for ecological goods and services produced in the future, not those 
produced in the past. 
 
___ Farmers and ranchers should be paid for the ecological goods and services they produce, 
regardless of whether or not they incur additional expenses in producing them. 
 
Scale: 
1 = strongly disagree       5 = somewhat agree 
2 = disagree   6 = agree 
3 = somewhat disagree 7 = strongly agree 
4 = neutral    
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Read before answering question: Federal and provincial governments have provided some 
programs to agricultural producers to improve environmental conditions. These have mainly 
taken the form of payments to offset the costs associated with adopting management practices 
that are more environmentally beneficial or less environmentally damaging. There are, however, 
many different ways that environmental improvements can be encouraged. 
 
8. Let’s say a government program was introduced for agricultural producers that encouraged 
improvements to surface water quality. In your opinion, what characteristics would be important 
to have as a part of the program? Please read the directions below before answering this 
question. 
 
 
Directions to answer this question: 
Rate the following list of characteristics for their importance in being included in an 
environmental program. You have up to 10 points to give each characteristic. The number of 
points you give each characteristic will indicate its importance to you (more important 
characteristics should receive more points). If you feel some characteristics are not important at 
all, give them 0 points.  
 
______ provides financial incentives for farmers and ranchers 
______ helps ensure survival of rural communities 
______improves water quality to meet safety guidelines for animals and aquatic life 
______reduces health risk to humans from water contamination 
______lowest possible cost to taxpayers 
______no negative financial impact to farmers and ranchers 
______provides the most environmental benefits possible with the least cost 
______all farmers and ranchers should be eligible for program 
______improves water quality for recreation (examples: swimming, fishing, boating) 
______sustains water resources for future generations 
_____ other: (please specify) _____________________________________________ 
_____ other: (please specify) _____________________________________________ 
_____ other: (please specify) _____________________________________________ 
 
 
Finally, a few questions about you and your household: 
 
9. What is your age? (Check one) 
__18-25 
__ 26-35 
__ 36-45 
__ 46-55 
__ 56-65 
__ 66-75 
__ 76+ 
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10. What is your main occupation (if more than one, the occupation that provides the majority of 
your income): 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. If you are an agricultural producer, what activities occur on your land (both leased and 
owned)? Please write the approximate percentage of your total household income that each 
activity listed below provides.  
 
(If you are not an agricultural producer, you may skip to question 13) 
 
_____ Annual crop production 
_____ Perennial crop production 
_____ Feedlot operation 
_____ Cow/calf operation 
_____ Dairy operation 
_____ Hog operation 
_____ Chicken production 
_____ Other (please specify): ____________________________________________ 
 
12. If you are an agricultural producer, what is the approximate percentage of total household 
income that comes from agricultural production? 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
13. Do you have children? (Check one) 
 
__ Yes 
__ No 
 
If so, what are their ages? (Please list) 
 
_________  __________  ____________ ___________ 
 
_________  __________  ____________ ___________ 
 
 
14. Please provide any additional comments you wish to make. These comments can be general 
or about a specific response you gave in the survey: 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey!  
 
Please fill out the address card in the return envelope if you wish to receive a report 
summarizing the results of this survey. 
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Appendix D: Legislated and voluntary measures in Alberta to manage 
water quality on agricultural landscapes 
 
 
Table D-1. Summary of Alberta legislative context related to agriculture and water quality 
 
Act Potential impact on agriculture Scope 
Agricultural 
Operations 
Practices Act 
-new large livestock operations require 
approvals 
-sets out a standard of 'generally accepted 
agricultural practices' but does not define 
them 
-Agricultural nuisance 
claims  
-Manure management 
Alberta Land 
Stewardship 
Act 
-Created the necessary legislation for the 
Alberta Land Use Framework 
-Each of seven regions must institute a land 
use plan that may include market-based 
instruments and actions on private lands to 
achieve conservation and stewardship goals  
-Province of Alberta 
with the seven regions 
delineated by 
watershed boundaries 
-Manages economic, 
environmental and 
social goals 
Environmental 
Protection and 
Enhancement 
Act (EPEA) 
- Restricts release of pesticides and manure 
into water bodies 
-Codes of practice around pesticide handling 
-Requirement to obtain approval for new 
confined feeding operations 
-Potentially harmful 
substances in water 
bodies 
  
Water Act -Created the necessary legislation for water 
management planning at the watershed scale 
-Created legislative capacity for Water For 
Life provincial water management strategy  
-Water allocation and 
conservation in Alberta 
Wildlife Act -Requires recovery plans for specific species 
-Restricts activities on critical habitat for 
species at risk 
 
-Critical habitat lands 
where recovery plans 
have been created for 
species at risk 
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Table D-2. Voluntary agri-environmental programs related to water quality currently provided 
by Canadian and Alberta governments and non-governmental organizations1 
 Program 
Agency Name Characteristics Length 
Funded by federal government under “Growing Forward” policy framework 
Government 
of Alberta 
Stewardship 
Plans: 
Integrated 
Crop 
Management 
(ICM); 
Grazing and 
Winter 
Feeding 
Management; 
and Manure 
Management 
Objective: Demonstrate environmental practices 
and make operational improvements that reduce 
environmental impacts (including water quality 
impacts) 
Structure: Develop a work plan based on 
approved practices (for example, off-site 
watering system purchase or groundwater 
monitoring near manure storage). An 
Environmental Farm Plan must be completed 
prior to applying for these plans 
Payment: 50/50 cost share up to a maximum 
from $15,000-$50,000 depending on plan 
Follow-up: Information not available 
2009-2013 
(or until 
funds have 
been 
exhausted) 
Agri-
Environment 
Services 
Branch 
(federal) 
Prairie 
Shelterbelt 
Program 
Objective: Conserve water and, more broadly, to 
promote environmental stewardship and BMPs 
Structure: Trees are provided for all landowners 
with the completion of a shelterbelt plan 
Payment: Trees are free; labour and all other 
costs are the responsibility of the landowner 
Follow-up: Applicant agrees to on-site 
inspection 
Ongoing 
since 1901 
Government 
of Alberta  
Water 
Management 
Program 
Objective: Create long-term water management 
plans to ensure water quality and quantity in the 
future 
Structure: Agricultural landowners must create a 
plan (proposed improvements to meet quantity 
and quality goals). Landowners with approved 
plans are eligible to apply for grants for specific 
projects outlined in the plan 
Payment: 1/3 cost share up to $5,000 
Follow-up: Inspections may occur; if non-
2009-2013 
161 
  
compliant, funding forfeiture and prosecution 
Agriculture 
and Agri-
Food Canada 
Sustainable 
Agriculture 
Environment 
Systems 
Objective: To accelerate development of BMPs 
to manage water and climate adaptation 
Structure: Funding for researchers to develop 
BMPs 
Payment: No payments for agricultural 
producers, this program creates new BMPs 
2009-2013 
Agricultural 
Research and 
Extension 
Council of 
Alberta 
Sustainable 
Grazing 
Mentorship 
Objective: Match agricultural producers with 
mentors to improve profitability and health of 
pastures and manage environmental issues on 
pasture land 
Structure: For a fee, producers are matched with 
a mentor and a grazing plan is developed 
together 
Payment: Producers pay $100 for up to 16 hours 
of consultation 
Information 
not 
available 
Alberta 
Agriculture 
and Rural 
Development 
Environmental 
Farm Plan 
(EFP) 
Objective: Develop whole farm plans that 
identify environmental risks and mitigate them, 
as well as find opportunities to improve 
operations 
Structure: Agricultural producers create an EFP 
by working through a guided process including 
facilitated workshops and a workbook. Once a 
plan to alleviate environment risks is in place, 
agricultural producers can apply for federal 
programs that provide cost-sharing funding. 
Payment: None. Process is voluntary and 
provided at no cost to the producer. An EFP is 
required for some cost-sharing programs 
Follow-up: None. Participants are not required to 
complete any tasks set out in EFP. Proof of 
completion of the plan is required to apply for 
some government programs 
Since 2003 
in Alberta 
Many funding partners (Public and private)2 
Alberta 
Riparian 
Habitat 
Management 
Cows and Fish 
Program 
Objective: Manage riparian areas through 
awareness and education 
Structure: Provide baseline assessments of 
Since 1992 
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Society riparian areas, monitoring services, and provide 
educational and technical assistance for 
implementing measures to improve riparian 
zones. Work generally occurs at the watershed 
scale. 
Payment: None. Provide educational material 
and technical assistance at no charge to the 
landowner 
Alberta Fish 
and Game 
Association 
Parkland 
Stewardship 
Program 
Objective: Educate rural landowners to improve 
wildlife habitat and ecological values of rural 
land 
Structure: Provides air photos, natural resource 
inventories, surface water quality monitoring 
tools, conservation plans and site-specific best 
management practices. 
Payment: None. Offers assistance at no charge. 
Information 
not 
available 
Southern 
Alberta Land 
Trust Society 
Conservation 
Easements 
Objective: Conserve ecologically sensitive 
rangeland in southern Alberta 
Structure: Offers conservation easements that 
maintain important ecological, social, 
agricultural, scenic and historic functions of the 
land by restricting activities on it in perpetuity or 
outright purchases of land from agricultural 
landowners 
Payment: Variable, depending on the agreement, 
but up to the full market value of a parcel of 
land. In the case of conservation easements, the 
value of the easement (forgone income) becomes 
a tax credit 
Follow-up: Participants must ensure donations 
meet requirements for tax credits 
Since 1998 
Ducks 
Unlimited 
Canada 
(DUC) 
Conserving 
Your 
Agricultural 
Land 
Objective: To create suitable habitat for 
waterfowl (these activities also have a positive 
impact on water quality, even though this is not 
the explicit focus) 
Structure: Offers a number of options for 
landowners, including transitioning from 
cropland to perennial cover, planting native and 
Since 1938 
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tame grasses, and land-use exchange 
Payment: There are incentive payments for the 
transition to perennial cover, a discounted price 
for grass seed, and the land-use exchange is a 
straight trade between conservation of the 
landowner’s sensitive lands and suitable 
agricultural land owned by DUC 
Follow-up: Information not available 
1 Current as of April, 2011 
2This list is not exhaustive, but provides examples of the types of programs offered to 
agricultural producers by NGOs 
(AAFC 2011; DUC 2011; AARD 2011; Alberta Riparian Habitat Management Society 2011; 
AFGA 2011; SALTS 2011) 
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